OPINION

JEROME B. SIMANDLE, Chief District Judge.

I. INTRODUCTION

In this action, Plaintiff John Cholankeril, Jr. (hereinafter, "Plaintiff") alleges that Selective Insurance Company of America (hereinafter, "Defendant") breached their Standard Flood Insurance Policy under the National Flood Insurance Act, 42 U.S.C. § 4072 (hereinafter, the "NFIA"), by failing to appropriately process his claim for damages to his beach property during Hurricane Sandy. (See generally Compl.)

As relevant here, the NFIA provides that a claimant may, "upon the disallowance" of any claim, institute an action against the insurance carrier "within one year after the date of mailing of notice of disallowance or partial disallowance" by the carrier. 42 U.S.C. § 4072. In the aftermath of the Hurricane Sandy damage implicated here, Plaintiff filed a proof of loss statement with his flood insurance provider, Defendant Selective Insurance Company of America (hereinafter, "Defendant") on April 28, 2014. Two days later, or on April 30, 2014, Defendant mailed Plaintiff a letter partially denying his claim. Following the denial, but more than 1 year after Defendant mailed notice of the partial denial, Plaintiff filed this action on May 11, 2015, alleging that Defendant breached the parties' insurance agreement.

Defendant now moves to dismiss Plaintiff's Complaint as time-barred under the one-year limitations period of the NFIA, because the statute began to run, by its own terms, on the date Defendant mailed notice of the partial denial. (Defs.' reply Br. at 5-8). More simply, Defendant claims that the NFIA's limitation period required Plaintiff to file this action no later than April 30, 2015, and submits that his failure to do so requires dismissal of Plaintiff's Complaint with prejudice. (See generally id.) Plaintiff, by contrast, largely side-steps the plain language of the statute, arguing instead that he never received the denial notice, and therefore submitting that his Complaint should be deemed timely. (See generally Pl.'s Br.)

The pending motion presents a straightforward question of statutory interpretation. More specifically, the Court must consider whether the statute of limitations under the NFIA begins on the date of mailing of a denial letter, or the later date on which the insured party receives the denial letter.

For the reasons that follow, the Court finds the NFIA's one-year limitations period triggered by mailing of the denial letter. Defendant's motion will, accordingly, be granted.1

II. BACKGROUND

A. Factual and Procedural Background2

Plaintiff owns an ocean-front property in Lavallette, New Jersey, and had a Standard Flood Insurance Policy issued by the Defendant in accordance with the National Flood Insurance Program. (See Compl. at ¶¶ 2, 4.)

On and around October 29, 2012, Hurricane Sandy struck the Northeastern coast of the United States, causing widespread damage and flooding to shore communities such as Lavallette. (See id. at ¶ 9.) Indeed, Plaintiff's property suffered severe flood and other damage. (See id. at ¶¶ 11-12.) As a result, Plaintiff filed a proof of loss with Defendant (and through current counsel) on April 28, 2014, claiming that the damages to his insured property amounted to $152,242.37. (Ex. A to Compl.)

Defendant received the proof of loss on April 29, 2014 (see Ex. A to Weber Aff.), and on April 30, 2014, issued a notice partially denying (or, disallowing) the proof of loss on account of Plaintiff's failure to attach "all documentation" (paid receipts, invoices, and/or an itemized (room by room) estimated by a licensed contractor) necessary to support his claim of $152,242.37 in damages.3 (Ex. B to Weber Aff.) For that reason, Defendant reduced Plaintiff's proof of loss to $85,358.34, and mailed the partial denial by certified mail to Plaintiff's counsel's offices in Tampa, Florida on the very same day. (See Weber Aff. at ¶¶ 5-6; Ex. C to Weber Aff.).

Following the denial, Plaintiff filed this action on May 11, 2015, alleging that Defendant breached the parties' insurance agreement by failing to appropriately process and pay his insurance claim. (See Compl. at ¶¶ 15-29.) In the aftermath of a District-wide effort to resolve cases arising out of Hurricane Sandy, Defendant now moves to dismiss this action on timeliness grounds.

III. STANDARD OF REVIEW

When determining the merits of a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)4, the court must "accept all factual allegations as true, construe the Complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, and determine whether, under any reasonable reading of the Complaint, the plaintiff may be entitled to relief.'" Fleisher v. Standard Ins. Co., 679 F.3d 116, at 120 (3d Cir. 2012) (citations omitted). However, in order to survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must "contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true," to "state a [plausible] claim to relief.'" Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)).

IV. DISCUSSION

Congress enacted the National Flood Insurance Program (hereinafter "NFIP") in 1968 as part of the NFIA, and in order to provide economical flood insurance to those in flood-affected areas. See generally 42 U.S.C. § 4001-4129; see also Gowland v. Aetna, 143 F.3d 951, 953 (5th Cir. 1998) ("It is uneconomical for private insurance companies to provide flood insurance with reasonable terms and conditions to those in flood prone areas").5

The pending motion hinges, as explained above, upon the triggering period for the NFIA's statute of limitations. Stated differently, the Court must consider whether the statute of limitations begins to run on the date that the insurer mails the denial letter (the position advanced by Defendant), or on the date that the insured party actually receives the denial letter (the contrary position staked out by Plaintiff).

The Court begins, as it must, with the terms of the statute. As relevant here, 42 U.S.C. § 4072 provides that

42 U.S.C. § 4072 (emphasis added). In other words, the statute explains, on its face, that the "mailing of notice" triggers the NFIA's limitations period. Id. (emphasis added). In interpreting this provision, courts have, in turn, consistently followed and applied the plain text of the statute, by concluding that the statute of limitations runs from the date of mailing.6 See, e.g., Lionheart Holding GRP v. Phila. Contribution Ship Ins. Co., 368 F. App'x 282 (3d Cir. 2010) (affirming lower court ruling that the statute of limitations for an SFIP was triggered by the date of the denial letter); Linblad, 2014 WL 6895775, at *4 ("the time for filing suit pursuant to the SFIP is calculated by the date of the denial letter, and pursuant to the statute by the date the denial letter is mailed") (emphasis added).7

With that conclusion, resolution of the pending motion becomes relatively straightforward. The denial letter here reveals, on its face, that Defendant mailed it to counsel for Plaintiff on April 30, 2014. (See Ex. B to Weber Aff.) As a result, this action would be timely only if filed by no later than April 30, 2015. Plaintiff, however, did not file this action until May 11, 2015, eleven days after the expiration of the statute of limitations. The Court therefore finds this action untimely under 42 U.S.C. § 4072.8 Linder & Associates, Inc. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 166 F.3d 547, 550 (3d Cir. 1999) (generally explaining that courts must interpret and apply the "plain and unambiguous" provisions of the NFIA).

V. CONCLUSION

In sum, Plaintiff filed this action eleven days too late under the plain terms of 42 U.S.C. § 4072. Defendant's motion to dismiss will, accordingly, be granted, and Plaintiff's Complaint will be dismissed with prejudice as time-barred.9

An accompanying Order will be entered.