BRIAN R. MARTINOTTI, District Judge.
Before this Court is Regina T. Babice's ("Babice") appeal from the final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security ("Commissioner"),
On April 8, 2013, Babice filed a Title II application for a period of disability and disability insurance benefits, alleging disability since January 16, 2012. (Tr. 221, 246, 259.) The claim was denied on June 10, 2013, and denied upon reconsideration on January 6, 2014. (Tr. 155-59, 171-75.) Begina filed a written request for hearing on January 23, 2014. Babice and her husband Nicholas Babice appeared and testified at the hearing held on December 17, 2015. (Tr. 46-47.) At the hearing, Babice's attorney requested an additional fourteen days to submit additional medical records. (Tr. 116.) Post-hearing medical records were received and reviewed. (Tr. 11-12.)
On February 11, 2016, the ALJ issued an unfavorable decision. (Tr. 23.) The decision provides, in relevant part:
(Tr. 26-38.)
The Appeals Council denied Babice's request for review on July 28, 2016. (Tr. 7-10.) Therefore, the ALJ decision became the final decision of the Commissioner, and on September 30, 2016, Babice brought this appeal. (ECF No. 1.)
On a review of a final decision of the Commissioner of the Social Security Administration, a district court "shall have power to enter, upon the pleadings and transcript of the record, a judgment affirming, modifying, or reversing the decision of the Commissioner of Social Security, with or without remanding the cause for a rehearing." 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); see Matthews v. Apfel, 239 F.3d 589, 592 (3d Cir. 2001). The Commissioner's decisions regarding questions of fact are deemed conclusive on a reviewing court if supported by "substantial evidence in the record." 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); see Knepp v. Apfel, 204 F.3d 78, 83 (3d Cir. 2000). This Court must affirm an ALJ's decision if it is supported by substantial evidence. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g), 1383(c)(3). Substantial evidence is "more than a mere scintilla. It means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971) (quoting Consol. Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938)). To determine whether an ALJ's decision is supported by substantial evidence, this Court must review the evidence in its totality. Daring v. Heckler, 727 F.2d 64, 70 (3d Cir. 1984). However, this Court may not "weigh the evidence or substitute its conclusions for those of the fact-finder." Williams v. Sullivan, 970 F.2d 1178, 1182 (3d Cir. 1992) (citation omitted). Accordingly, this Court may not set an ALJ's decision aside, "even if [it] would have decided the factual inquiry differently." Hartranft v. Apfel, 181 F.3d 358, 360 (3d Cir. 1999) (citations omitted).
Under the Social Security Act, the Social Security Administration is authorized to pay Social Security Insurance to "disabled" persons. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a). A person is "disabled" if he is unable to engage in "any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months." 20 C.F.R. § 404.1505(a). A person is unable to engage in substantial gainful activity when his physical or mental impairments are of such severity that he is not only unable to do his previous work but cannot, considering his age, education, and work experience, engage in any other kind of "substantial gainful work that exists in the national economy." Id.
Regulations promulgated under the Social Security Act establish a five-step process for determining whether a claimant is disabled. 20 C.F.R. § 416 .920(a)(1). First, the ALJ determines whether the claimant has shown that he or she is not currently engaged in "substantial gainful activity." Id. §§ 404.1520(b), 416.920(b); see Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137, 146-47 n.5 (1987). If a claimant is presently engaged in any form of substantial gainful activity, he or she is automatically denied disability benefits. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(b); see also Bowen, 482 U.S. at 140. Second, the ALJ determines whether the claimant has demonstrated a "severe impairment" or "combination of impairments" that significantly limits his physical or mental ability to do basic work activities. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(c), 416.920(c); see Bowen, 482 U.S. at 146-47 n.5. Basic work activities are defined as "the abilities and aptitudes necessary to do most jobs." 20 C.F.R. § 404.1521(b). These activities include physical functions such as "walking, standing, sitting, lifting, pushing, pulling, reaching, carrying or handling." Id. A claimant who does not have a severe impairment is not considered disabled. Id. at § 404.1520(c); see Plummer v. Apfel, 186 F.3d 422, 428 (3d Cir. 1999).
Third, if the impairment is found to be severe, the ALJ then determines whether the impairment meets or is equal to the impairments listed in 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P., App. 1 (the "Impairment List"). 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(iii). If the claimant demonstrates that his or her impairments are equal in severity to, or meet those on the Impairment List, the claimant has satisfied his or her burden of proof and is automatically entitled to benefits. See id. at §§ 404.1520(d), 416.920(d); see also Bowen, 482 U.S. at 146-47 n.5. If the specific impairment is not listed, the ALJ will consider in his or her decision the impairment that most closely satisfies those listed for purposes of deciding whether the impairment is medically equivalent. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1526(a). If there is more than one impairment, the ALJ then must consider whether the combination of impairments is equal to any listed impairment. Id. An impairment or combination of impairments is basically equivalent to a listed impairment if there are medical findings equal in severity to all the criteria for the one most similar. Williams, 970 F.2d at 1186.
If the claimant is not conclusively disabled under the criteria set forth in the Impairment List, step three is not satisfied, and the claimant must prove at step four whether he or she retains the "residual functional capacity" ("RFC") to perform his or her past relevant work. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(e)-(f), 416.920(e)-(f); Bowen, 482 U.S. at 141. Step four involves three sub-steps:
Burnett v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 220 F.3d 112, 120 (3d Cir. 2000) (citations omitted). When determining RFC, "[a]n ALJ may reject a treating physician's opinion outright only on the basis of contradictory medical evidence, but may afford a treating physician's opinion more or less weight depending upon the extent to which supporting explanations are provided." Hoyman v. Colvin, 606 F. App'x 678, 679-80 (3d Cir. 2015) (quoting Plummer, 186 F.3d at 429). Unsupported diagnoses are not entitled to great weight. Jones v. Sullivan, 954 F.2d 125, 129 (3d Cir. 1991). Moreover, an administrative law judge must provide the reason for providing more or less weight to the evidence. See Fragnoli v. Massanari, 247 F.3d 34, 42 (3d Cir. 2001).
The claimant is not disabled if his RFC allows him to perform his past relevant work. 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(a)(4)(iv). However, if the claimant's RFC prevents him from doing so, an administrative law judge proceeds to the fifth and final step of the process. Id. The final step requires the administrative law judge to "show [that] there are other jobs existing in significant numbers in the national economy which the claimant can perform, consistent with her medical impairments, age, education, past work experience, and [RFC]." Plummer, 186 F.3d at 428. In doing so, "[t]he ALJ must analyze the cumulative effect of all the claimant's impairments in determining whether she is capable of performing work and is not disabled." Id. (citation omitted). Notably, an administrative law judge typically seeks the assistance of a vocational expert at this final step. Id. (citation omitted).
The claimant bears the burden of proof for steps one, two, and four. Sykes v. Apfel, 228 F.3d 259, 263 (3d Cir. 2000). Neither side bears the burden of proof for step three "[b]ecause step three involves a conclusive presumption based on the listings." Id. at 263 n.2 (citing Bowen, 482 U.S. at 146-47 n.5). An administrative law judge bears the burden of proof for the fifth step. See id. at 263.
Babice argues the ALJ did not make a proper finding at step two because her anxiety and depression are considered "severe" impairments. (ECF No. 35 at 11.) She argues this determination "tainted the findings at Steps 3 and 5." (Id.) The Commissioner argues there is substantial evidence in the record to support the ALJ's finding that Babice did not have a severe mental impairment. (ECF No. 37.)
A claimant bears the burden of proving she has a severe impairment at step two of the sequential process. Sykes, 228 F.3d at 263. An "impairment or combination of impairments" is not severe if it does not "significantly limit[] your physical or mental ability to do basic work activities." 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(c), 404.1522. "Basic work activities" include "the abilities and aptitudes necessary to do most jobs." 20 C.F.R. § 404.1522(b). Examples include:
Id. A mental impairment is generally considered nonsevere if the degree of functional limitation in the following four functional areas is "none" or "mild": "[u]nderstand, remember or apply information; interact with others; concentrate, persist, or maintain pace; and adapt or manage oneself." 20 C.F.R. § 404a(c)(3), (d)(1).
Here, the ALJ's determination that Babice's "medically determinable mental impairments of depression and anxiety, considered singly and in combination, do not cause more than minimal limitation in [her] ability to perform basic mental work activities and [is] therefore nonsevere," is supported by substantial evidence in the record. (Tr. 28.) The record supports the ALJ's finding as to the first functional area, with respect to activities of daily living. Indeed, Babice traveled with her husband for three years, could prepare simple meals, launder clothes, and perform light cleaning around the house. (Tr. 29, 290-92.) Most of Babice's alleged limitations were limited by physical, rather than mental issues. (Tr. 290-92.) With respect to her social functioning, she did not have difficulty traveling, as she found physical therapy treatment centers in different states. She shopped in stores, talked on the phone and texted with family and friends, and admitted getting alone with authority figures. (Tr. 29, 60-62, 96-98, 290, 293-94.) As to the third function area, concentration, persistence, or pace, Babice admitted she spends the day watching television and reading. (Tr. 293-94.) She can pay bills, maintain a savings account, count change, and use a checkbook. (Tr. 29, 293.) Further, she admitted she could pay attention "as long as [she] need[ed] to," and that she followed written and spoken instructions "very well." (Tr. 29, 295.) As to episodes of decompensation, Babice experienced no episodes of decompensations of an extended duration. (Tr. 29.)
In addition to the record supporting that Babice's limitations of the four functional areas was mild or none, Babice failed to mentation any mental impairments at the hearing. Further, Babice's opposition also lacks evidence to support her argument that her depression and anxiety were severe. The opposition merely states she was prescribed medication for her disorders and that a psychiatrist found her to have "anxiety and depression related to ongoing physical problems. She was tearful and had trouble staying focused. Had anxiety attacks and is on meds." (ECF No. 35 at 13.) This is insufficient to support a finding that her anxiety and depression was severe. Even assuming it was sufficient, the ALJ's decision was supported by substantial evidence in the record therefore, this Court may not "weigh the evidence or substitute its conclusions for those of the fact-finder." Williams, 970 F.2d at 1182. This Court may not set an ALJ's decision aside, "even if [it] would have decided the factual inquiry differently." Hartranft, 181 F.3d at 360. Lastly, Babice's own psychiatrist, Sandra Pric-Embury, Ph.D. opined she had no limitation in the ability to perform work-related mental activities. (Tr. 957.)
Because there is substantial evidence to support the ALJ's findings that Babice's mental impairments were nonsevere, the Court finds no error at step two.
Babice argues her seven severe medically determined impairments meet or equal the listings at step three. (ECF No. 35 at 13.) She further argues "[a] decision must match the evidence to the specific Listings requirements for both the individual and combined impairments. Without the analysis there cannot be a meaningful review." (Id. at 15.) The Commissioner argues "the ALJ considered the evidence relevant to Listings 1.02 and 1.04, and substantial evidence demonstrates that [Babice's] impairments were not of listing-level severity." (ECF No. 37 at 7.)
The listings articulated in 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P., App. 1, are descriptions of various physical and mental illnesses and abnormalities, categorized by the body system they affect. Sullivan v. Zebley, 493 U.S. 521, 529-30 (1990). All impairments are defined "in terms of several specific medical signs, symptoms, or laboratory test results." Id. at 530. "For a claimant to show that his impairment matches a listing, it must meet all of the specified medical criteria. An impairment that manifests only some of those criteria, no matter how severely, does not qualify." Id.; see Social Security Ruling (SSR) 83-19, Dep't of Health & Human Servs. Rulings 90 (Jan. 1983) ("An impairment meets a listed condition . . . only when it manifests the specific findings described in the set of medical criteria for that listed impairment."); 20 C.F.R. § 416.926(a) (1989) (noting that a claimant's impairment is "equivalent" to a listed impairment "if the medical findings are at least equal in severity and duration to the criteria of any listed impairment"). "A claimant cannot qualify for benefits under the `equivalence' step by showing that the overall functional impact of his unlisted impairment or combination of impairments is as severe as that of a listed impairment." Sullivan, 493 U.S. at 531-32 (citing SSR 83-19, at 91-92 ("[I]t is incorrect to consider whether the listing is equaled on the basis of an assessment of overall functional impairment. . . . The functional consequences of the impairments . . . irrespective of their nature or extent, cannot justify a determination of equivalence.").
The Third Circuit requires "the ALJ to set forth the reasons for [her] decision" for her step-three analysis. Burnett v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 220 F.3d 112, 119 (3d Cir. 2000). Conclusory statements have been found to be "beyond meaningful judicial review." Cotter v. Harris, 642 F.2d 700, 704-05 (3d Cir. 1981). In Burnett, the Third Circuit remanded the matter because the ALJ made only conclusory statements without mentioning any specific listed impairments or explaining his reasoning. Burnett, 220 F.3d at 119-20 (finding "although [Plaintiff] has established that she suffered from a severe musculoskeletal [impairment], said impairment failed to equal the level of severity of any disabling condition contained in Appendix 1, Subpart of Social Security Regulations No. 4."). In Torres v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 279 F. App'x 149, 152 (3d Cir. 2008), the court found "the ALJ failed at step three by failing to consider [Plaintiff's] impairments in combination when determining medical equivalence." Further, the "ALJ failed to combine [Plaintiff's] many medical impairments and compare them to analogous Appendix 1 listings." Id. The ALJ's entire analysis consisted of one cursory paragraph stating:
Id.
Here, the ALJ's entire analysis consisted of three paragraphs, only one which directly addressed the impairments and listed impairments, stating:
(Tr. 30 (emphasis added).) The ALJ's step three analysis is unquestionably conclusory. She failed to directly compare the seven severe medically determined impairments to any listing in 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P., App. 1. She also failed to explain why the impairments do not meet or equal the Listings individually or in combination. Indeed, the ALJ never combined the impairments and compared them to the listed impairments. The ALJ's conclusory statements are "beyond meaningful judicial review." Cotter, 642 F.2d at 704-05. Because the Court has no way of reviewing the ALJ's step three ruling, the Commissioner's final decision is
Having decided to remand the case at step three, the Court has no obligation to reach Babice's other arguments at steps four and five. Vivaritas v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 264 F. App'x. 155, 156-57 (3d Cir. 2008) ("Inasmuch as further development of the record and the ALJ's decision based on that record may make consideration of steps four and five of the five-step sequential evaluation procedure unnecessary, we do not reach [plaintiff's] other challenges to the ALJ's decision.").
For the reasons set forth above, the Court
