KEVIN McNULTY, District Judge.
The petitioner, Tawakalitu Atinuke Shifat, is an immigration detainee currently lodged at the Hudson County Correctional Facility in Kearny, New Jersey. Ms. Shifat is proceeding pro se with a petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. Her petition challenges her immigration detention and also alludes to a denial of medical care. For the following reasons, the habeas petition will be summarily dismissed without prejudice.
Ms. Shifat is a native of Nigeria. She was placed into immigration detention on November 2, 2015. On May 5, 2016, an Immigration Judge ("IJ") ordered Ms. Shifat removed. The Board of Immigration Appeals ("BIA") dismissed Ms. Shifat's appeal of that removal order on December 9, 2016. Ms. Shifat's motion to reopen was denied by the BIA on February 24, 2017. According to the petition, Ms. Shifat's motion for stay of removal remains pending before the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.
In April 2017, this Court received Ms. Shifat's petition for a writ of habeas corpus. Ms. Shifat asserts that her prolonged immigration detention violates the Constitution. Additionally, she protests a lack of medical care, alluding to an operation that immigration authorities state they cannot fund. (See Dkt. No. 1 at p.10)
With respect to screening the petition, 28 U.S.C. § 2243 provides in relevant part:
"[A] district court is authorized to dismiss a [habeas] petition summarily when it plainly appears from the face of the petition and any exhibits annexed to it that the petitioner is not entitled to relief in the district court [.]" Lonchar v. Thomas, 517 U.S. 314, 320 (1996).
Ms. Shifat is now subject to a final order of removal. See 8 C.F.R. § 1241.1(a) (order or removal by IJ becomes final upon dismissal of appeal by the BIA). Post-removal immigration detention can become excessive at some point. Title 8 of the United States Code Section 1231(a)(1)(A) states that, "except as otherwise provided in this section, when an alien is ordered removed, the Attorney General shall remove the alien from the United States within a period of 90 days (in this section referred to as the "removal period")." Id. § 1231(a)(1)(A). The removal period begins on the latest of the following:
Id. § 1231(a)(1)(B). Federal regulations provide that:
8 C.F.R. § 1241.1. Section 1231(a)(2) requires that the alien be detained during the ninety day post-removal order period. See 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(2). If the alien is not removed during that ninety-day period, then § 1231(a)(6) authorizes either continued detention or release on bond:
8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6).
In Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001), the United States Supreme Court held that § 1231(a)(6) "limits an alien's post-removal-period detention to a period reasonably necessary to bring about that alien's removal from the United States. It does not permit indefinite detention." 533 U.S. at 689. To state a habeas claim under § 2241, the petitioner must provide facts showing good reason to believe that there is no reasonable likelihood of his actual removal in the reasonably foreseeable future. See Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 701. "Zadvydas does not delineate the boundaries of evidentiary sufficiency, but it suggests that an inversely proportional relationship is at play: the longer an alien is detained, the less he must put forward to obtain relief" Alexander v. Attorney Gen. United States, 495 F. App'x 274, 276-77 (3d Cir. 2012) (citing Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 701). As a rule of thumb, the Supreme Court stated that six months is a presumptively reasonable period of post-removal detention under § 1231(a)(6). See Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 701.
Ms. Shifat's post-removal immigration detention began on December 9, 2016, when the BIA dismissed her appeal. See 8 C.F.R. § 1241.1(a). Thus, her immigration detention is still within the presumptively reasonable six-month period of post-removal immigration detention set forth in Zadvydas. Her challenge is therefore premature. Accord Grossett v. Muller, No. 13-0364, 2013 WL 6582944, at *3 (D.N.J. Dec. 13, 2013) (noting Zadvydas claim is premature if filed prior to expiration of six-month presumptively reasonable removal period); Abdou v. Elwood, No. 12-7720, 2013 WL 1405774, at *4 (D.N.J. Apr. 4, 2013) (same). Should the United States fail to execute the order of removal within a reasonable time, the claim may be reasserted. My dismissal of her petition is without prejudice to such a later challenge.
Ms. Shifat also asserts in her habeas petition that she has been denied adequate medical care by immigration authorities. To the extent this may have been intended as a separate claim, it relates to the conditions of her confinement at the Hudson County Correctional Facility. Such a conditions-of-confinement claim is appropriately brought in a civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, not as a supplement to a habeas petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. See Woodruff v. Williamson, 362 F. App'x 263, 266 (3d Cir. 2010); see also Leamer v. Fauver, 288 F.3d 532, 542 (3d Cir.2002) ("[W]henever the challenge ultimately attacks the `core of habeas' — the validity of the continued conviction or the fact or length of the sentence — a challenge, however, denominated and regardless of the relief sought, must be brought by way of a habeas corpus petition. Conversely, when the challenge is to a condition of confinement, such that a finding in plaintiff's failure would not alter his sentence or undo his conviction, [a civil rights action] is appropriate.").
Accordingly, I will dismiss Ms. Shifat's medical care claim. See Brown v. Warden Lewisburg USP, 601 F. App'x 85, 86 (3d Cir. 2015) (finding district court properly dismissed habeas petition where petitioner raised claims associated with his conditions of confinement since they are not cognizable habeas claims). This dismissal is without prejudice to assertion of such a claim in a properly filed § 1983 action.
For the foregoing reasons, the habeas petition is dismissed without prejudice. An appropriate order will be entered.