ROBERT B. KUGLER, District Judge.
Plaintiffs have a long and storied history with the United States judicial system.
In March 2000, Plaintiffs were enjoined from filing new litigation in the federal court system in South Carolina. Potter v. Mosteller, Civ. No. 5:98-1158-22 (D.N.J. Mar. 22, 2000). Plaintiffs were described as "seasoned litigators with more trial experience than many attorneys" who had continuously and consistently "harass[ed] Defendants." Id. at 19.
In March 2005, Plaintiffs "conspired to advance [the] litigation as a blatant and transparent sham proceeding for the purpose of defrauding the insurers." Potter v. Potter, Civ. No. AMD 00-63, Mem. Opp. at 4, (D. Md. Mar. 28, 2005). Mr. Potter has sued his former neighbors, John and Ashley Sorantino, in at least 13 separate civil complaints in Cumberland, Cape May, and Atlantic Counties. Mr. Potter also filed at least 35 separate criminal complaints against them. In September 2008, a jury trial awarded the Sorantinos $249,000 in damages for malicious prosecution by Mr. Potter. (CCSD Mot. PI at Ex. M.) Plaintiffs additionally brought suit against anyone even tangentially involved in these cases. (CCSD Mot. PI at Ex. O.)
After the verdict, Mr. Potter filed an amended complaint in the Atlantic County matter (CCSD Mot. PI at Ex. P.) On December 5, 2008, he sued the Sorantinos' counsel.
This case arises from what happened next. Mr. Potter alleges that on September 1, 2011, the bankruptcy court terminated his petition and thus the Property belonged to him, despite the eviction order by the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Middle District of Florida pursuant to the Trustee's request. (Am. Compl. at 19.) On October 19, 2011, Ms. Potter also filed for bankruptcy, claiming assets and liabilities in the range of $0-50,000. (Id. at 20; see Pl. Aff. (Doc. No. 81) at Ex. Q.) Plaintiffs assert that they then immediately served notice that same day of this bankruptcy filing on every defendant in this case (there are 66 named defendants).
Plaintiffs subsequently brought claims for: Defendants' Willful Violation of Title 11 U.S.C. § 362 et seq. (Count One); Conversion (Count Two); Trespass (Count Three); Tortious Interference With Contractual Relations (Count Four); Unlawful Interference With Prospective Economic Advantage (Count Five); Malicious Prosecution (Count Six); and Breach of Contract (Count Seven). Given Plaintiffs' litigation history, this Court ordered Plaintiffs to submit competent evidence to the Court regarding Plaintiffs' claims.
There are two primary sources of subject-matter jurisdiction for federal district courts. The first is diversity jurisdiction. This form of jurisdiction permits individuals to bring claims in federal court where the claim exceeds $75,000 and the parties are citizens of different states. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332. The second is federal-question jurisdiction. Under federal question jurisdiction, a litigant—regardless of the value of the claim—may bring a claim in federal court if it arises under federal law, including the United States Constitution. See 28 U.S.C. § 1331.
Furthermore, 28 U.S.C. § 1367 provides for supplemental jurisdiction in federal courts. Supplemental jurisdiction allows a federal court to adjudicate a claim over which it does not have independent subject-matter jurisdiction, on the basis that the claim is related to a claim over which the federal court does have independent jurisdiction.
Because subject-matter jurisdiction is non-waivable, courts have an independent obligation to satisfy themselves of jurisdiction if it is in doubt. Nesbit v. Gears Unlimited, Inc., 347 F.3d 72, 76-77 (3d Cir. 2003) (citing Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. V. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 278 (1977)). A necessary corollary is that a court can raise sua sponte subject-matter jurisdiction concerns. Nesbit, 347 F.3d at 77.
Pursuant to the All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a), a district court may enter a pre-filing injunction "to preclude abusive, groundless and vexatious litigation." Brow v. Farrelly, 994 F.2d 1027, 1038 (3d Cir. 1993). "When a district court is confronted with a pattern of conduct from which it can only conclude that a litigant is intentionally abusing the judicial process and will continue to do so unless restrained, we believe it is entitled to resort to its power of injunction and contempt to protect its process." Abdul-Akbar v. Watson, 901 F.2d 329, 333 (3d Cir. 1990)). "Courts have uniformly sanctioned litigants who attempt to relitigate issues already decided against [them] . . ." Dunleavy v. Gannon, 2012 WL 259382 (D.N.J. Jan. 26, 2012) (citing Napier v. Thirty or More Unidentified Fed. Agents, Employees or Officers, 855 F.2d 1080 (3d Cir. 1988)).
However, "the District Court should not restrict a litigant from filing claims absent exigent circumstances, such as a litigant's continuous abuse of the judicial process by filing meritless and repetitive actions." Farrelly, 994 F.2d at 1037. Moreover, "[i]f the circumstances warrant the imposition of an injunction, the District Court must give notice to the litigant to show cause why the proposed injunctive relief should not issue." Id. Finally, "the scope of the injunctive order must be narrowly tailored to fit the particular circumstances of the case before the District Court." Id.
"[A] party may amend its pleading only with the opposing party's written consent or the court's leave," but "[t]he court should freely give leave when justice so requires." Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a). There is no evidence that this motion was unduly delayed, in bad faith, had a dilatory motive, or caused unfair prejudice, though, as we will discuss, it is futile. Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 108 (3d Cir. 2002).
As we delve into below, we do not have jurisdiction over the claims in the Amended Complaint. As such, the Motion to Amend must be denied because it is futile.
Upon initial glance, it may appear as if Plaintiffs properly plead a federal question—they allege that all the defendants violated the 11 U.S.C. § 362 automatic stay of Ms. Potter's estate by participating in a raid of her property the day after she filed her bankruptcy petition. (See Am. Compl.) The automatic stay contention is, however, improperly plead.
A claim arising from an alleged willful violation of § 362(k) is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Bankruptcy Court. In re Aleckna, 543 B.R. 717, 719-20 (M.D. Pa. 2016) (citing In re Roman-Perez, 527 B.R. 844, 852 (Bankr. D.P.R. 2015)). As such, Plaintiffs' 11 U.S.C. § 362(k) claim must be properly plead in the Bankruptcy Court—this Court only has appellate jurisdiction over such a claim.
Because the federal vehicle for Plaintiffs' Complaint is not cognizable, this Court cannot exercise jurisdiction over Plaintiffs' remaining claims. They are New Jersey tort claims concerning non-diverse parties, and therefore may properly be brought in New Jersey state court, assuming, of course, that they are not vexatious and malicious, as will be discussed below.
Plaintiffs' serial complaints—dozens in both federal and state courts up and down the Eastern seaboard—and voluminous filings make out a preliminary showing of abuse of the judicial system. Plaintiffs' repeated attempts to create new controversies by suing the same defendants repeatedly—like Mr. Reilly, the CCPO, the Sorantinos, and more—and wantonly disregarding past judgments
As a result, Plaintiffs will be required to show cause within twenty days of the order accompanying this opinion why their pattern of conduct, which has forced the expenditure of dizzying amounts of judicial and legal resources, does not justify a tailored pre-filing injunction that provides the following:
Because this Court does not have subject-matter jurisdiction over this case, the outstanding motions—Plaintiffs' Cross Motion for the Imposition of Pre-Filing Injunctions and to Strike Document No. 15 (Doc. No. 17); CCPO and Mr. Reilly's Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs' Complaint (Doc. No. 35); the Looses' Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs' Complaint (Doc. No. 58); Plaintiffs' Motion to Prohibit CCSD From Joining ECF 58 (Doc. No. 71); defendant Bruce J. Duke LLC and Bruce J. Duke's Motion to Dismiss with Prejudice for Failure to State a Claim Upon which Relief can be Granted (Doc. No. 78); and Plaintiffs' Motion to Reset the Return Date of 78 to Its Initial Return Date of July 16, 2018 (Doc. No. 79)—are hereby dismissed as moot.
For the reasons discussed above, Plaintiffs' Motion to Amend Pleadings (Doc. No. 69) is