MEMORANDUM OPINION

KEVIN McNULTY, District Judge.

On June 30, 2016, I filed in all four of the above-captioned actions an Opinion and Order (see, e.g., 13 cv 6981 ECF nos. 167, 168). There, an arbitration award was confirmed in favor of Asta Funding Inc. ("Asta") and against New World Solution, Inc. ("NWS"), David Shaun Neal, and Robert F. Coyne. In addition, and in the alternative, summary judgment was granted in favor of Asta, and denied to Neal and Coyne, after a full opportunity for federalcourt discovery. The petitions of Neal and Coyne to vacate the arbitration award were dismissed, and miscellaneous motions were denied. Now before the Court are identical motions, filed in all four actions, for reconsideration of the Opinion and Order.1 For the reasons stated herein, the motions are denied.

This Court authorizes motions for reconsideration pursuant to Local Civil Rule 7. 1(i).2 Bowers v. Nat'l Collegiate Athletics Assoc., 130 F.Supp.2d 610, 612 (D.N.J. 2001). That Rule states:

L. Civ. R. 7.1(i).

A motion for reconsideration pursuant to this District's Local Rules or Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59 is "an extremely limited procedural vehicle.'" Tehan v. Disability Mgmt. Servs., Inc., 111 F.Supp.2d 542, 549 (D.N.J. 2000) (quoting Resorts Int'l, Inc. v. Greate Bay Hotel and Casino, Inc., 830 F.Supp. 826, 831 (D.N.J. 1992)). A court will grant a motion for reconsideration only where: (1) an intervening change in the controlling law has occurred; (2) evidence not previously available has become available; or (3) it is necessary to correct a clear error of law or prevent manifest injustice. Max's Seafood Cafe ex rel. Lou-Ann, Inc. v. Quinteros, 176 F.3d 669, 677 (3d Cir. 1999); Beety— Monticelli v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 343 F. App'x. 743, 747 (3d Cir. 2009) (non-precedential). In other words, such a motion may be granted where facts or controlling legal authority were presented to, but not considered by, the court. Mauro v. N.J. Supreme Ct., 238 F. App'x 791, 793 (3d Cir. 2007) (non-precedential).

Reconsideration is not warranted, however, where (1) the movant simply repeats the cases and arguments previously analyzed by the court, Arista Recs., Inc. v. Flea World, Inc., 356 F.Supp.2d 411, 416 (D.N.J. 2005); see also Tehan, 111 F. Supp. 2d at 549 ("Motions for reconsideration will not be granted where a party simply asks the court to analyze the same facts and cases it had already considered . . . ."); or (2) the movant has filed the motion merely to disagree with or relitigate the court's initial decision, id.; see Morris v. Siemens Components, Inc., 938 F.Supp. 277, 278 (D.N.J. 1996) ("A party's mere disagreement with a decision of the district court should be raised in the ordinary appellate process and is inappropriate on a motion for reargument."). The motion is not a vehicle for a litigant to raise new arguments or present evidence that could have been raised prior to the initial judgment. See Bapu Corp. v. Choice Hotels Int'l, Inc., Civ. No. 07-5938, 2010 WL 5418972 (D.N.J. Dec. 23, 2010) (citing P. Schoenfeld Asset Mgmt. LLC v. Cendant Corp., 161 F.Supp.2d 349, 352 (D.N.J. 2001)).

Because the requirements are so stringent, motions for reconsideration typically are not granted; rather, relief is "an extraordinary remedy" to be granted "sparingly." See NL Indus. Inc. v. Commercial Union Ins. Co., 935 F.Supp. 513, 516 (D.N.J. 1996). Unless a court has truly failed to consider pertinent authorities or evidence that could not with reasonable diligence have been presented earlier, a motion to reconsider a decision (even one that may contain an error) is generally futile. None of the features warranting reconsideration are present in this motion.

Emblematic of the inadequacy of this motion is its first point: the contention that the agreement at issue did not incorporate the Arbitration Rules of the American Arbitration Association ("AAA"). As pointed out in my Opinion, the agreement at issue contained the following clause:

(Opinion at 5) That, I held, was a "clear and unmistakable" statement of intent that arbitration be governed by the AAA Rules. (Opinion at 27-28)

Neal and Coyne now argue that this clause was ineffective because different language is "required by the AAA Rules." They do not cite the "AAA Rules" to which they are referring. At any rate, the language they cite is not a "magic words" formulation, but a standard clause. It has been judicially upheld, but never judicially required. All that is required, as stated in my Opinion, is that the language convey a clear and unmistakable intent to arbitrate and to do so under the AAA rules.3 The clause in this agreement, as I found, meets that requirement. Neal and Coyne may think that it does not, but they offer no basis under the standards stated above, such as overlooked authority or an argument that was unavailable to them at the time, to reopen the Court's decision. In their view, I have held that an arbitrator, under the AAA Rules, may extend jurisdiction over "whomever he felt," or over "any nonparty." But the Court, in a thirteen page discussion, carefully stated the legal bases for, and limits of, such jurisdiction. (See Opinion at 25-38)

The remainder of the motion simply states certain reasons that Neal and Coyne disagree with the Opinion or the Court's interpretation of case law. No arguments that are new, or that could not have been pursued at the time of the motions, are proffered. Indeed, these seem to be the very arguments that Neal and Coyne did pursue, and that were rejected by the Court for the reasons stated in the Opinion.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the motion for reconsideration (ECF no. 170) is denied. A separate order will issue.