JOSEPH A. DICKSON, Magistrate Judge.
This matter comes before the Court upon Plaintiffs Dominick Depalma and Joseph Leszczynski's, individually and on behalf of all other similarly situated current and former employees (collectively "Plaintiffs") motion to equitably toll the statute of limitations for the putative collective action members ("Potential Opt-ins") "from March 20, 2015, the date Plaintiffs filed their Motion for Conditional Certification under 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) of the Fair Labor Standards Act (`FLSA'), to ten days after this Court issues its Order on the certification motion." (Pls. Br., ECF No. 62-1, at 5). Pursuant to Rule 78 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, no oral argument was heard. Upon careful consideration of the parties' submissions, and for the reasons stated below, Plaintiffs' motion is
Plaintiffs filed the instant matter on December 20, 2013 against Defendant The Scotts Company, LLC ("Defendant") seeking unpaid overtime compensation pursuant to the FLSA. (Compl., ECF No. 1). Defendant allegedly misclassified Plaintiff as exempt and, therefore, denied Plaintiffs overtime pay under the FLSA. (Am. Compl., ECF No. 5, ¶ 2). Plaintiffs filed an Amended Complaint on February 5, 2014 and Defendant Answered on February 26, 2014. (Am. Compl., ECF No. 5; Answer, ECF No. 17).
This Court held an Initial Conference on August 14, 2014 and entered a Pretrial Scheduling Order on August 15, 2014. (ECF No. 30). Pre-certification fact discovery remained open through January 30, 2015. (
As noted above, Plaintiffs seek to toll the statute of limitations from March 20, 2015; until ten (10) days after the adjudication of the pending Motion for Conditional Certification "so that the claims of Potential Opt-ins do not become time-barred." (Pls. Br., ECF No. 62-1, at 11).
The FLSA requires employers to pay overtime compensation for an employee's work in excess of forty (40) hours per week. 29 U.S. C. § 207. "Any employer who violates the provisions of section 206 or section 207 of this title shall be liable to the employee or employees affected in the amount of their unpaid minimum wages, or their unpaid overtime compensation, as the case may be, and in an additional equal amount as liquidated damages." 29 U.S.C. § 216(b). Under the FLSA, an action for unpaid overtime compensation must be "commenced within two years after the cause of action accrued, and every such action shall be forever barred unless commenced within two years after the cause of action accrued, except that a cause of action arising out of a willful violation may be commenced within three years after the cause of action accrued." 29 U.S.C. § 255(a).
The FLSA authorizes collective actions against employers "by any one or more employees for and in behalf of himself or themselves and other employees similarly situated." 29 U.S.C. § 216(b). "To qualify for relief under the FLSA, a party must commence his cause of action before the statute of limitations applying to his individual claims has lapsed."
The doctrine of equitable tolling "functions to stop the statute of limitations from running where the claim's accrual date has already passed."
Plaintiffs argue that "until the Court rules on Plaintiffs' pending certification motion, Potential Opt-ins — through no fault of their own — have been and continue to be prevented from learning about the existence of this action and the ongoing expiration of their claims", since "the FLSA statute of limitations period for an opt-in ... continues to run until the opt-in files a written consent to join the action." (Pls. Br., ECF No. 62-1, at 7). Defendant on the other hand argues that Plaintiffs are not entitled to equitable tolling because the Defendant has not actively misled the Plaintiffs, the Plaintiffs have not been prevented from asserting their rights in an extraordinary way, and Plaintiffs have not timely asserted their rights in the wrong forum. (See Def. Opp. Br., ECF No. 64).
Plaintiffs maintain that"[d]istrict courts have held that delay in a court making a collective action ruling is justification enough, under `extraordinary circumstance' or `interest of justice' analysis, for application of the equitable tolling doctrine." (Pls. Br., ECF No. 62-1, at 9). Plaintiffs cite to
With regard to equitable tolling, the plaintiffs argued "that courts have routinely tolled the statute of limitations in FLSA cases whereas here, Plaintiffs or opt-in Plaintiffs did not cause the delay. Plaintiffs maintain that they have diligently pursued their claim. However, due to forces beyond their control, opt-in Plaintiffs have not been advised of their rights under the FLSA to join the instant action."
On August 1, 2014, two years after the initiation of the suit and almost eighteen months after the filing of plaintiffs' motion, the Honorable Douglas E. Arpert, U.S.M.J., issued a report and recommendation recommending that plaintiffs' motion be granted in its entirety.
Defendants objected on multiple grounds and argued that Judge Arpert "relied on extra-jurisdictional case law to grant equitable tolling based on the fact that `extraordinary circumstances' existed sufficient to warrant the imposition of tolling, but because Plaintiffs' failed to establish any one (1) of the three (3) prongs required by Third Circuit law, the Magistrate Judge's recommendation should be rejected."
Here, Defendant argues that Ornelas is distinguishable from the case at hand because in Ornelas, plaintiffs' motion for conditional certification had been pending for almost two years. (Def. Op. Br., ECF No. 34, at 9). "Here, only nine months have passed since Plaintiffs filed their motion for conditional certification, which hardly represents the type of extraordinary circumstances necessary to invoke the exceptional remedy of equitable tolling and instead is more reflective of the routine lapse of time present in all cases that Congress contemplated when it set up a different statute of limitations tolling arrangement for FLSA collective actions."
Plaintiffs replied, arguing that "Defendant is forced to concede that the only difference is that the delay in the
This Court agrees with Plaintiffs and finds that the difference in time is, in this instance, immaterial. As noted above, the motion for conditional certification in Qmelas was pending before the Court for eighteen (18) months. Here, Judge McNulty ruled on Plaintiffs' motion for conditional certification a little more than twelve (12) months after it was filed. (
Under the Court's holding in
Based on the foregoing, Plaintiffs' motion for equitable tolling, (ECF No. 62), is