NOT FOR PUBLICATION

OPINION

KATHARINE S. HAYDEN, District Judge.

I. Background

Pending before this Court is plaintiff Roberta Bordeaux's motion for class certification in a Fair Debt Collections Practices Act suit against defendants LTD Financial Services, LP and Advantage Assets II, Inc. In conjunction with that, defendants are appealing orders of Magistrate Judge Cathy Waldor directed toward their submissions on class certification.

After both parties fully briefed the class certification issue, defendants moved before Judge Waldor for an order striking a declaration of plaintiff's attorney Andrew Thomasson (D.E. 63-3) under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(f), or in the alternative under L. Civ. R. 7.2(a).1 (D.E. 73.) Among other things, the Thomasson declaration contended that defendants "never produced or disclosed in discovery" certain exhibits that they attached to their opposition papers. (Id. at ¶ 7.)

By text order (D.E. 80), Judge Waldor denied the motion to strike and further, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(c)(1), she struck Exhibits C, F, and G from defendant's opposition submissions. Defendants filed a timely appeal to this Court. (D.E. 83.)

II. Standard of Review

"The district court may modify the magistrate's order only if the district court finds that the magistrate's ruling was clearly erroneous or contrary to law." Cipollone v. Liggett Grp., Inc., 785 F.2d 1108, 1120 (3d Cir. 1986); 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A); L. Civ. R. 72.1(c)(1)(A). On questions of fact, a "reviewing court will not reverse the magistrate judge's determination even if the court might have decided the matter differently." In re Bristol-Meyers Squibb Sec. Lit., No. 00-1990, 2003 WL 2592198 at *2 (D.N.J. June 25, 2003). In contrast, the district court reviews questions of law de novo. Id; see also Cooper Hospital/Univ. Med. Center v. Sullivan, 183 F.R.D. 119, 127 (D.N.J. 1998).

III. Discussion

According to defendants, the Thomasson declaration should be stricken for three reasons: (1) the declaration includes "immaterial and scandalous2 statements meant to attack the credibility of defense counsel"; (2) the declaration asserts legal and factual arguments; and (3) the factual allegations asserted are "outside the scope of the declarant's personal knowledge." (D.E. 83 at 8.) As to the stricken exhibits, defendants argue that they are permissible as rebuttal evidence; that Judge Waldor does not have the authority to strike exhibits sua sponte; and finally that in submitting, they did not act in bad faith. (Id. at 13, 17-19.)

As to defendants' challenge to the contents of the Thomasson declaration, the Court is not persuaded that Judge Waldor's denial of the motion to strike was "clearly erroneous or contrary to law." Local Civil Rule 7.2(a) requires affidavits, declarations, certifications, and other similar documents to include only "statements of fact within the personal knowledge of the signatory," and it prohibits arguments of facts and law, as well as legal arguments and conclusions. L. Civ. R. 7.2(a). As plaintiff's attorney, Thomasson has personal knowledge of what documents were turned over to him throughout discovery, as well as what documents were submitted past the discovery deadline. To the extent a declaration crosses the line into "legal arguments and summations," Local Rule 7.2(a) directs that those "will be disregarded by the Court and may subject the signatory to appropriate censure, sanctions, or both." As such, the Court either may disregard a declarant's legal conclusions and credit only the facts stated, or the Court may take further steps such as censure and sanctions.3 Here, Judge Waldor—who has conducted discovery beginning in April 2016 (D.E. 12)—decided the Thomasson declaration satisfied the requirements of Local Rule 7.2(a), and the Court finds her ruling was not clearly erroneous or contrary to law.

As to defendants' second argument, Rule 37(c)(1) states "if a party fails to provide information . . . as required by Rule 26(a) or (e), the party is not allowed to use that information . . . to supply evidence on a motion . . . unless the failure was substantially justified or is harmless." Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(c)(1). The Rule authorizes sanctions, including payment of reasonable expenses, informing the jury of the party's failure, and other appropriate means of enforcement. Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(c)(1)(A-C).

The docket indicates that Judge Waldor originally set a fact discovery deadline for January 17, 2017. She granted defendants' request and extended it to March 15, 2017. (D.E. 12; D.E. 29.) Exhibits C, F, and G were filed as exhibits on May 23, 2017, over two months past the already-extended discovery deadline. (D.E. 56.) On July 24, Judge Waldor struck these exhibits because "[p]roduction of these documents occurred outside the scheduling order without cause." (D.E. 80.) Discovery management and the issuance of sanctions for violations thereof are squarely in the authority of magistrate judges. See, 28 U.S.C. § 632(b)(1). Judge Waldor's actions are neither "clearly erroneous [nor] contrary to law."

IV. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, the Court denies defendants' appeal. An appropriate order will be entered.