NOEL L. HILLMAN, District Judge.
Charles Mincey filed a Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 challenging a judgment of conviction filed in the Superior Court of New Jersey, Atlantic County, on July 15, 2004, imposing an aggregate 25-year term of imprisonment, with an 85% period of parole ineligibility, after he pled guilty to first-degree manslaughter and first-degree aggravated assault. The State filed an Answer and the record, and Mincey filed a Reply. After carefully reviewing the arguments of the parties and the state court record, this Court will dismiss the Petition with prejudice and deny a certificate of appealability.
The Appellate Division of the Superior Court of New Jersey summarized the facts of the case this way:
State v. Mincey, 2011 WL 31293 at *2 (N.J. Super. Ct., App. Div., Jan. 6, 2011).
Sometime in 2001 a grand jury sitting in the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Atlantic County, issued a 15-count indictment against Charles Mincey and Howard Reed charging them with the first-degree murder of Fritz Charlestin, first-degree robbery, and other crimes. On March 25, 2004, Reed pled guilty to the first-degree robbery of Christopher Soyer, the cab driver. During his plea allocution, Reed stated that he displayed a 9 millimeter gun to Soyer, he gave the gun to Mincey, and then Reed got out of the cab. (ECF No. 6-11 at 9.)
Mincey's trial began two months later on May 24, 2004. After two days of testimony, on May 27, 2004, the parties agreed to a plea agreement whereby Mincey pled guilty to first-degree aggravated manslaughter and second-degree aggravated assault in exchange for dismissal of the other charges in the indictment and the State's recommendation for a maximum aggregate sentence of 25 years in prison. The Appellate Division described the testimony at Mincey's abbreviated trial as follows:
State v. Mincey, 2013 WL 195279 at *1 (N.J. Super. Ct., App. Div., Jan. 18, 2013).
On June 4, 2004, the same judge who presided over Mincey's trial sentenced Reed to a ten-year term of imprisonment in accordance with his plea agreement. (ECF No. 6-12.) On July 9, 2004, that same judge sentenced Mincey to the agreed upon aggregate 25-year term of imprisonment. (ECF No. 6-7.) Mincey appealed the sentence, and by order filed on February 8, 2006, the Appellate Division affirmed. (ECF No. 6-17 at 68.)
On June 18, 2007, Mincey signed a pro se state petition for post-conviction relief, which the trial court filed on June 26, 2007. (ECF No. 6-17 at 69.) For the reasons expressed on the record on June 25, 2009, the trial court denied the postconviction relief petition without an evidentiary hearing. The order was filed on July 6, 2009. (ECF No. 6-17 at 117.) Mincey appealed, and on January 6, 2011, the Appellate Division vacated the order and remanded for an evidentiary hearing "limited to the issue of the exculpatory evidence of codefendant Reed and that which may be developed form Soyer, if any." State v. Mincey, 2011 WL 31293 *5 (N.J. Super. Ct., App. Div., Jan. 6, 2011). On June 16, 2011, the Supreme Court of New Jersey denied certification. See State v. Mincey, 207 N.J. 35 (2011) (table).
The trial court conducted the evidentiary hearing on July 6, 2011, hearing testimony from Howard Reed, Mincey, and his trial attorney. The trial court denied the post-conviction relief petition in and order and opinion dated On July 26, 2011. (ECF Nos. 7-6, 7-5.) Mincey appealed, and on January 18, 2013, the Appellate Division affirmed. See State v. Mincey, 2013 WL 195279 (N.J. Super. Ct., App. Div., Jan. 18, 2013). On September 10, 2013, the Supreme Court of New Jersey denied certification. State v. Mincey, 215 N.J. 486 (2013) (table).
Mincey signed his § 2254 Petition on February 14, 2014, but his cover letter is dated March 2, 2014. The Clerk received the Petition on March 10, 2014.
(Memorandum at ECF No. 1-2 at 43-47.)
The State filed an Answer arguing that Mincey is not entitled to habeas relief on the merits of his claims, and Mincey filed a Reply arguing that he is. (ECF Nos. 6, 10.)
Section 2254 of title 28 of the United States Code sets limits on the power of a federal court to grant a habeas petition to a state prisoner. See Cullen v. Pinholster, 131 S.Ct. 1388, 1398 (2011). Section 2254(a) permits a court to entertain only claims alleging that a person is in state custody "in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). Where a state court adjudicated petitioner's federal claim on the merits,
A court begins the analysis under § 2254(d)(1) by determining the relevant law clearly established by the Supreme Court. See Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 660 (2004). "[C]learly established law for purposes of § 2254(d)(1) includes only the holdings, as opposed to the dicta, of t[he Supreme Court's] decisions," as of the time of the relevant state-court decision. Woods, 135 S.Ct. at 1376 (quoting White v. Woodall, 134 S.Ct. 1697, 1702 (2014), and Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412 (2000)). A decision is "contrary to" a Supreme Court holding within 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) if the state court "contradicts the governing law set forth in [the Supreme Court's] cases" or if it "confronts a set of facts that are materially indistinguishable from a decision of th[e Supreme] Court and nevertheless arrives at a [different] result." Williams, 529 U.S. at 405-06. Under the "`unreasonable application' clause of § 2254(d)(1), a federal habeas court may grant the writ if the state court identifies the correct governing legal principle from th[e Supreme] Court's decisions but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner's case." Id., 529 U.S. at 413.
Where a petitioner seeks habeas relief pursuant to § 2254(d)(2) on the basis of an erroneous factual determination of the state court, two provisions of the AEDPA necessarily apply. First, the AEDPA provides that "a determination of a factual issue made by a State court shall be presumed to be correct [and] [t]he applicant shall have the burden of rebutting the presumption of correctness by clear and convincing evidence." 29 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1); see Miller-El v. Dretke, 545 U.S. 231, 240 (2005). Second, the AEDPA precludes habeas relief unless the adjudication of the claim "resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2).
In the two grounds raised in his § 2254 Petition, Mincey asserts that his trial attorney was constitutionally deficient in failing to interview co-defendant Howard Reed and in strongly advising Mincey to plead guilty. The Sixth Amendment guarantees the accused the "right . . . to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defense." U.S. Const. amend. VI. A claim that counsel's assistance was so defective as to require reversal of a conviction has two components, both of which must be satisfied. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). A defendant must "show that counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness" id. at 687-88, and that "there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different." Id. at 694 (citations omitted). To establish ineffective assistance of counsel in the plea negotiation context, Mincey must show: (1) counsel's advice regarding the plea offer was not "`within the range of competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases,'" Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 56 (1985) (quoting McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 (1970)), and (2) "there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, [the petitioner] would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial." Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S.Ct. 1376, 1384-85 (2012) (quoting Hill, 474 U.S. at 59).
Mincey asserts that his trial attorney was constitutionally deficient in "failing to interview Howard Reed who exculpated and exonerated Petitioner[.]" (ECF No. 1 at 24.) To be sure, Reed's affidavit dated September 15, 2006, which was attached to Mincey's pro se petition for post-conviction relief, states that "Charles Mincey had nothing to do with the robbery or shooting of Fritz Charlestin. He did not help me in any way. He was there and I believe that's why he was picked in the line up. I could not say anything about the truth because I did not want to get myself any more time." (ECF No. 6-17 at 83.) Although Reed's affidavit states that Mincey had nothing to do with the robbery and murder, it also states unequivocally that Reed would not have exonerated Mincey had he testified at Mincey's trial in 2004 "because [Reed] did not want to get [him]self any more time." Id. Reed's plea allocution, two months before Mincey's trial, confirms that Reed's trial testimony, if it had been elicited, would not have been exculpatory. During the allocution, Reed stated that he robbed Soyer by displaying a handgun and that Reed then gave the handgun to Mincey and left the taxi. (ECF No. 6-11 at 6-8.)
In affirming the denial of Mincey's post-conviction relief petition, the Appellate Division found the following facts with respect to codefendant Howard Reed:
State v. Mincey, 2011 WL 31293 at *2.
The Appellate Division also found that Reed "confirmed on cross-examination that he would not have testified to that exculpatory version of events at [Mincey's] trial, for fear of losing the benefit of his plea bargain." State v. Mincey, 2013 WL 195279 at * 2 (N.J. Super. Ct., App. Div., Jan. 18, 2013). The Appellate Division concluded that defense counsel was not ineffective in failing to interview or call Reed because "Reed would not have given favorable testimony even if defense counsel had attempted to cross-examine him or had called him as a witness." State v. Mincey, 2013 WL 195279 at *5.
Section 2254(e)(1) requires this Court to presume the correctness of the Appellate Division's finding that, if Mincey's attorney had interviewed Reed or had called him to testify at Mincey's trial, Reed would have testified that he brandished the gun, gave the gun to Mincey and exited the taxi. Mincey has not rebutted these findings by clear and convincing evidence. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). Given Reed's postconviction relief testimony and his affidavit, both of which indicated that Reed's trial testimony would have been consistent with his plea allocution and would not have exculpated Mincey, Mincey has not shown that the Appellate Division unreasonably determined the facts in light of the evidence presented. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)((2). In addition, the Appellate Division did not unreasonably apply Strickland or other Supreme Court precedent when it found that counsel was not deficient in failing to interview Reed or to call him as a trial witness, given its finding that Reed's testimony would not have helped Mincey. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1).
Mincey also asserts that trial counsel was deficient in strongly advising him to plead guilty after hearing two and onehalf days of testimony from the prosecution's case. A defendant who pleads guilty upon the advice of counsel "may only attack the voluntary and intelligent character of the guilty plea by showing that the advice he received from counsel was not within the [appropriate] standards." Tollett v. Henderson, 311 U.S. 258, 268 (1973). Due process requires that a guilty plea is "voluntary" and that the defendant's waiver of his constitutional rights is "knowing, intelligent, [and] with sufficient awareness of the relevant circumstances and likely consequences." United States v. Ruiz, 536 U.S. 622, 628 (2002) (quoting Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 748 (1970)). As the Court explained in McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759 (1970):
McMann, 397 U.S. at 769-770.
Moreover, "an accused is entitled to rely upon his counsel. . . to offer his informed opinion as to what plea should be entered." Von Moltke v. Gillies, 332 U.S. 708, 721 (1948); accord Cullen v. United States, 194 F.3d 401, 404 (2d Cir. 1999) ("A defense lawyer in a criminal case has the duty to advise his client fully on whether a particular plea to a charge appears to be desirable.") (citations and internal quotation marks omitted) (emphasis in original); United States v. Day, 969 F.2d 39, 43 (3d Cir. 1992) (observing that a defendant "is entitled to rely upon his counsel to make an independent examination of the facts, circumstances, pleadings and laws involved and then to offer his informed opinion as to what plea should be entered.") (quoting Von Moltke, 332 U.S. at 721).
In this case, the Appellate Division found the following facts with respect to counsel's advice to plead guilty:
State v. Mincey, 2013 WL 195279 at *5.
Based on these findings, the Appellate Division concluded that "Reed's testimony [at the post-conviction relief evidentiary hearing] clearly established that [Mincey's] trial counsel was not ineffective when he strongly advised [Mincey] to accept the plea bargain the State was offering." State v. Mincey, 2013 WL 195279 at * 5.
This Court is required to presume the correctness of the Appellate Division's factual findings, as Mincey has not rebutted them by clear and convincing evidence; nor has Mincey shown that they were unreasonable in light of the evidence presented. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 2254(d)(1) and (e)(2). In addition, in light of these findings, the Appellate Division did not unreasonably apply Strickland or other Supreme Court precedent when it held that Mincey's trial attorney was not constitutionally deficient in strongly advising him to plead guilty instead of risking a life sentence for murder. Mincey is not entitled to habeas relief on this ground under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1).
The AEDPA provides that an appeal may not be taken to the court of appeals from a final order in a § 2254 proceeding unless a judge issues a certificate of appealability on the ground that "the applicant has made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right." 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). This Court denies a certificate of appealability because jurists of reason would not find it debatable that dismissal of the Petition as time barred is correct. See Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000).
This Court will dismiss the Petition with prejudice and deny a certificate of appealability. An Order consistent with this Opinion will be filed. At Camden, New Jersey
