KEVIN McNULTY, United States District Judge.
This matter comes before the Court on the post-trial motion of defendant Margaret Tiangco for a judgment of acquittal, pursuant to Fed. R. Crim. P. 29(c), or in the alternative for a new trial, pursuant to Fed. R. Crim. P. 33. (ECF no. 180) I have considered the proffered grounds separately and in combination. For the reasons
On October 29, 2014, the defendant, Margaret Tiangco, a/k/a "Greta," was arrested on a criminal complaint that charged her and eleven codefendants with a single count of conspiracy to distribute and possess with intent to distribute 50 grams or more of methamphetamine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846. (ECF nos. 1, 86) On November 2, 2015, Ms. Tiangco was charged in a two-count indictment. (ECF no. 132) Count 1 charged that "[f]rom in or about January 2013 through in or about July 2014" Ms. Tiangco was part of a conspiracy to distribute and possess with intent to distribute 50 grams or more of methamphetamine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846. Count 2 charged that, on April 29, 2014, Ms. Tiangco distributed and possessed with intent to distribute 50 grams or more of methamphetamine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a) and (b)(1)(A).
Ms. Tiangco moved to dismiss Count 1 because the unexcluded time between arrest on the complaint and the filing of the indictment added up to 36 days, in excess of the 30 day limit imposed by the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161(b).
On April 25, 2016, the grand jury returned a Superseding Indictment. (ECF no. 150) It was identical to the original Indictment, except that the time frame of the Count 1 conspiracy had been expanded greatly, from 2013-14 to "[f]rom in or about 2004 through in or about July 2014."
Ms. Tiangco, represented by Paulette L. Pitt, Esq., went to trial. Trial occupied six days from July 5 through 12, 2016. On July 12, 2016, the jury entered a verdict of guilty on both counts of the Superseding Indictment. (ECF no. 176) In answers to special interrogatories, the jury found that each count involved 50 grams or more of methamphetamine, as charged. (ECF no. 178)
On July 25, 2016, Ms. Tiangco filed a motion for judgment of acquittal, under Fed. R. Crim. P. 29(c), or in the alternative for a new trial, under Fed. R. Crim. P. 33. (ECF no. 180)
Under Rule 29, a defendant who asserts that there was insufficient evidence to sustain a conviction shoulders "a very
The standard under Rule 33 is more general; a court "may vacate any judgment and grant a new trial if the interest of justice so requires." Fed. R. Crim. P. 33. When a defendant seeks a new trial claiming that the verdict was against the weight of the evidence, the court's review is less restricted than it is under Rule 29. "However, even if a district court believes that the jury verdict is contrary to the weight of the evidence, it can order a new trial `only if it believes that there is a serious danger that a miscarriage of justice has occurred — that is, that an innocent person has been convicted.'" United States v. Silveus, 542 F.3d at 1004-05 (quoting United States v. Johnson, 302 F.3d 139, 150 (3d Cir. 2002)). "Such motions are not favored and should be `granted sparingly and only in exceptional cases.'" Id. at 1005 (quoting Gov't of Virgin Islands v. Derricks, 810 F.2d 50, 55 (3d Cir. 1987) (citations omitted)). A Rule 33 motion may also be based on an alleged error or combination of errors at trial. Borrowing the appellate concept of harmless error, district courts have held that a new trial will be ordered when it is "reasonably possible that such error, or combination of errors, substantially influenced the jury's decision." United States v. Crim, 561 F.Supp.2d 530, 533 (E.D. Pa. 2008) (citing U.S. v. Copple, 24 F.3d 535, 547 n. 17 (3d Cir. 1994)), aff'd, 451 Fed.Appx. 196 (3d Cir. 2011); accord United States v. Bryant, Crim. No. 07-267, 2009 WL 1559796 at *6 (D.N.J. May 28, 2009). I remain cognizant, however, that the Rule 33 standard is both discretionary ("may") and flexible ("interest of justice").
Because the grounds for the motion are focused and particular, I dispense with an overall statement of the evidence at trial. Suffice it to say that it was persuasive and overwhelming. Ms. Tiangco acted as a broker, transporting or sending methamphetamine from a California supplier, Javier Diaz, to New Jersey distributors — originally Arlon Macatangay, and later John Freehauf. The evidence included the testimony of three coconspirators (Diaz, Freehauf, and Kristie Navarro); video of Ms. Tiangco at a UPS center sending a package containing methamphetamine (later intercepted by the agents in New Jersey); telephone calls and text messages arranging shipments; evidence that Ms. Tiangco was pulled over in Missouri with a pound of methamphetamine in her car; Navarro's eyewitness account of deliveries by Tiangco; a post-arrest letter in which Tiangco
Ms. Tiangco here revives her objection to the admission of evidence of her arrest near Joplin, Missouri, on September 15, 2009, with approximately one pound of methamphetamine in her car. On June 29 and July 6, 2016, I held a suppression hearing after which I found, based on the testimony of the officers involved, that the traffic stop was proper and that Ms. Tiangco made self-incriminatory statements after proper Miranda warnings.
At trial, the jury heard testimony from two of the police officers involved in the 2009 Missouri traffic stop and arrest. (7/7 Tr. at 73, 107) Officer Blane Cornelius described the stop for speeding and the consent search that followed. That search yielded the following, documented by photographs placed in evidence: a candy tin containing a glass methamphetamine smoking pipe, and a backpack containing a gallon ziplock bag approximately 1/3 full of methamphetamine. (7/7 Tr. 86-90; see also 110-11; Exhibs. 6B-1, 6B-2, 6B-5, 6B-7, 6B-10) Officer Schanot testified that this "large quantity" of the drug field-tested positive for methamphetamine. (7/7 Tr. at 111-12). He also introduced a recording of Ms. Tiangco's statement to the police, in which she admitted possession of the methamphetamine and stated that she was en route to New Jersey. (Exhib. 6A (transcript)). Also read into evidence was a stipulation that in 2014, Ms. Tiangco admitted that she knowingly possessed the methamphetamine that was recovered from the car in Missouri. (7/7 Tr. at 131-33)
Ms. Tiangco argues that this evidence of her transportation of methamphetamine in 2009 should be analyzed as extrinsic "prior bad acts" evidence. See Fed. R. Evid. 404(b). True, this evidence would have been extrinsic to Count 1 of the original Indictment, which was confined to the 2013-14 period. But the original Indictment created no vested entitlement to that time frame. When the government superseded the Indictment, it extended the beginning of the conspiracy period back to 2004. At trial, it introduced ample evidence of methamphetamine dealing throughout that period, supporting the expanded time frame. (See, e.g., Testimony of Javier Diaz, 7/7 Tr., passim.)
The arrest in Missouri occurred in 2009, squarely in the middle of the ten-year conspiracy charged in the Superseding Indictment. The acts involved — transportation of methamphetamine obtained from Diaz in California to a recipient in New Jersey — were part and parcel of the conspiracy. This therefore was not extrinsic evidence, but direct evidence of the conspiracy as charged. I do not accept Ms. Tiangco's argument that the government was "getting in the back door what it could not get in the front door." This was evidence of the charged offense, brought in through the "front door" of direct relevance under Rules 401 and 402. Rule 404(b) has no application to evidence that
To her main objection, Ms. Tiangco adds a couple of subordinate ones. The prosecution, she says, "inaccurately and misleadingly referred to the Missouri case as a possession with intent to distribute case rather than a possession case." (Tiangco Br. at 6) Not quite. Here is the full exchange at the pages cited by Tiangco:
(7/7 Tr. at 128:23-129:19) (emphasis added to highlight references to possession).
First of all, this exchange was not a description of the Missouri charge at all; it was a description of the Missouri events.
And it was supported by evidence. Third, and finally, the jury saw and heard overwhelming evidence of intent to distribute. The jury saw photographs of a large quantity of methamphetamine. (Exhibs. 6B-5, 6B-10) They heard evidence that a typical user would consume a gram or less, and that it would take one person perhaps a year to consume a pound.
Finally, Ms. Tiangco argues that there was no evidence that the methamphetamine seized in Missouri originated with co-conspirator Javier Diaz, or that it weighed one pound.
There was ample evidence from which the jury could conclude that Diaz was the source of the Missouri methamphetamine. Diaz testified credibly and persuasively to a long course of methamphetamine dealings with Ms. Tiangco, beginning in 2005, at times involving 10 to 20 pounds per month. (7/7 Tr. at 10-16) Diaz admitted that it was he who supplied the crystal methamphetamine that was seized from Tiangco in Missouri in 2009. (Id. at 17, 27, 31, 37-38) Indeed, he testified that he was Ms. Tiangco's only supplier. She was pulled over by the police in Missouri just two days after she left his house in Los Angeles with the drug. (Id. at 37:14, 38:1)
Ms. Tiangco insists that Diaz's testimony that the drug was his product was proven to be "inaccurate." (Tiangco Br. 6, citing 7/7 Tr. at 37, Exhibit 6B-2) Diaz, however, inspected the photograph of the drugs and testified with certainty that the depicted methamphetamine was his. The only apparent discrepancy was that the photograph did not show any newspaper, which he typically included as an inner wrapper. (7/7 Tr. at 37:17-20) Ms. Tiangco elicited this rather minor, explainable discrepancy on cross examination.
As to the weight, it is true that the police officers testified only that it was a "large quantity" (and the jurors could perhaps have judged that for themselves from the photograph). (7/7 Tr. at 111:15; Exhibs. 6B-5, 6B-10)
More generally, of course, the jury did not need to find that this particular transaction involved a pound of methamphetamine. In special interrogatories, they were called upon only to state whether the conspiracy involved at least 50 grams of methamphetamine. There was overwhelming evidentiary support for the jury's answer of "yes" to that question, and Ms. Tiangco does not directly challenge it in this motion.
Ms. Tiangco's contentions come nowhere near a Rule 29 showing that a judgment of acquittal is required. Nor do they raise the slightest issue, under Rule 33, that there was any error requiring a new trial for reasons of justice and fairness.
Count 2 alleges that on April 29, 2014, Ms. Tiango did knowingly and intentionally distribute and possess with intent to distribute 50 grams or more of methamphetamine, in violation of Title 21, United States Code, Sections 841(a) and (b)(1)(A) and Title 18, United States Code, Section 2. She argues that Count 2 must be dismissed because venue was not properly laid in New Jersey. I disagree. Venue was proper under a general "continuing offense" theory. See United States v. Uribe, 890 F.2d 554, 558-59 (1st Cir. 1989). Alternatively, venue was proper because Ms. Tiangco remained in constructive possession of the package while it was in New Jersey. See United States v. Boney, 572 F.2d 397, 400-02 (2d Cir. 1978).
The U.S. Constitution, Article III, § 2, cl. 3, requires that trials of crimes be held "in the State where said crimes shall have been committed." The Sixth Amendment provides for trial by jury "of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed." And the Federal Rules provide that "[u]nless a statute or these rules permit otherwise, the government must prosecute an offense in a district where the offense was committed." Fed. R. Crim. P. 18. Where venue is contested, "[t]he Government bears the burden of proving venue by a preponderance of the evidence and venue must be proper for each count of the indictment. United States v. Perez, 280 F.3d 318, 328-30 (3d Cir. 2002)." United States v. Root, 585 F.3d 145, 155 (3d Cir. 2009).
The government retrieved business records from UPS, as well as surveillance footage of a transaction at the counter of UPS Store #321 in Las Vegas, Nevada. That counter transaction occurred at approximately 3:46 p.m. on April 29, 2014. (Exhibs. 1A, 1B, 1C, 1D) Records confirm that, at that time and date, a package bearing tracking number 1C10598X0190432694 was dropped off at the UPS store; that the shipping account was that of "Gret Tiangco"; and that the designated recipients were Alain Tiangco and Melissa M in Long Branch, New Jersey. (7/6 Tr. at 40-41; Exhib. 1D) The surveillance video, in color and of good quality, showed that Ms. Tiangco and a companion sealed and dropped off that package at the counter of the UPS store. (7/6 Tr. 42; Exhib. 1B)
In a text message dated April 30, 2014, Tiangco sent Freehauf the package's UPS tracking number, 1C10598X0190432694. (7/6 Tr. at 29; 7/8 Tr. at 44; Exhib. 4A) In another text message exchange that day, Tiangco told Freehauf the package was already in New Jersey, that it would be at her brother's house in Long Branch by 10 a.m., and that Freehauf should hurry to pick it up because Ramon (a friend) was in need of the drug. (7/8 Tr. at 45; Exhib. 4A)
As the request of the federal agents, however, UPS detained the package at their distribution hub in Tinton Falls, New Jersey. The agents in New Jersey picked up the package from UPS. (7/6 Tr. at 30) Pursuant to a search warrant, they opened the UPS package. (7/6 Tr. at 30-31) Inside was approximately 55 grams of nearly pure methamphetamine. (See Exhibs. 15, 1, 1A, 2A) The package bore tracking number 1C10598X0190432694. It identified Ms. Tiangco as the sender, and it bore her phone number and return address. (Id.) The package was addressed to Ms. Tiangco's brother, Alain Tiangco (as well as Melissa M), in Long Branch, NJ. (7/6 Tr. at 44)
Because the package was intercepted, it never reached its addressee, Alain Tiangco, or Freehauf. Both Freehauf and Kristie Navarro testified to their considerable
Ms. Tiangco stresses that this evidence demonstrates that she acted wholly within the State of Nevada. She performed no act of distribution or possession with intent to distribute in New Jersey in connection with the April 29, 2014 package. It follows, she argues, that venue for Count 2 could not properly be laid in the District of New Jersey.
Venue must be assessed in relation to the actions made unlawful by the statute: "[T]he locus delicti must be determined from the nature of the crime alleged and the location of the act or acts constituting it." United States v. Cabrales, 524 U.S. 1, 6, 118 S.Ct. 1772, 1776, 141 L.Ed.2d 1 (1998) (quoting United States v. Anderson, 328 U.S. 699, 703, 66 S.Ct. 1213, 90 S.Ct. 1529 (1946)). Count 2 was charged as, and could be committed by, either actual distribution of methamphetamine or possession of methamphetamine with intent to distribute it. See 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1).
To "distribute" a drug is to "deliver" possession of it to another. 21 U.S.C. § 802(11). To "deliver" means "the actual, constructive, or attempted transfer of a controlled substance ... whether or not there exists an agency relationship." 21 U.S.C. § 802(8). It does not require a sale or exchange. United States v. Coady, 809 F.2d 119, 124 (1st Cir. 1987); United States v. Ramirez, 608 F.2d 1261, 1264 (9th Cir. 1979). See also United States v. Navarro, 476 F.3d 188, 196 (3d Cir. 2007) (superseded on other grounds by amendment to U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(b)). "Possession" includes physical custody. It also encompasses "constructive possession," i.e., "dominion and control" in the sense of "the ability to reduce an object to actual possession." United States v. Martorano, 709 F.2d 863, 869 (3d Cir. 1983); see also United States v. Jenkins, 90 F.3d 814, 817 (3d Cir. 1996). The jury was so charged.
The government concedes that all of Ms. Tiangco's physical actions with respect to Count 2 took place in Nevada. They point out, however, that a continuing offense "begun in one district and completed in another, or committed in more than one district, may be inquired of and prosecuted in any district in which such offense was begun, continued, or completed." 18 U.S.C. § 3237(a); United States v. Auernheimer, 748 F.3d 525, 533 (3d Cir. 2014). And "possession with intent to distribute a controlled substance is a continuing offense." United States v. Hull, 456 F.3d 133, 146 (3d Cir. 2006) (quoting United States v. Zidell, 323 F.3d 412, 422 (6th Cir. 2003)).
I am guided by United States v. Uribe, 890 F.2d 554, 558-59 (1st Cir. 1989). There, a cocaine purchaser named Rash placed a telephone call to a supplier in Warwick, Rhode Island to order a kilogram of cocaine. The supplier obtained a kilogram from his source in Rhode Island. The supplier then traveled to Worcester, Massachusetts, where he delivered the package to Rash. Rash was named in a substantive count of possession with intent to distribute, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), brought in the District of Rhode Island. Rash contested venue, objecting that he "never had possession of the contraband, actual or constructive, within the district" (i.e., Rhode Island). Id. at 558. The Court of Appeals, per Selya, J., demurred:
Id. at 559.
Ms. Tiangco sealed and deposited a package with UPS for delivery in New Jersey. This process was underway and ongoing, within the State of New Jersey, until the agents diverted the package. Under Uribe, because possession with intent to distribute is a continuing offense, venue is proper along the way until the package arrives at its destination.
The Second Circuit rejected defendant's arguments based on the law governing commercial transactions, bills of lading, passage of title, and the like. Such concepts, it held, were overridden by broader criminal law concepts of possession and culpability. Id. at 401. The goal of preventing drug trafficking and the goal of promoting stability in legitimate business transactions, it held, were divergent and did not merit parallel treatment.
Rather, the Boney court reasoned, the air freight carrier acted as the agent of Boney as shipper. If, the court explained, the intended recipient "had not appeared to claim the goods, [Boney] could have retrieved them from the carrier.... she did not lose possession until the methaqualone was actually delivered. In that sense, the carrier was like any other agent whose possession was constructively that of his principal." Id. at 401. Nor was it significant that the intended recipient was in fact a government informer, and that the criminal scheme was therefore doomed to fail:
Id. at 401-02.
Viewing the facts through the lens of Boney, I find that Ms. Tiangco retained dominion, control, and the ability to reduce the package to possession. She thus remained in constructive possession of the package while it was in New Jersey. For this reason, too, venue over the charge of possession with intent to distribute was proper.
Defendant cites a number of cases, chief among them United States v. Tingle, 183 F.3d 719 (7th Cir. 1999), which found venue improper as to drug distribution counts. There, however, defendant Tingle had
It is important to remember, first of all, that the relevant count of that indictment charged Tingle with distribution to Rathers. It did not charge possession with intent to distribute. It therefore would have been fruitless to argue that Tingle continued to constructively possess the drug when it was in the hands of Rathers in Wisconsin, or that she was culpable for Rathers's delivery to Judon. So Uribe and Boney, both involving charges of possession with intent to distribute, are distinguishable right off the bat.
Even as to a distribution charge, however, the facts of Tingle are distinguishable. I do not suggest that, where a drug was distributed from one person to another in district #1, a subsequent delivery down the chain of distribution in district #2 would give district #2 venue over the original distribution. But venue over Count 2 here is not based on the happenstance of a subsequent act of distribution between third parties in New Jersey. Rather, Tiangco committed the drugs to a courier service, an intermediary she chose for the very purpose of having the package delivered to Long Branch, New Jersey (although it only got as far as the UPS facility in Tinton Falls, New Jersey). Thus Ms. Tiangco purposefully engaged in a unitary interstate transfer of drugs. That, I think, is sufficient to distinguish Tingle and confer venue. See also n. 15, supra.
This is a continuing offense which, although begun elsewhere, continued into this district. A delivery from Tiangco to the New Jersey UPS personnel occurred in New Jersey. An attempted delivery to Tiangco's brother occurred in New Jersey. A possessory offense continued into this district under the principles of Uribe. And a constructive possession (coupled with a contemporaneous intent to distribute) occurred in New Jersey under the principles of Boney.
Venue as to Count 2 therefore was properly laid in New Jersey. There being no error, there is no basis to enter a judgment of acquittal or order a new trial on Count 2.
Ms. Tiangco asserts that the Court's refusal to ask one of her proposed voir dire questions requires acquittal or a new trial. At issue is her Proposed Question 32: "Do you have any opinions or beliefs about Bruce/Caitlyn Jenner?"
(Court's Question no. 22)
Voir dire questioning of prospective jurors, pursuant to Fed. R. Crim. P. 24(a), is generally a matter for the court's discretion. If, voir dire examination is conducted by the Court, as is the custom in this District, the Court must permit counsel to propose questions. Id. I did accept proposed questions from counsel, and I adopted many of them. At voir dire, I also followed up with additional questions as necessary to develop the venire members' responses. There was no violation of Rule 24 procedures here; I therefore turn to more general standards governing voir dire.
"`[V]oir dire' is the appropriate method for inquiry into possible prejudice or bias on the part of jurors, and ... the procedure used must provide a reasonable assurance for the discovery of prejudice." Waldorf v. Shuta, 3 F.3d 705, 709 (3d Cir. 1993) (citing, inter alia, Gov't of Virgin Islands v. Dowling, 814 F.2d 134, 139 (3d Cir. 1987)). "In making this determination, we note that the method of conducting the voir dire is left to the sound discretion of the district court. Generally, a district judge need not pursue any specific line of questioning on voir dire. Any method is sufficient provided it is probative on
The concerns of juror bias raised in Poole and Segal were specific and direct. The concerns expressed in Ms. Tiangco's case, however, were diffuse and general. Counsel never claimed that Ms. Tiangco is herself transgender. There were stray references to a "girlfriend," but again no indication whatsoever that person is transgender. One government witness, coconspirator Benjamin Navarro, was born biologically male but identifies as female, and prefers to be known as Kristie. (7/8 Tr. at 94) Navarro was in a relationship with Freehauf, knew Ms. Tiangco, and participated in the methamphetamine distribution conspiracy. But again, there was no specific indication that anything about the jurors' attitudes toward Navarro might affect their judgment as to Ms. Tiangco's guilt.
Concerns about jurors' attitudes toward transgender persons would therefore seem to apply to Ms. Tiangco only obliquely, if at all. Nevertheless, I entertained the notion that there might be some potential for bias, however unpredictable. I therefore did not refuse to address the subject matter of transgender persons; I simply declined to adopt the particular question suggested by the defense. See Butler, supra.
Defense counsel seems to regard the proposed question about Caitlyn Jenner as the royal road to the jurors' subconscious (or conscious) attitudes. I was not persuaded. I judged that this was not the sole, or even the best, means of uncovering relevant bias. I did, however, grant defense counsel's application to include a question about transgender status.
The question I did ask fully addressed defense counsel's concerns. That I settled on this particular question as a means of addressing the transgender issue was a judgment well within my discretion as the trial judge. Moreover, reviewing the voir dire as a whole, I am satisfied that it was reasonably designed to uncover the prejudices of jurors that would be relevant to identification of a challenge for cause or a basis for a peremptory strike. See generally Segal, supra; United States v. Salamone, 800 F.2d 1216, 1225-26 (3d Cir. 1986).
There is no error or likelihood of prejudice requiring a new trial, and certainly no basis for a judgment of acquittal.
Finally, to be clear, I have considered the defendant's claims of error cumulatively. Individually, they do not raise a substantial possibility of prejudice. Taken together, they likewise do not suggest any prejudice, unfairness, or evidentiary insufficiency that would warrant a new trial or judgment of acquittal.
For the foregoing reasons, the post-trial motion (ECF no. 180) of defendant Margaret
United States v. Taylor, 559 Fed.Appx. 122, 126-27 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 135 S.Ct. 125, 190 L.Ed.2d 95 (2014) (quoting Perez, 280 F.3d at 334).
Ms. Tiangco's Rule 29 motion for a judgment of acquittal at the close of the government's case included an argument that venue of Count 2 was inappropriate. I denied that motion orally. This seemed to me to be a legal dispute, not a factual one. Nevertheless, because the issue of venue was disputed, out of caution I submitted it to the jury for decision. The relevant jury instruction was delivered as follows:
This is essentially Model Third Circuit Jury Instruction (Criminal) 3.09 with the second paragraph ("Regarding Count Two ...") inserted.
The defendant did not object to the language of this charge, which the parties worked out in conference. Error, assuming any is asserted, was surely harmless. The parties do not contest the venue-creating facts — i.e., the defendant's sending of the package from Las Vegas and its interception in New Jersey before it reached the intended recipient. Rather, Ms. Tiangco argues here, as she did at the close of the government's case, that those facts do not suffice as a matter of law to support venue in this District.
United States v. Murphy, 323 F.3d 102, 118 (3d Cir. 2003).
I conclude that vacating the conviction on Count 2 would have little or no practical effect, given Tiangco's conviction on Count 1. The overarching nature of the Count 1 conspiracy implies that the evidence would have been precisely the same even if Count 1 had been tried separately. The Count 2 shipment, even if found to be out-of-state, was unquestionably conduct in furtherance of the conspiracy. The jury therefore could not have been confused or misled into considering evidence that did not properly relate to Count 1. It follows that there is little possibility of prejudice or taint from the inclusion of Count 2, even if it were ultimately found invalid.
In addition, the sentences on Counts 1 and 2 would run concurrently as a matter of law, and the offense level will reflect aggregation of all drug amounts involved in the conspiracy. See U.S.S.G. §§ 5G1.2(c), 3D1.2(d), 1B1.3. At most, then, reversal of Count 2 would require a reviewing Court to vacate one of the $100 special assessments, which are imposed on a per-count basis. See 18 U.S.C. § 3013(a)(2). As the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held in a two-count case like this one:
United States v. Thomas, 690 F.3d 358, 372 (5th Cir. 2012). See also Tingle, 183 F.3d at 728 ("This will not affect Tingle's sentence, however, for the sentence on this count was to run concurrent with her conspiracy sentence.").
While I would not ordinarily cite Wikipedia as authoritative, it is probably an accurate reflection of information that is before the public. Considered in that way, it is relevant to the jury selection question.
