NOT FOR PUBLICATION

PER CURIAM.

Defendant Czeslaw Koc appeals from his convictions for driving while intoxicated (DWI) and driving with a suspended license. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.

I.

Defendant was charged in the Township of Washington, Bergen County, with DWI, in violation of N.J.S.A. 39:4-50, driving while his license was suspended, in violation of N.J.S.A. 39:3-40; and driving without a license, contrary to N.J.S.A. 39:3-10. Defendant moved in the municipal court to suppress the evidence obtained in the stop of his vehicle. Defendant also moved to suppress the results of his breathalyzer tests based on the use of a Canadian ampoule in the testing process.

The municipal court judge conducted a hearing and thereafter denied the motions. Defendant then entered a conditional plea of guilty to DWI and driving while suspended, reserving the right to challenge on appeal the denial of his suppression motions. The State agreed to dismiss the charge of driving without a license.

On the DWI conviction, the judge imposed a $1000 fine, $33 in court costs, a $200 DWI surcharge, a $50 assessment for the Violent Crimes Compensation Board, and a $75 assessment for the Safe Neighborhood Fund. The judge also imposed a ten-year suspension of defendant's driving privileges, ordered defendant to install a ignition interlock device on his vehicle for three years, and required defendant to serve 180 days in jail. On the conviction for driving while suspended, the judge imposed a $250 fine, $33 in court costs and a concurrent ten-year license suspension.

Defendant sought de novo review by the Law Division. The trial court considered the matter on November 15, 2010, and on that date, placed its decision on the record. The court found that the police had lawfully stopped defendant's vehicle. The court also found that the State had established that the breathalyzer test administered to defendant yielded "an accurate, reliable result."

The court found defendant guilty of DWI and driving while suspended. The court imposed the same sentences the municipal court judge had imposed, with the exception of the length of the license suspension for driving while suspended, which the court reduced to six months. The court entered a judgment of conviction dated November 15, 2011, memorializing its decisions. The trial court stayed the fines, license suspension and jail sentence pending appeal.

Defendant appeals and raises the following arguments for our consideration:

II.

Defendant first argues that the trial court erred by denying his motion to suppress evidence obtained in the stop of his motor vehicle. We disagree.

"Law enforcement officers `may stop motor vehicles where they have a reasonable or articulable suspicion that a motor vehicle violation has occurred.'" State v. Barrow, 408 N.J.Super. 509, 517 (App. Div. 2009) (quoting State v. Murphy, 238 N.J.Super. 546, 553 (App. Div. 1990)). "`Reasonable suspicion' means that `the police officer must be able to point to specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant that intrusion.'" Ibid. (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 1880, 20 L. Ed. 2d 889, 906 (1968)).

At the suppression hearing in the municipal court, Salvatore Padovano (Padovano), the owner of a liquor store and bar located in a strip mall in Washington Township, testified that on December 26, 2008, defendant entered the store and went to the bar. Padavano was at the front counter.

Defendant sat down at the bar. He ordered a Dewar's scotch whiskey mixed with club soda or water. The bartender served that drink and a second drink of the same kind. Another bartender served defendant a third scotch whiskey. Padavano said that, after twenty or twenty-five minutes, defendant was bobbing his head and slurring his speech. His eyes looked "droopy."

Padavano asked defendant if he wanted him to call for a taxi or get defendant a ride home. Defendant told Padavano he did not need a ride because he was going to walk home. Over the next ten minutes, Padavano asked defendant seven or eight times if he needed a taxi or a ride home. Defendant said he was walking and was fine. After this conversation, the bar's employees took defendant's third drink from him. Defendant had consumed less than a fourth of that drink.

Defendant left the bar. Padavano went to the window to make sure defendant was going to walk. He observed defendant get into his car. Padavano called the police and informed the police that a customer of the bar had gotten into his vehicle and should not be driving because he had too much to drink. The police were in the area to respond to a report of an unruly patron at another bar across the street. When defendant began to drive out of the parking lot, a police car pulled in front of his vehicle.

Corporal Thomas Lawton (Lawton) of the Washington Township Police Department was the officer driving that police vehicle. Lawton exited the police vehicle and observed Padovano pointing at defendant's car. Padovano told Lawton that the driver of that vehicle had just come out of his bar, had too much to drink, and should not be driving.

Lawton approached defendant's vehicle. Its engine was running. The lights were on. It was raining and defendant had activated his windshield wipers. Lawton was standing next to the driver's door of defendant's car. He detected the odor of alcohol emanating from defendant's breath. Lawton also observed that defendant's eyes were bloodshot. Defendant admitted that he had been drinking. He said he had two drinks. Lawton asked defendant to exit the vehicle.

We are satisfied that the trial court correctly found that the police officer had reasonable suspicion to believe that defendant was driving while intoxicated. Defendant was behind the wheel of his car and he was driving it out of the parking lot when Lawton pulled his vehicle in front of defendant's car. As noted, Padavano pointed to defendant, told the officer that defendant had been in the bar, had too much to drink, and should not be driving.

Defendant argues, however, that the police officer did not have grounds to make the stop. Defendant contends that none of the witnesses observed any "untoward driving whatsoever." He asserts that he was merely sitting in his vehicle and his conduct was "completely innocuous." Defendant contends that he did nothing to suggest that he was engaged in or about to engage in any criminal conduct.

We disagree. "The State need not prove that the suspected motor vehicle violation has in fact occurred, only that the officer had a reasonable, articulable and objective basis for justifying the stop." Barrow, supra, 408 N.J. Super. at 518 (citing State v. Locurto, 157 N.J. 463, 470 (1999)). Here, the information that Padavano provided to the officer gave him a sufficient basis to stop defendant's car.

Defendant's reliance upon State v. Stampone, 341 N.J.Super. 247 (App. Div. 2001), is misplaced. In that case, the police officer observed a motor vehicle with Kansas license plates parked on a residential street in Saddle Brook at around 5:00 p.m. Id. at 249. The defendant was in the driver's seat and the car's engine was not running. Ibid. The defendant did not make eye contact with the officer. Ibid. A burglary had occurred on the street a week or two earlier. Ibid. The officer approached the car and asked the defendant what he was doing there. Id. at 250. The defendant replied that he was waiting for his girlfriend. Ibid.

The officer twice asked the defendant to provide identification and he refused to do so. Ibid. The officer asked the defendant to provide his driver's license. Ibid. When asked again, he initially refused but eventually retrieved his license from the trunk of the car. Ibid. When the officer opened the driver's door of the car, the defendant reached over and slammed the door into the officer's legs. Ibid. The defendant was found guilty of failing to exhibit his license, contrary to N.J.S.A. 39:3-29, and disorderly conduct, contrary to N.J.S.A. 2C:33-2(a)(1). Id. at 249.

We held that, based on these facts, the officer did not have grounds to make an investigate stop. Id. at 252. We noted that the officer was not prohibited from approaching defendant and engaging him in voluntary conversation as part of a field inquiry. Ibid. (citing State v. Maryland, 167 N.J. 471, 482-83 (2001)). We concluded, however, that the officer went from the field inquiry to an investigative stop "without the benefit of articulable suspicion." Id. at 253.

However, as the trial court recognized in this matter, Stampone is distinguishable on its facts. Here, the officer did not merely happen upon defendant sitting in a car parked on the side of the road with the engine turned off. As we have explained, defendant was driving his car out of the parking lot and Padavano informed the officer that defendant was unfit to drive because of his consumption of alcohol. Based on that information, the officer had a reasonable, articulable suspicion that defendant was driving while intoxicated.

We therefore conclude that the record fully supports the trial court's denial of defendant's motion to suppress evidence based on an allegedly unlawful traffic stop.

III.

Defendant also argues that the trial court erred by denying his motion to suppress the results of the breathalyzer test. Again, we disagree.

In State v. Maure, 240 N.J.Super. 269, 271 (App. Div. 1990), aff'd o.b., 123 N.J. 457 (1991), the defendant challenged that admission of breathalyzer readings, arguing that the State failed to establish that the ampoules used in the test "were properly constituted and mixed to proper proportions." Ibid. The ampoules were taken from a batch manufactured by Guth Laboratories (Guth). Id. at 272. Guth had supplied random sample ampoules to an independent laboratory for an analysis of their chemical composition. Ibid.

The State had presented the municipal court with a certificate from the lab indicating that the ampoules had been tested and found to be properly constituted and mixed to correct proportions. Ibid. The certificate was not, however, properly authenticated. Ibid. The municipal court suppressed the breathalyzer readings, and the trial court affirmed. Id. at 273. We granted the State's motion for leave to appeal. Id. at 274.

We noted in Maure that the case law has long required the State to show by "clear and convincing proof that the ampoule used in testing a defendant was properly constituted." Id. at 279. We held that "`spot checking of a random ampoule [from the same batch as that used in a particular test] is sufficient prima facie proof that the chemicals in the test ampoule were of the proper kind and mixed to proper proportion.'" Id. at 280 (quoting State v. Dickens, 130 N.J.Super. 73, 79 (App. Div. 1974)).

We also held that the foundational requirements for admission of the breathalyzer results would be satisfied by the admission of the State Police Coordinator's certifications "indicating that random sample testing of ampoules from the same batch that was used in the defendants' breathalyzer tests has been conducted both before and after those examinations." Id. at 281. We noted, however, that the certifications are not unassailable and the defendant is not precluded from challenging the breathalyzer results on the ground that the test ampoule was in some way defective. Id. at 283.

In this case, the trial court correctly determined that the State had established by clear and convincing evidence that the breathalyzer instrument used to test defendant was in proper working order. The court stated that the State had established a foundation for admission of the breathalyzer results by presenting the State Police Coordinator's Breath Testing Instrument Inspection Certificates, which indicated that the breathalyzer was tested on December 11, 2008 and February 18, 2009, and found to be in proper working order. The court correctly found that, under Maure, the results of defendant's breathalyzer tests were admissible.

Defendant argues that the trial court erred because the assay certificate regarding the testing of the Canadian ampoules was unreliable. At the suppression hearing, defendant presented testimony from Gary M. Aramini (Aramini), who raised questions as to the validity of the certificate. Among other things, Aramini said the certificate did not have information that had previously been included in assay certificates provided with Guth's ampoules, including measures of "acid concentration" and "normality." Aramini also said that he did not know anything about the persons involved in the tests or what had been done.

The trial court correctly determined, however, that under Maure, the breathalyzer results were admissible here based on the certifications of the State Police Coordinator that the breathalyzer had been tested before and after the tests and worked properly. Indeed, on cross-examination, Aramini conceded that the machine would not have worked properly if the ampoules were defective.

Defendant additionally argues that since there was no confrontation or cross-examination of the persons involved in the Canadian tests, the court should not have credited the Canadian assay certificate and the breathalyzer results should have been excluded. However, as we have explained, the admission of the results of defendant's breathalyzer tests was not dependent upon the validity of the Canadian testing certificate. Moreover, defendant did not have a right to confront the individual who prepared the certificate. State v. Sweet, 195 N.J. 357, 374 (2008), cert. denied, 557 U.S. ____, 129 S.Ct. 2858, 174 L. Ed. 2d 601 (2009).

Affirmed.