CONTINUANCE ORDER

KAREN M. WILLIAMS, Magistrate Judge.

This matter having come before the Court on the joint application of Paul J. Fishman, United States Attorney for the District of New Jersey (by Matthew J. Skahill, Assistant U.S. Attorney), and the defendant, Harold Miller, through his attorney, Christopher O'Malley, Esq., for an order granting a continuance of the proceedings in the above-captioned matter so that the defendant will have additional time to consult with counsel and enter a plea pursuant to a signed plea agreement, and the defendant having signed a plea agreement, and the parties jointly requesting additional time so that this matter may be scheduled for a change of plea hearing in front of a United States District Court Judge; and the defendant being aware that he has the right to have the matter submitted to a grand jury within thirty days of the date of his initial appearance pursuant to Title 18, United States Code, Section 3161(b); and the defendant, through his attorney, having consented to the continuance and waived such right; and for good cause shown;

IT IS THE FINDING OF THIS COURT that this action should be continued for the following reasons:

(1) The defendant, through his counsel, has requested additional time in order to consult with counsel and enter a plea pursuant to a signed plea agreement;

(2) The United States and the defendant have jointly represented that the parties have entered into a written plea agreement and desire additional time so that this matter may be scheduled for a change of plea hearing in front of a United States District Judge, which would render any subsequent trial of this matter unnecessary;

(3) The grant of a continuance will likely conserve judicial resources; and

(4) Pursuant to Title 18, United States Code, Section 3161(h)(7), the ends of justice served by granting the continuance outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial.

IT IS, therefore, on this 19th day of December, 2016,

ORDERED that this action be, and it hereby is, continued from and including the date this order is signed through and including January 31, 2017; and it is further

ORDERED that the period from and including the date this order is signed through and including January 31, 2017 shall be excludable in computing time under the Speedy Trial Act of 1974.