KEVIN McNULTY, District Judge.
The plaintiff, Mr. Ibrahim, served our country in the U.S. Navy from 1980-82. In 2012, he submitted a service-related claim to the United States Department of Veterans' Affairs (the "VA") based on a laceration and smashed phalanx.
On June 1, 2018, Mr. Ibrahim filed this action against the VA and several of its employees. He seeks the benefits that were denied, alleges that he was denied due process, and asserts claims under the Federal Tort Claims Act ("FTCA"), 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b), and the Administrative Procedure Act ("APA"), 5 U.S.C § 500 et seq. This matter comes before the court upon the motion of the plaintiff for a default judgment (DE 21) and the motion of the defendants to dismiss the complaint for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction (DE 16).
The plaintiff's motion for entry of a default judgment must be denied. To begin with, there has been no clerk's entry of default, which is a prerequisite for such a motion. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(a). Given the plaintiff's pro se status, however, I look past that defect and consider whether there has been a default.
The complaint was served on the United States Attorney's Office on October 25, 2018. (DE 20 p.2; acknowledgement of service by receptionist).
The United States has not defaulted, but has timely responded to the complaint via a Rule 12(b) motion. Neither entry of default nor a default judgment is warranted. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 55. The plaintiff's motion for a default judgment is therefore denied.
I next consider the motion of the United States and the other defendants to dismiss the complaint for lack of jurisdiction. (DE 16) The jurisdiction of this Court must be assessed against the background of the principle that the United States can be sued only to the extent it has waived its sovereign immunity. See FDIC v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 484, 114 S.Ct. 996 (1994).
The United States persuasively argues that, by statutory decree, this Court lacks jurisdiction over claims relating to VA benefits. That is not to say that there is no remedy for a veteran who is denied benefits. It is just to say that Mr. Ibrahim is in the wrong court.
As the government points out, Mr. Ibrahim's claim for benefits based on his injuries is governed by a specialized statutory scheme under the Veterans' Judicial Review Act ("VJRA"). Under the VJRA, the VA's decisions as to questions of law and fact in relation to benefits determinations are final and unreviewable. 38 U.S.C § 511;
Mr. Ibrahim is not without recourse, however. A veteran denied benefits may obtain review via a three-part, statutorily-defined review process, which I will refer to as the "VJRA Appeal Procedure." First, the veteran must file a notice of disagreement with the Board of Veterans Appeals. See 38 U.S.C. § 7104(a). Second, as to appeals from decisions of the Board, the Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims has exclusive jurisdiction. See 38 U.S.C. §§ 7252(a), 7266(a). Third, any appeal from that court may be heard by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. See 38 U.S.C. § 7292(a). See generally Jayme v. United States, Civ. No. 10-3248, 2011 WL 4412431, at *2 (D.N.J. Sept. 21, 2011) (overview of procedure). That VJRA Appeal Procedure is the sole and exclusive means of review of an adverse benefits determination.
So far, the plaintiff does not really disagree. He seems to draw a distinction, however, between his claim for benefits, which should be heard via the VJRA Appeal Procedure, and his claim that he was deprived of due process, which he says should be heard in this Court. (See Pl. Responding Brf. 3, DE 18. ("I am objecting to the defense dismissal of this case, and I can be partial to a part of this matter to be referred to the United States Court of Appeal for Veteran Claims and move forward on the Deprivation of Rights by employees and agents of the Department of Veteran Affairs."))
I therefore consider whether the plaintiff's claim of denial of due process sets forth a distinct claim that is not within the scope of the VJRA's bar to this court's jurisdiction. As to that issue, I am aided by the analysis of Veterans for Common Sense v. Shinseki, 678 F.3d 1013 (9th Cir. 2012) (en banc). Veterans for Common Sense emphasizes that the scope of the VJRA's exclusion is very broad indeed, applying not only to benefits decisions, but to all decisions that may affect them:
Veterans for Common Sense, 678 F.3d at 1025-26.
In Veterans for Common Sense, the plaintiff organization asserted, inter alia, that the VA's procedures for processing mental health and disability benefits claims were inadequate and slow. It asserted violations of the APA and constitutional claims of deprivation of due process. These claims, said the plaintiff organization, were generalized and did not challenge the outcome of any particular benefits decision. Nevertheless, the Ninth Circuit held that the VJRA's statutory bar to jurisdiction, 38 U.S.C. § 511(a), applied.
The plaintiff's claims, said the Court, however they were couched, nevertheless sought relief that would impact on individual benefits decisions and require the court to review them. 678 F.3d at 1027-28. Nor was it significant that the claims were postured as constitutional claims of denial of due process by the VA or its personnel:
Id. at 1031 (citing cases).
It follows from these well-established principles that this Court lacks jurisdiction over Mr. Ibrahim's claim, including those aspects that claim he was deprived of due process. He may pursue his claims, however, through the VJRA Appeal Procedure—first in the Board of Veterans Appeals, next in the Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims, and ultimately, if appropriate, in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit.
For the foregoing reasons, the plaintiff's motion for a default judgment (DE 21) is DENIED, and the defendants' motion to dismiss the complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction (DE 16) is GRANTED.
38 U.S.C. § 511(a). Subsection (b) provides for certain exceptions not relevant here.
678 F.3d at 1031-32 (emphasis in original; case citations omitted). And ultimately, of course, an appeal would lie to an Article III Court, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. Id. at 1032.