OPINION

STANLEY R. CHESLER, District Judge.

Petitioner is a native and citizen of Ecuador who, after being apprehended in Arizona in 2006, conceded being in the United States illegally but falsely stated that he was a native and citizen of Mexico. Thus, he was removed to Mexico in an expedited fashion under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b). Seven years later, when he got arrested on criminal charges in New York, the immigration officials learned of his illegal reentry into the United States and served him with a notice of reinstatement of removal. When, after being offered an opportunity to contest that reinstatement, he declined to do so, he triggered his removal process. Correspondingly, on January 21, 2014, when his criminal confinement expired, he was released into immigration custody, and the immigration officials. obtained his Ecuadorian passport, which rendered his removal inevitable. However, on March 2, 2014, he expressed fears of being removed to Ecuador, and the immigration officials referred him to the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services "USCIS") for a reasonable fear determination, as they were required to do by 8 C.F.R. § 208.31. Petitioner already had an appropriate interview and is now awaiting the USCIS decision.

Although there are no proceedings pending before an immigration judge or the Board of Immigration Appeals (`BIA"). no petition for review of his order of removal was filed with any circuit court. and no circuit court ever entered a stay of his removal. Petitioner filed the Petition at bar styled as an application by a pre-removal-order detainee to invoke 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) and seek a bond hearing before an immigration judge. (or an outright release). See ECF No. 1. Since, under In re Joseph, 22 I & N. Dec. 799 (BIA 1999), a bond hearing should have automatically been provided to Petitioner had he been a bona fide § 1226(a) detainee, this Court directed the parties to show cause as to why his request should not be granted. See ECF No. 8. The parties complied, and the above-detailed background came to light. See ECF Nos. 9 and 11.

Apprised of Petitioner's § 1226(a) claim, Respondents contend that his detention is governed by 8 U.S.C.S. § 1231(a) and the holding of Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001), since his order of removal was intact and in in full force.1 See ECF No. 9. In Zadvydas, the Supreme Court extended the 90-day removal period by holding that aliens may be detained under § 1231(a) for "a period reasonably necessary to bring about that alien's removal from the United States" Zadvydas, 533 U S at 689 Mindful that this holding could lead to difficult judgment calls in the courts, the Supreme Court. "for the sake of uniform administration in the federal courts." recognized a six-month "presumptively reasonable period of detention." Id. at 700-01 (emphasis supplied). However, the Court stressed. in no ambiguous terms, that even

Id. at 701.2 Respondents, therefore, maintain that Petitioner is not entitled to a bond hearing3 or an outright release since he is well within his Zadvydas period and, in any event, his removal to Ecuador or an alternative country is foreseeable because the sole issue pending before the USCIS is where rather than whether he would be removed.

Traversing to Respondents' position, Petitioner raises two points, both different from that raised in his Petition. On the one hand, he still invokes 1226(a) by alleging that his order of removal is no longer final simply because he is now awaiting the outcome of his USCIS interview, See ECF No. at 3.

On the other hand, he concedes being a § 1231(a) detainee but claims being entitled to habeas relief since [i]t can be reasonably expected that the decision [by the USCIS] following [Petitioner's USCIS] interview [might] take additional ninety days, thereby pushing his [immigration] detainment period over six months. Id.

Both Petitioner's arguments are unavailing.

He cannot qualify as a § 1226(a) detainee. While the finality his removal order could have been eliminated (and his removal period would have ended. reverting him to 1226 pre-removal-order status) had a circuit court ordered a of his removal, and his next Zadvydas-based removal period would not have started until the circuit court would affirm his removal, see Michel v. INS, 119 F.Supp.2d 485, 498 Pa. 2000), nothing in the unambiguous language of 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(1)(B)(ii) allows this Court to equate an administrative interview by the USCIS officials with the injunctive power of a circuit court's order granting stay.4 Therefore, Respondents are correct that Petitioner is a removal-period alien whose detention is governed by § 1231 and Zadvydas.

Petitioner's alternative position, based on § 1231, fares even worse. While he hypothesizes that his immigration custody could, eventually, exceed six months, and maintains that this should entitle him to habeas relief, he errs.5 Since, as of now, Petitioner is within his Zadvydas period, habeas relief is foreclosed. Moreover, even if he remains in immigration custody for over six months. Zadvydas would he inapplicable to him. The analysis in Zadvydas does not turn on a mere span of time. it turns on the inverted relationship between the foreseeability of Petitioner's removal and the length of his immigration detention. See Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 701. Here, the submissions at bar indicate that his removal is not merely foreseeable, it is forthcoming. Since he is trying to escape the imminence of his removal to Ecuador, and his prior expedited removal to Mexico indicates a possibility of alternative destinations, his § 1231 position is wholly meritless. Therefore, the Petition will be dismissed. Such dismissal will be without prejudice to Petitioner's commencing a new and separate § 2241 action in the event he develops a bona tide claim in light of the guidance provided to him herein. An appropriate Order follows.