ORDER FOR CONTINUANCE

FREDA L. WOLFSON, Chief District Judge.

This matter having come before the Court on the joint application of Craig Carpenito, United States Attorney for the District of New Jersey (by Catherine R. Murphy, Assistant United States Attorney), and defendant Kevin Rogers (by Patrick McMahon, Assistant Federal Public Defender), for an order granting a continuance of the proceedings in the above-captioned matter from the date this Order is signed through and including December 1, 2019, to permit defense counsel the reasonable time necessary for effective preparation in this matter and to allow the parties to enter into plea negotiations; and the defendant being aware that he has the right to have the matter brought to trial within 70 days of the date of his appearance before a judicial officer of this court pursuant to Title 18, United States Code, Section 3161(c); and one prior continuance having been entered; and the defendant, through his attorney, having consented to the continuance; and for good and sufficient cause shown,

IT IS THE FINDING OF THIS COURT that this action should be continued for the following reasons:

(1) Taking into account the exercise of diligence, the facts of this case require that defense counsel be permitted a reasonable amount of additional time for effective preparation in this matter;

(2) Both the United States and the defendant seek additional time to continue plea negotiations, which would render any subsequent trial of this matter unnecessary;

(3) The defendant has consented to the aforementioned continuance;

(4) The grant of a continuance likely will conserve judicial resources; and;

(5) As a result of the foregoing, pursuant to Title 18, United States Code, Section 3161(h)(7), the ends of justice served by granting the continuance outweigh the best interests of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial.

WHEREFORE, it is on this 1st day of October, 2019;

ORDERED that this action be, and it hereby is, continued from the date this Order is signed through and including December 1, 2019; and it is further

ORDERED that the period from the date this Order is signed through and including December 1, 2019, and shall be excludable in computing time under the Speedy Trial Act of 1974.