NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

PER CURIAM.

Defendant, Ralph Kiett, Jr., appeals from an order denying his petition for post-conviction relief. The petition was filed in March 2008, as a "motion to correct illegal sentence." In a letter opinion dated April 12, 2010, Judge DeLury articulated his reasons for denying the petition. We affirm.

The incident giving rise to the April 15, 1985 indictment occurred in early 1982. The nineteen-year-old victim had disappeared on the night of February 25, 1982. Six days later, her nude body, clad only in socks and stabbed twenty-eight times, was found in a marshy area in Atlantic City.

"The evidence that defendant committed the crime was overwhelming." State v. Kiett, 121 N.J. 483, 485 (1990). He was a seventeen-year-old juvenile.

The indictment charged defendant in seven counts: three of murder, two of weapon possession, and two of aggravated sexual assault. "The prosecutor filed notice of aggravating factors under N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3c(2)(e), designating the matter as a capital case." Id. at 485.

While incarcerated at the Cumberland County Juvenile Detention Center, defendant pushed a guard in order to grab his keys, punched another guard, and fled. Defendant was apprehended and charged in a second indictment with escape and two counts of aggravated assault.

The trial court waived Family Part jurisdiction and referred the matters for trial in the Law Division, Criminal Part. On September 17, 1985, defendant entered guilty pleas to murder and escape. Pursuant to the plea bargain, "the prosecutor agreed, in effect, not to seek the death penalty." Id. at 486. The remaining charges in the two indictments were to be dismissed.

On November 25, 1985, after analyzing the aggravating and mitigating factors, the trial court sentenced defendant in accordance with the State's recommendation as recited in the plea bargain: on the murder conviction, to a prison term for life with thirty years of parole ineligibility; and, on the escape conviction, to a consecutive ten-year term with five years of parole ineligibility.

On appeal, the Supreme Court held that, because defendant, as a juvenile, was not eligible for the death penalty, and because he had entered his guilty plea to capital murder "under a misapprehension that the death penalty was applicable to juveniles, . . . pursuant to a plea bargain that removed the risk of the death penalty[,]" id. at 484, defendant could withdraw his plea of guilty to murder, id. at 499. The matter was remanded.

On April 12, 1991, after new negotiations and a plea agreement, defendant entered a retraxit plea of guilty. The agreement contemplated a sentence of life imprisonment with thirty years of parole ineligibility for murder, and a concurrent term of imprisonment for ten years with five years of parole ineligibility for escape. The remaining charges were to be dismissed. On April 26, 1991, the trial court, after weighing the aggravating and mitigating factors, imposed sentence in conformity with the plea agreement.

On March 12, 2008, defendant, pro se, filed a "motion to correct illegal sentence." That motion was treated as a petition for post-conviction relief. Counsel filed a brief on behalf of defendant on October 2, 2009. Defendant also filed three pro se briefs.

Judge DeLury heard argument in the matter on March 11, 2010. He denied the petition in an order entered on April 28, 2010, for reasons expressed in a letter opinion dated April 12, 2010. Judge DeLury held that, under the terms of Rule 3:22-12, the petition for post-conviction relief was barred by the passage of so much time. He also determined that, under the second standard of Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1984), and State v. Fritz, 105 N.J. 42 (1987), i.e., that different conduct by trial counsel would have produced a different result, defendant had not made a prima facie showing of ineffective assistance of trial counsel either in respect of counsel's omission to argue mitigating factors or in counsel's lack of objection to "double-counting" of aggravating factors. The judge went on to observe that we had already rejected defendant's excessive sentencing claim, precluding further consideration under Rule 3:22-5. He found, as well, that defendant had made no adequate prima facie showing that he was insane at the time the crime was committed. Finally, the judge rejected defendant's argument that his guilty plea lacked a sufficient factual basis in any significant particular thereby rendering the sentence illegal.

Defendant opens his points on appeal by stressing that "the standard of review is plenary," and he raises three additional arguments: that "the PCR judge erred in finding that [defendant's] motion for post[-]conviction relief should be time barred"; that "the PCR judge erred in failing to find [defendant's] trial counsel was ineffective" by reason of a "failure to address any mitigating factors" in the sentencing proceeding; and that "the PCR judge erred in finding that counsel was not ineffective for failing to object to double— counting of aggravating factors."

After analyzing the record in the light of the arguments advanced by the parties, we are in essential agreement with the reasons articulated by Judge DeLury for denying the petition for post-conviction relief, and we affirm substantially for the reasons set out in his written opinion.

Affirmed.