PETER G. SHERIDAN, District Judge.
Petitioner Rene Edwards ("Petitioner"), a prisoner confined at New Jersey State Prison in Trenton, New Jersey at the time of filing, has submitted an Amended Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. (ECF No. 3.) For the reasons stated herein, the Amended Petition will be denied.
This Court, affording the state court's factual determinations the appropriate deference, see 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1)
State v. Edwards, No. A-0284-10T4, 2013 WL 163297 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2013).
A Camden County Grand Jury returned an indictment charging Petitioner with second-degree aggravated assault upon Christopher Eife, N.J.S.A 2C:12-1(b)(1) (count one); third-degree aggravated assault upon Larry Robinson, N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1(b)(7) (count two); third-degree subjecting a law enforcement officer, Camden County Sheriffs Officer Eife, to bodily fluid, N.J.S.A. 2C:12-13 (count three); third-degree resisting arrest by using or threatening physical force, N.J.S.A. 2C:29-2(a) (count four); and third-degree aggravated assault on law enforcement officers Eife "and/or" Sheriffs Officer Robinson "and/or" Sheriffs Officer William Murray, N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1(b) (5) (a) (count five). Id. Following a jury trial, Petitioner was acquitted on counts one and three; convicted of the lesser-included offense of simple assault, on count two; convicted on count four; and convicted on count five as it related to Officers Murray and Robinson. Id. The court sentenced Petitioner to a five year term of imprisonment, subject to a parole ineligibility period of two and one-half years, on counts four and five, and to a six-month term of imprisonment on the lesser-included disorderly persons offense on count two, all to run concurrently. Id. These sentences were to run consecutively to Petitioner's sentence for a violation of probation on an earlier conviction. Id.
Petitioner appealed and the Appellate Division affirmed the conviction and sentence. Id. The New Jersey Supreme Court denied the petition for certification, State v. Edwards, 68 A.3d 890 (N.J. 2013), and the United States Supreme Court denied the petition for writ of certiorari. State v. Edwards, 134 S.Ct. 828 (2013). On September 5, 2013, Petitioner filed his original Petition in this case. (ECF No. 1.) Pursuant to various administrative orders from this Court (ECF Nos. 2, 6, 10), Petitioner filed an Amended Petition on December 2, 2013 (ECF No. 3). Thereafter, in April 2014, Petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief ("PCR"), which appears to still be pending in state court. (Resp't's Answer, Ex. 13, ECF No. 28-13.)
As amended by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA"), 28 U.S.C. § 2254 provides, in pertinent part:
28 U.S.C. § 2254.
"§ 2254 sets several limits on the power of a federal court to grant an application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a state prisoner." Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170, 131 S.Ct. 1388, 1398, 179 L. Ed. 2d 557 (2011); Glenn v. Wynder, 743 F.3d 402, 406 (3d Cir. 2014). Section 2254(a) permits a court to entertain only claims alleging that a person is in state custody "in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States." Id.
A federal court's authority to grant habeas relief is further limited when a state court has adjudicated petitioner's federal claim on the merits. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).
A court begins the analysis under § 2254(d)(1) by determining the relevant law clearly established by the Supreme Court. See Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 660 (2004). Clearly established law "refers to the holdings, as opposed to the dicta, of [the Supreme Court's] decisions as of the time of the relevant state-court decision." Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412 (2000). A court must look for "the governing legal principle or principles set forth by the Supreme Court at the time the state court renders its decision." Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 71-72 (2003). "[C]ircuit precedent does not constitute `clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court,' [and] therefore cannot form the basis for habeas relief under AEDPA." Parker, 132 S.Ct. at 2155 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1)).
A decision is "contrary to" a Supreme Court holding within 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1), if the state court applies a rule that "contradicts the governing law set forth in [the Supreme Court's] cases" or if it "confronts a set of facts that are materially indistinguishable from a decision of [the Supreme Court] and nevertheless arrives at a [different result.]" Williams, 529 U.S. at 405-06. Under the "`unreasonable application' clause of § 2254(d)(1), a federal habeas court may grant the writ if the state court identifies the correct governing legal principle from [the Supreme Court's] decisions but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner's case." Williams, 529 U.S. at 413. However, under § 2254(d)(1), "an unreasonable application of federal law is different from an incorrect application of federal law." Harrington v. Richter, 131 S.Ct. 770, 785 (2011) (quoting Williams, 529 U.S. at 410). "If this standard is difficult to meet—and it is—that is because it was meant to be." Burt v. Titlow, 134 S.Ct. 10, 16 (2013) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). The petitioner carries the burden of proof, and review under § 2254(d) is limited to the record that was before the state court that adjudicated the claim on the merits. Pinholster, 131 S.Ct. at 1398.
In his first ground for relief, Petitioner argues that the trial court committed reversible error when it instructed the jury that there is "no such animal as simply [sic] assault." (Am. Pet. ¶ 12, Ground One.) Petitioner raised this claim in his direct appeal, where it was rejected by the Appellate Division:
Edwards, 2013 WL 163297, at *3-4.
Habeas review of jury instructions is limited to those instances where the instructions violated a defendant's due process rights. Echols v. Ricci, 492 F. App'x 301, 312 (3d Cir. 2012) (citing Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 71-72 (1991) (holding that "[t]he only question for us is whether the ailing instruction by itself so infected the entire trial that the resulting conviction violates due process")). See also Middleton v. McNeil, 541 U.S. 433, 437 (2004) (same). A defendant's due process rights are violated where the instruction "operated to lift the burden of proof on an essential element of an offense as defined by state law." Echols, 492 F. App'x at 312 (quoting Smith v. Horn, 120 F.3d 400, 416 (3d Cir. 1997)).
An error in the jury instructions is not grounds for habeas relief if the error is harmless. Pagliaccetti v. Kerestes, 581 F. App'x 134, 136 (3d Cir. 2014) (citing Yohn v. Love, 76 F.3d 508, 522 (3d Cir. 1996)). An error is harmless unless it "had substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury's verdict." Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 637 (1993). In determining whether there is harmless error, the court examines the impact of the error on the trial as a whole. Yohn, 76 F.3d at 523.
Here, the Appellate Division properly examined the jury instructions and determined that even if the judge had misstated the law in his initial "shorthand" remarks to the jury at the end of the first day of deliberations, the judge properly explained the law on the next trial day, prior to the jury retiring for continued deliberations. Since he clearly corrected any potential error in his "shorthand" instructions with his subsequent detailed instructions, the Appellate Division found that the instructions as a whole were proper. This Court finds that the state court's adjudication of this claim did not result in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or result in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding. Certainly, looking the instructions as a whole, the jury was properly instructed on the elements of the offenses prior to continued deliberations and any potential error in the initial instruction was properly corrected and had no effect on the trial. See Brecht, 507 U.S. at 637. (Habeas relief on this ground is denied.
In the second ground of the Petition, Petitioner argues that he was denied his right to a fair trial when a state's witness testified that Petitioner was on parole at the time of the alleged assault, in violation of the New Jersey Rules of Evidence. (Am. Pet. ¶ 12, Ground Two.) Petitioner raised this issue on direct appeal, where it was rejected by the Appellate Division:
Edwards, 2013 WL 163297, at *4-5.
It is well-established that the violation of a right created by state law is not cognizable as a basis for federal habeas relief. Estelle, 502 U.S. at 67-68 ("We have stated many times that federal habeas corpus relief does not lie for errors of state law") (internal citations omitted). Accordingly, Petitioner cannot obtain relief for any errors in state law evidentiary rulings, unless they rise to the level of a deprivation of due process. Estelle, 502 U.S. at 70 ("`the Due Process Clause guarantees fundamental elements of fairness in a criminal trial'") (quoting Spencer v. Texas, 385 U.S. 554, 563-64 (1967)). For a habeas petitioner to prevail on a claim that an evidentiary error amounted to a deprivation of due process, he must show that the error was so pervasive as to have denied him a fundamentally fair trial. Keller v. Larkins, 251 F.3d 408, 413 (3d Cir. 2001).
Since Petitioner is challenging the state court's ruling regarding the admission of evidence under state rules, Petitioner must establish that he was deprived of a fundamentally fair trial to obtain habeas relief. He cannot do so. As stated by the Appellate Division, the state's witnesses were specifically instructed not to mention that Petitioner was on parole and on the one occasion where a state witness mentioned that she wanted to talk to Petitioner about a parole issue, the court instructed the jury to disregard the statement. Edwards, 2013 WL 163297, at *4-5. Even during that exchange, the state's witnesses specifically did not mention that Petitioner himself was on parole. Id.
To the extent Petitioner objects to testimony which indicated that the state's witnesses were parole officers, one of the elements of the crime required that the prosecution prove that Petitioner was aware that he was assaulting law enforcement officers acting in the performance of their duties; that would be difficult, if not impossible, to prove if their testimony did not consist of the now objected-to information. In sum, there is nothing in the record to suggest that the admission of this evidence denied Petitioner his right to a fair trial. The decision of the state court was neither contrary to, nor an unreasonable application of, Supreme Court law and Petitioner is not entitled to relief on this claim.
In Ground Three of his Petition, Petitioner states only the following: "INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL, FAILURE-TO DISCLOSE MATERIAL FACTS OR MISREPRESENTATION OF FACTS," (Am. Pet. ¶ 12, Ground Three) (capitalization in original). In the "Supporting Facts" section, Petitioner states that "COUNSEL, FAILED TO `OBJECT' TO PROSECUTOR'S [sic] WHEN N.J.R.E. WAS ON PAROLE/PROBATION, TRANSCRIPT, PART-B DATED APRIL 6, 2010." (Id.) (capitalization in original). Petitioner then includes citations to various parts of the trial transcript containing the testimony of state witnesses. (Id.)
The Sixth Amendment, applicable to states through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, guarantees the accused the "right . . . to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defense." U.S. Const. amend. VI. The right to counsel is the right to the effective assistance of counsel, and counsel can deprive a defendant of the right by failing to render adequate legal assistance. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686 (1984).
A claim that counsel's assistance was so defective as to require reversal of a conviction has two components, both of which must be satisfied. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687. First, the defendant must "show that counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness." Id. at 687-88. "[C]ounsel should be `strongly presumed to have rendered adequate assistance and made all significant decisions in the exercise of reasonable professional judgment.'" Pinholster, 131 S.Ct. at 1403 (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690). "To overcome that presumption, a defendant must show that counsel failed to act `reasonabl[y] considering all the circumstances.'" Id. (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688). A "convicted defendant making a claim of ineffective assistance must identify the acts or omissions of counsel that are alleged not to have been the result of reasonable professional judgment." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690. The court must then determine whether, in light of all the circumstances at the time, the identified errors were so serious that they were outside the wide range of professionally competent assistance. Id.
To satisfy the prejudice prong, the defendant must show that "there is a reasonable probability that, absent the errors, the factfinder would have had a reasonable doubt respecting guilt." Id. at 695. "It is not enough `to show that the errors had some conceivable effect on the outcome of the proceeding' . . . Counsel's errors must be `so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable.'" Harrington, 131 S.Ct. at 788 (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687). As the Supreme Court explained,
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 695-96.
The Supreme Court instructs that a court need not address both components of an ineffective assistance claim "if the defendant makes an insufficient showing on one." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697. "If it is easier to dispose of an ineffectiveness claim on the ground of lack of sufficient prejudice, which we expect will often be so, that course should be followed." Id.
Here, at the outset, Petitioner has failed to comply with Rule 2(c) of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases in the United States District Court. As this Court previously advised him, Rule 2(c) requires that the petition "(1) specify all the grounds for relief available to the petitioner; (2) state the facts supporting each ground; (3) state the relief requested; (4) be printed, typewritten, or legibly handwritten; and (5) be signed under penalty of perjury by the petitioner or by a person authorized to sign it for the petitioner under 28 U.S.C. § 2242." (Nov. 13
To the best the Court can identify, it appears that Petitioner is alleging that his counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the alleged violation of the New Jersey Rules of Evidence when testimony about Petitioner's parole status was introduced at trial. Petitioner cannot meet either prong of Strickland for that claim. As discussed above, no testimony about Petitioner's parole status was actually introduced at trial. The state witnesses testified about their jobs and their uniforms, but the trial court was very careful not to allow testimony about Petitioner's status. In fact, on the one occasion when a state witness did reference speaking to Petitioner "about an issue that involved the Division of Parole," Petitioner's counsel objected and the court specifically instructed the jury to disregard the statement. (Resp't's Br., Ex. Rta 7, Trial Tr. 21:11-23:4, Apr. 1, 2010, D.E. No. 28-20.) All other references to parole or probation only came about when discussing where the officers were employed and there was no mention of Petitioner's parole status. Certainly, by objecting on the one occasion where a state witness may have implied that Petitioner was on parole, trial counsel's representation did not fall below "an objective standard of reasonableness." Petitioner cannot meet the first prong of Strickland and this claim must be denied.
In the fourth ground of his Petition, Petitioner argues that the "STATE USE OF THE PHRASE `AND/OR' THROUGHOUT THE INDICTMENT DENIED DEFENDAND [sic] OF CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS TO BE ADVISE [sic] OF THE CHARGE AGAINST HIM." (Pet. ¶ 12, Ground Four) (capitalization in original). As his supporting facts for this ground, Petitioner states the following: "TAKE NOTICE, OFFICER EIFE, WAS THE ONLY OFFICE [sic] FOR GETTING [sic] — INDICTMENT THE ENTIRE JURY FOUND HE LIEF, DURING TRIAL, THEREFORE THE ENTIRE, INDICTMENT SHOULD BE DISMISS [sic], SINCE IT WAS BASE [sic] ON OFFICER [sic] LIE, AND MISCONDUCT, OF THE MOST SERIOUSLY [sic] CHARGE." (Id.) (capitalization in original). Petitioner raised this claim on direct appeal, where it was rejected by the state court:
Edwards, 2013 WL 163297, at *5-6.
There is no federal constitutional right to a grand jury in state criminal proceedings, thus defects in a state grand jury process are not reviewable via a federal habeas petition unless they "rise for some other reason to the level of a denial of rights protected by the United States Constitution." Wainwright v. Goode, 464 U.S. 78, 86 (1983); see also Jelinek v. Costello, 247 F.Supp.2d 212, 278 (E.D.N.Y. 2003) ("On its face, a state prisoner's claim that he was denied the procedural right to be indicted by a grand jury appears to implicate a right that is exclusively of state concern"). The Sixth Amendment guarantees the right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation. The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment also requires reasonable notice and information of a specific charge against the accused.
Here, the state court properly found that the grand jury indictment "clearly set forth the date and place of each offense; the victim of the offense; and the offense charged." Edwards, 2013 WL 163297, at *5-6. Reviewing the language of the indictment, it is without question that Petitioner was, or should have been, aware of the charges pending against him based on that document. The Court finds that the decision of the state court was neither contrary to, nor an unreasonable application of, Supreme Court law and Petitioner is not entitled to relief on this claim.
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c), unless a circuit justice or judge issues a certificate of appealability, an appeal may not be taken from a final order in a proceeding under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. A certificate of appealability may issue "only if the applicant has made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right." 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). "A petitioner satisfies this standard by demonstrating that jurists of reason could disagree with the district court's resolution of his constitutional claims or that jurists could conclude the issues presented are adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed further." Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 327 (2003).
Here, Petitioner has failed to make a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right. Thus, no certificate of appealability shall issue.
For the above reasons, the § 2254 habeas petition is denied, and a certificate of appealability will not issue. An appropriate Order follows.
