BRIAN R. MARTINOTTI, District Judge.
Before this court is Defendant Camelback Mountain Ski Resort's ("Camelback")
On February 16, 2016, Plaintiffs Gyl Cole ("Gyl") and Ronald Cole ("Ronald") (collectively, "Plaintiffs") filed a complaint in the Superior Court of New Jersey (Civ. No. OCN-L-496-16) alleging negligence and breach of duty in connection with a skiing injury suffered by Gyl on Camelback's property in Tannersville, Pennsylvania. (Dkt. No. 3-3 at 2; Dkt. No. 4 at 2.) On April 5, 2016, Camelback filed a Notice of Removal with this Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1332, 1441. (Dkt. No. 1.)
Camelback now files this motion to transfer venue to the Middle District of Pennsylvania based on a forum selection clause in the Ski Area Use Ticket. (Dkt. No. 3-3 at 3-4.) The Ski Area Use Ticket states:
(Cert. of Charles Blier, Ex. A (Dkt. No. 3-2) at 3.)
A motion to transfer venue is governed by 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a), which states:
28 U.S.C. § 1404(a).
In ruling on such a motion, courts impose a balancing test and take into account the factors enumerated in § 1404(a) — namely, the convenience of the parties, the convenience of the witnesses, and the interests of justice — as well as a variety of private and public interest factors based on their relevancy to and effect on the litigation. See Jumara v. State Farm Ins. Co., 55 F.3d 873, 879 (3d Cir. 1995). One such factor is a forum selection clause, which "is treated as a manifestation of the parties' preferences as to a convenient forum" and is "entitled to substantial consideration." Id. at 880.
A forum selection clause is considered presumptively valid and enforceable unless the party objecting to its enforcement makes a strong showing of unreasonableness. Cadapult Graphic Sys., Inc. v. Tektronix, Inc., 98 F.Supp.2d 560, 565 (D.N.J. 2000). A party can establish "unreasonableness" only if: (1) "[the clause] is the result of fraud or overreaching;" (2) "enforcement would violate a strong public policy;" or (3) "enforcement would . . . result in litigation in a jurisdiction so seriously inconvenient as to be unreasonable." Id. (quoting Coastal Steel Corp. v. Tilghman Wheelabrator Ltd., 709 F.2d 190, 202; Union Steel America Co. v. M/V Sanko Spruce, 14 F.Supp.2d 256, 686 (D.N.J. 1998)).
Where a motion to transfer venue is based on a forum selection clause, the Court must assume the parties' private interests "weigh entirely in favor of the preselected forum." Atlantic Marine Constr. Co. v. U.S. Dist. Court for the W. Dist. of Tex., 134 S.Ct. 568, 582 (2013). Therefore, the Court may only consider public-interest factors. Id. The party seeking to avoid the forum selection clause has the burden of establishing that public interests disfavoring the transfer outweigh the parties' choice. Id. In other words, "the `interest of justice' is served by holding parties to their bargain." Id. at 583.
As a threshold matter, this action plainly could have been brought in the Middle District of Pennsylvania and may, therefore, be transferred to that court pursuant to the plain language of 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a). 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) ("[A] district court may transfer any civil action to any other district or division where it might have been brought. . . ."). The parties agree the genesis of the accident occurred at Camelback's property in Pennsylvania. (Dkt. No. 3-3 at 2; Dkt. No. 4 at 3.) The agreement goes on to say that, should a dispute arise under this agreement, the matter "shall be litigated exclusively in the Court of Common Pleas of Monroe County, PA, or in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania." (Id.)
Plaintiffs fail to show that enforcement of the forum selection clause would be unreasonable or violate public policy.
The Court is not persuaded by Plaintiffs' arguments. "When parties agree to a forumselection clause, they waive the right to challenge the preselected forum as inconvenient or less convenient for themselves or their witnesses, or for their pursuit of the litigation." Atlantic Marine, 134 S. Ct. at 582. Plaintiffs' contentions are rooted primarily in their own private interests and cannot be considered. Id.
Likewise, the Court is not persuaded by Plaintiffs' argument that Gyl did not purchase the Ski Area Use Ticket and therefore did not agree to the forum selection clause. The language of the ticket expressly applies to both the "purchaser" and "user of th[e] ticket," and it is undisputed that Gyl was using it at the time of the accident. Further, if the Court were to entertain this argument, Ronald's claims could still be transferred to Pennsylvania as the ticket purchaser. Thus, Plaintiffs, as either the purchaser or the user, are bound by the forum selection clause.
To the extent Plaintiffs argue a conflict of laws exists between Pennsylvania and New Jersey, such a motion is not before this Court. See id. at 584 (noting that the choice of law issue will be governed by the transferee court's rules and may result in that court applying the laws of another state). In any event, the Middle District of Pennsylvania is fully capable of applying the laws of the Pennsylvania and New Jersey.
For the reasons set forth above, Camelback's motion is