OPINION

WILLIAM J. MARTINI, District Judge.

Counterclaim Defendant J.G. and Third-Party Defendants N.G. and V.G. filed a motion for summary judgment, seeking an order to dismiss Third-Party Plaintiff C.M.'s claims against them. For the reasons set forth below, the motion is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART.

I. BACKGROUND

This case arises out of J.G.'s allegations that his older cousin, C.M., sexually abused him when J.G. was a minor. (Counterclaim Defendant's and Third-Party Defendants' Statement of Material Facts ("Opposition SOF") at ¶ 1) C.M. filed a Counterclaim and added J.G.'s sister, N.G., and theft mother, V.G., as Third-Party Defendants. (Opposition SOF at ¶ 2) C.M.'s Counterclaim and Third-Party Complaint ("C.M.'s Complaint") seeks damages for defamation, civil conspiracy, intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress, and tortious interference with an economic advantage. (Opposition SOF at ¶ 2)

J.G. alleges that C. M. sexually abused him multiple times between 1995 and 1999, when J.G. was between the ages of seven and eleven. (Opposition SOF at ¶ 5; J.G.'s Amended Complaint at ¶ 5) The abuse occurred in the home where C.M. lived with his mother, the aunt of J.G. and N.G. C.M. alleges that J.G., N.G., and V.G. made an agreement to extort money from C.M. and defame him with false alIegations of sexual abuse. (See C.M.'s Complaint at ¶ 40)

On December 7, 2009, J.G. called his mother, V.G., and told her that C.M. had sexually abused him. (C.M.'s Supplemental Statement of Facts ("C.M.'s SOF") at ¶¶ 11. 9-10) N.G. learned of J.G.'s accusations against C.M. through V.G. and J.G. (C.M.'s SOF at ¶¶ 12-14) V.G. and a friend, Mary Jo Lynch, then made a series of threatening phone callsto C.M. telling him to stay away from J.G. and N.G. (C.M.'s SOF at ¶¶ 21-29) C. M. sent N.G. a message to ask her what was happening. (C. M.'s SOF at ¶ 30) In response, N.G. sent C.M. a Facebook message that said:

(C.M.'s SOF at ¶ 31)1

C.M. alleges that J.G., N.G., and V.G. then told other family members that C.M. was a chiId molester. (C.M.'s SOF at ¶¶ 35-40)

V.G. and N.G. al so drove together to the office of Dr. Stephanie Pope, one of C.M.'s friends, to inform her that C.M. had sexually abused J.G. (See C.M.'s SOF at ¶¶ 45-49) This occurred, according to Dr. Pope, in late February or Early March 2011. (Declaration of Andrew Macklin ("Macklin Decl.") Exhibit N)

On April 26, 2011, V.G. sent a letter to State Senator Sandra Cunningham. (Def's SOF at ¶ 17; Certification of Michael Kassak, Esq., ("Kassak Cert.") Exhibit K) At the time, C. M. was Cunningham's Chief of Staff. (C.M.'s Complaint at ¶ 19) The letter told Cunningham that C. M. had sexually abused V.G.'s son. (Kassak Cert. Exhibit K) V.G. asked Cunningham to take "appropriate" action. (Kassak Cert. Exhibit K) As a result of V.G.'s accusations, Cunningham terminated C.M. (Macklin Decl. Exhibit C, Deposition of Sandra Cunningham at 58:2-8) C.M. was unemployed for approximately 10 months afterwards. (See Kassak Cert. Exhibit H, Deposition of C.M. at 12:9-14) C.M. eventually found a new job as the Executive Director of the Trenton Downtown Association. (Deposition of C.M. at 11:1-22) His new position pays $5,000 to $10,000 less than his position with Senator Cunningham. (Deposition of C.M. at 225:13-17) C.M. al I eges that it wi I I be di ffi cult or impossible to reach his long-term aspiration of holding elected office because of the allegedly defamatory statements. (Deposition of C.M. at 226:24-228:11)

As a result of J.G.'s allegations, C.M. sought psychotherapy in June 2011. (See C.M.'s SOF at ¶ 77; Kassak Cert. Exhibit S, Deposition of Miriam Si I verman, LSCW at 24:5-10) C.M.'s therapist conducted a mental health evaluation. (Deposition of Miriam Silverman at 28:15-22) His therapist diagnosed him with moderate-level M or Depressive Disorder. (C.M.'s SOF at 1177-78) His therapist testified that he suffered from this condition as of March 2013. (C.M.'s SOF at ¶ 78)

II. LEGAL STANDARD

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 provides for summary judgment "if the pleadings, the discovery [i ncl udi ng, depositi ons, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file] and disclosure materials on file, and any affidavits show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56; see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986); Turner v. Schering-Plough Corp., 901 F.2d 335, 340 (3d Ci r. 1990). A factual dispute is genuine if a reasonable jury could find for the non-moving party, and is material if it will affect the outcome of the trial under governing substantive law. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). The court considers all evidence and inferences drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Andreoli v. Gates, 482 F.3d 641, 647 (3d Cir. 2007).

III. DISCUSSION

A. Defamation

The statute of limitations on a defamation action is one year. N.J.S.A. 2A:14-3. C.M. concedes that the statute of limitations bars all but two instances of defamation descri bed in his Complaint: the statements V. G. made to Stephanie Pope and the letter to Senator Cunningham. These statements were both made within a year of C.M.'s filling his Countercl aim and Third-Party Complaint.

The statements at issue suffice as evidence of defamation. A defamation claim has three elements: (1) the assertion of a false and defamatory statement concerning another; (2) the unprivileged publication of that statement to a third party; and (3) fault of the publisher. Feggans v. Billington, 291 N.J.Super. 382, 390-91 (App. Div. 1996). Plaintiff must also produce evidence of damages, unless the claim is slander per se. Ward v. Zelikovsky, 136 N.J. 516, 540 (1994).

A slander per se claim has the same el ements as an ordi nary defamati on claim, except that the plaintiff can prove liability for slander per se without evidence of damages. Ibid. The damages in a slander per se cl aim are presumed. Ibid. There are four recognized categories of statements that qualify as slander per se. Id. at 526. These are statement that impute (1) commission of a cri me, (2) contraction of a loathsome di sease, (3) occupational incompetence or misconduct, and (4) unchastity of a woman. Id. at 526. The allegations agai nst C.M., if true, would have made hi mgui I ty of at I east a thi rd degree sexual offense under M aryl and I aw. See Md. Code Ann., Cri m. Law § § 3-301, 3-307. Therefore, the statements in question fit into the category of slander per se. Evi dence of damages is not required on this claim.

C.M. has presented evidence that V.G. intentionally made these false and defamatory statements to Sandra Cunni ngham and Stephanie Pope. The record lacks evidence that J.G. or N.G. made defamatory statements not barred by the statute of limitati ons. For these reasons, the defamati on claims survive with respect to V .G. but not with respect to J.G. or N.G.

B. Negligent I nfliction of Emotional Distress

The elements for a cl aim of negligent infliction of emotional distress are: "(1) the death or seri ous physi cal injury of another caused by defendant's negligenre; (2) a marital or intimate, familial relationship between plaintiff and the injured person; (3) observation of the death or injury at the scene of the accident; and (4) resulting severe emotional distress." Portee v. Jaffee, 84 N.J. 88, 101 (1980). C.M. has not produced evidence of a death or serious inj ury. Therefore, this claim is dismissed.

C. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress

In order to prove a cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress, a plaintiff must prove that (1) the defendant's behavior was intentional or reckless behavior and was intended to produce emotional distress, (2) the defendant's behavior was so outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as atrocious and utterly intolerable in a civilized community, (3) the defendant's behavior proximately caused the plaintiff's distress, and (4) that the emotional distress suffered by plaintiff was so severe that no reasonable person could be expected to endure it. Ingraham v. Ortho-McNeiIPharm., 422 N.J.Super. 12, 19-20 (App. Div. 2011) (citing Buckley v. Trenton Saving Fund Society, 111 N.J. 355 (1988)). J.G., N.G., and V.G. argue that C.M. has failed to produce evidence of severe emotional distress or extreme and outrageous conduct. These arguments are not convincing.

1. Severe Emotional Distress

"Severe emotional distress is a severe and disabling emotional or mental condition which may be generally recognized and diagnosed by trained professionals." Turner v. Wong, 363 N.J.Super. 186, 200 (App. Div. 2003) (citing Taylor v. Metzger, 152 N.J. 490, 515 (1998)). "The emotional distress must be sufficiently substanti al to result in either physi cal illness or serious psychological sequelae." Id. at 200 (citing Aly v. Garcia, 333 N.J.Super. 195, 204 (App. Div. 2000), certif. denied, 167 N.J. 87 (2001)).

In Turner v. Wong, the state court elaborated:

363 N.J. Super. at 200-01.

C.M. did seek psychological counseling as a result of the allegedly false allegations against him. His therapist diagnosed him with moderate-level Major Depressive Disorder, a condition from which he continued to suffer for many months. This descri pti on of this emotional di stress is suffi ciently welI defined and clinical to meet the legal definition of "severe emotional distress."

2. Extreme and Outrageous Conduct

Extreme and outrageous conduct must be "so outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized community." Buckley v. Trenton Saving Fund Soc., 111 N.J. 355, 366 (1988). "[T]he limited scope of the tort tolerates many kinds of unjust, unfair and unkind conduct." Anderson v. DSM N.V., 589 F.Supp.2d 528, 538 (D.N.J. 2008). In McConnell v. State Farm Mut. Ins. Co., this court descri bed the standard in some depth:

61 F.Supp.2d 356, 363 (D.N.J. 1999).

In the versi on of the facts most favorable to C. M., J.G., N.G., and V .G. falsely accused C. M. of sexual abuse and told this same Iie to C. M.'s fri ends, fami I y, and empl oyer. Reasonable mi nds sould find such behavior is extreme and outrageous.

C.M. has produced evidence of all four elements of intentional infliction of emotional distress. Therefore, this count of C.M.'s Complaint survives summary j udgment.

D. Tortious I nterference with an Economic Advantage

There are four requirements for maintaining an action for torti ous interference with an economic advantage. MacDougall v. Weichert, 144 N.J. 380, 404 (1996) (citing Printing Mart-Morristown v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 116 N.J. 739 (1989)). The plaintiff must show evidence that (1) plaintiff had a prospective economic or contractual relationship, (2) defendant acted intentionally or with malice, (3) the i nterference caused the I oss of the prospective gai n, and (4) the I oss caused damage. Id. at 404.

V .G. argues that her statements did not result in the loss of C.M.'s job. Some of Senator Cunni ngham's deposition testimony directly contradicts V.G.'s argument. Cunningham stated:

Cunningham's testi mony is clear evidence that V.G.'s letter played a causal rotein the loss of C.M.'s job. The job he found to reelace his positi on with Senator Cunni ngham pays less. C. M. has thus met his burden of produci ng evidence sufficient to prove torti ous interference with an economic advantage agai nst V . G.

J.G. and N.G. argue that there is no evidence that they participated in any act that caused nterference with C. M.'s empl oyment. C. M. does not dispute that J.G. and N.G. had no di rest contact with Senator Cunningham. For this reason, the court wi I I di smi ss the torti ous interference wi th an economic advantage claim agai nst J.G. and N.G.

E. Civil Conspiracy

A civil conspiracy is "a combination of two or more persons acting in concert to commit an unlawful act, or to commit a lawful act by unlawful means, the principal element of which is an agreement between the parties to infl ict a wrong agai nst or inj ury upon another and an overt act that results in damage." Morgan v. Union Cnty. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders, 268 N.J.Super. 337, 364 (App. Div. 1993). In order to prove the existence of such a conspi racy, a pl ai nti ff need not provide di rect evi dence of the agreement between the conspi rators. Ibid. "The gi st of the claim is not the unlawful agreement, but the underlying wrong which, absent the conspiracy, would give a right of action." I bid. IT] he question whether an agreement exi sts should not be taken from the jury in a civi I conspi racy case so long as there is a possi bi I ity that the jury can infer from the ci rcumstances [that the al I aged conspi rators] had a meeti ng of the mi nds and thus reached an understandi ng to achi eve the conspi racy's objectives." Id. at 365.

J.G., V.G., and N.G. argue that there was no di rest evidence of an agreement. C.M. has produced circumstantial evidence that J.G., N.G., and V.G. all worked together in order to of Iict emotional di stress on C. M., interfere with his career, and defame him with false al legations of sexual abuse. According to C.M., J.G.'s story of sexual abuse is false. J.G. consulted with N.G. and V.G. about the sexual abuse. Then N.G. and V.G. took acts in furtherance of a scheme to defame C.M. and interfere with his career based on J.G.'s false story. This is sufficient circumstantial evi dence from whi ch a jury sould concl ude that three mi nds agreed to harm C. M.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, the motion for summary judgment filed by J.G., N.G., and V.G. is granted in part and denied in part. Thefollowing claims only may proceed to trial:

All other claims are hereby dismissed. An appropriate order follows.