NOT FOR PUBLICATION

PER CURIAM.

Plaintiff Beverly Ann Williamson appeals from an order of the Law Division enforcing a settlement agreement among the parties resolving a lawsuit instituted by plaintiff, compelling her to execute the Negotiated Settlement Agreement and General Release (Agreement and Release), dismissing with prejudice her complaint, and directing payment of the settlement proceeds by separate checks to plaintiff and to her attorney. Plaintiff claims there was no meeting of the minds, she was fraudulently induced to sign the one-page post-mediation document, and the court denied her due process. We affirm in part and vacate and remand in part.

In 2009, plaintiff, represented by Eldridge Hawkins, Esquire, filed suit against her employer and supervisory personnel (collectively defendants) alleging violations of the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination and the New Jersey Constitution, breach of the implied covenant of good faith, and wrongful discharge and hostile working environment. The parties participated in discovery, which was extended through July 9, 2011, as well as an unsuccessful court-ordered mediation.

At some point during the litigation, Ty Hyderally, Esquire, began representing plaintiff. On May 3, 2011, the parties participated in voluntary, private mediation, which lasted approximately nine hours.1 At the conclusion, the parties purportedly reached a settlement in which plaintiff would dismiss her complaint with prejudice in exchange for $125,000 plus the cost of six months of medical, dental and vision insurance. Defendants would also characterize a portion of the settlement proceeds as payment for unreimbursed medical expenses for which plaintiff would receive a 1099 IRS form. Plaintiff, the mediator, and an attorney for defendants affixed their signatures, "[a]gree[ing] as to form and content," to a one-page document that provided, in pertinent part:

Plaintiff subsequently provided information to defendants regarding her total unreimbursed medical expenses. On May 13, 2011, defendants forwarded to plaintiff's counsel an eleven-page Agreement and Release. By email ten days later, defendants were advised that plaintiff was "declining settlement."

Defendants filed a motion to enforce the settlement and compel plaintiff to sign the Agreement and Release, supported by a certification by Brett Anders, one of defendants' attorneys who participated in the mediation. Plaintiff, who had become pro se, sent the court letters in opposition, stating, in pertinent part, that the post-mediation document did not outline an entire settlement, there was no meeting of the minds as to the material terms, and the Agreement and Release contained terms to which she did not agree. Plaintiff also claimed she "was told" the post-mediation document was a "confidentiality agreement." In her July 17, 2011 letter, plaintiff asserted that "Mr. Anders stated that it was a confidentiality agreement after mediation. He slid it to Mr. Hyderally who was standing next to him and he briefly looked at it and slid it across the table to me." Plaintiff also expressed distrust of Hyderally, whom she claimed was no longer her attorney.

Plaintiff, Hyderally, and defense counsel participated in oral argument on July 22, 2011. Anders explained that after they reached an oral agreement to settle, the mediator typed the one-page "summary of the settlement which became the key terms, namely, the dollar amount and the fact that the lawsuit be dismissed" and it was signed by plaintiff, a representative of defendant company, and the mediator. Hyderally stated that he represented plaintiff until after the mediation and plaintiff released him as counsel while they were discussing the terms of the settlement agreement. He represented that "we had a[n] agreement at the mediation," and explained that plaintiff wanted some parts of the formal agreement to be modified but they never got past that point. Plaintiff was sworn in at the outset of the argument and participated in the discussions regarding the amount of the health insurance reimbursement and the issuance of the separate checks and the 1099 forms. The court concluded that a settlement had been reached and determined that an award of $5,000 for health care was "fair," resulting in an aggregate settlement figure of $130,000. Based on the colloquy, it appears that Hyderally had filed a fee petition, but at argument he agreed to cap his fees at the forty-percent figure contained in the fee agreement with plaintiff.2 The court perfunctorily awarded him forty-percent of the $125,000, plus costs.

The court's ruling was memorialized in an order of July 22, 2011, enforcing the May 3, 2011 settlement agreement among the parties, compelling plaintiff to execute the Agreement and Release, dismissing her complaint with prejudice, and directing defendants to forward two checks to plaintiff totaling $77,807.12, and a $52,193.48 check to Hyderally. By order of August 19, 2011, the court granted defendants' motion to modify the order and stay its payment obligation pending appeal, conditioned on the payment of interest to plaintiff on the funds from that date. This appeal ensued.

On appeal, plaintiff argues the trial court erred in enforcing the settlement against her without having conducted a hearing to resolve the disputed question of fact of whether she was advised by her attorney and defense counsel that a mere confidentiality agreement had been reached and the parties would attempt to work out a settlement agreement in the coming weeks. According to plaintiff, the court should have heard testimony from plaintiff and counsel present at the mediation as to what occurred there and what was intended, and made findings of fact in that regard. Plaintiff submits the procedure followed by the court violated that prescribed by Amatuzzo v. Kozmiuk, 305 N.J.Super. 469, 475 (App. Div. 1997), warranting remand for a hearing to determine the existence and scope of an enforceable settlement among the parties.

Plaintiff alternatively argues that if a settlement were reached, the court failed to address her objections as to its scope and terms. She contends the Agreement and Release contained terms to which she never agreed and which were not encompassed within a fair reading of the one-page, post-mediation document signed by her. Plaintiff seeks a remand with direction that the settlement be limited to the terms set forth in the one-page document she signed following mediation.

In furtherance of New Jersey's strong policy of enforcing settlements, "our courts `strain to give effect to the terms of a settlement wherever possible.'" Brundage v. Estate of Carambio, 195 N.J. 575, 601 (2008) (internal citation omitted). See also Dep't of Pub. Advocate v. N.J. Bd. of Pub. Utils., 206 N.J.Super. 523, 528 (App. Div. 1985). Therefore, an agreement to settle a lawsuit will be honored and enforced in the absence of fraud or other compelling circumstances. Pascarella v. Bruck, 190 N.J.Super. 118, 124-25 (App. Div. 1983). "Where the parties agree upon the essential terms of a settlement, so that the mechanics can be `fleshed out' in a writing to be thereafter executed, the settlement will be enforced notwithstanding the fact the writing does not materialize because a party later reneges." Lahue v. Pio Costa, 263 N.J.Super. 575, 596 (App. Div. 1993) (internal citation omitted).

Nevertheless, a party moving to enforce a settlement bears the burden of demonstrating that one exists in the first place. Amatuzzo, supra, 305 N.J. Super. at 475. Similar to the standard for review of a summary judgment motion, Brill v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 142 N.J. 520, 540 (1995), on a disputed motion to enforce a settlement, the court must hold a hearing to resolve any dispute of material fact unless the available competent evidence, considered in a light most favorable to the non-moving party, is "so one-sided" as to render the hearing unnecessary. Amatuzzo, supra, 305 N.J. Super. at 474-75.

Based on our review of the record, we are satisfied there was no material fact in dispute that warranted a plenary hearing. Even if we were to view plaintiff's letters to the court as appropriate certifications under Rule 1:6-6, the entire crux of her fraudulent inducement claim was that defense counsel Anders said the one-page document typed up by the mediator was a confidentiality agreement as he slid it to her attorney, who briefly looked at it and gave it to her. Even with all favorable inferences, this statement is woefully inadequate to create a viable defense.

Moreover, the plain language of the document renders it implausible that plaintiff was unaware she was agreeing to an enforceable settlement when she signed the document. See Winoka Village, Inc. v. Tate, 16 N.J.Super. 330, 333 (App. Div. 1951) ("The alleged oral misrepresentation, being contradictory of the undertakings expressly dealt with by the writings, are not effectual in that circumstance to avoid the obligations he knowingly assumed."). See also Filmlife, Inc. v. Mal "Z" Ena, Inc., 251 N.J.Super. 570, 574-76 (App. Div. 1991) (granting a motion to dismiss complaint which sought to avoid a contract based on alleged oral misrepresentation that directly contradicted the writing). The document is not captioned "Confidentiality Agreement," and, in fact, there is no reference to confidentiality until the penultimate paragraph. Rather, the first sentence states that the parties "have agreed to a settlement in princip[le]" and sets forth the "terms of the Settlement Agreement, which will be signed by the parties within one week," which include, in pertinent part: the amount of the payment due to plaintiff and its classifications for tax purposes, "in settlement of all claims contained in the above referenced Complaint," in exchange for plaintiff dismissing her complaint with prejudice and executing a full release. Plaintiff signed directly under the phrase "Agreed as to form and content[.]"

In addition, plaintiff gave no indication to the court that she was stonewalled or misunderstood the post-mediation document. Plaintiff freely participated in the July 22 proceeding and made no mention of her fraudulent inducement claim. Plaintiff's primary concerns expressed to the court were the amount of the medical insurance reimbursement, to which defense counsel provided a lengthy explanation; whether the confidentiality provision impeded her ability to discuss the terms with her doctor and with close friends, which the court informed her it did; and that the one-page document was "the only agreement." In response to the last comment, Hyderally responded, "[t]here's no more formal agreement. This is it." The judge added, "Yes. You abide by that agreement, all right."

Thus, although it would have been preferable for the court to have made specific findings, the record is clear that defendants satisfied their burden of proof and there is no genuine dispute that the parties, with the advice of counsel, reached a binding settlement in principle as to all the material terms following a lengthy mediation as reflected in the May 3, 2011 document. Accordingly, we affirm those provisions in the order stating that "the May 3, 2011 settlement agreement... is enforced" and plaintiff's "complaint... is dismissed with prejudice as the parties have reached a valid and binding settlement."

There may be provisions in the Agreement and Release that are standard boilerplate and reasonable secondary terms that effectuate the intent and purpose of the May 3 document. We agree with plaintiff, however, that the court performed no analysis and made no determination whether each of the provisions of the formal agreement encompassed or exceeded the scope of the parties' settlement. The portion of the order compelling plaintiff to sign the Agreement and Release also appears to be inconsistent with the court's assurance to plaintiff at the end of the proceeding that the terms of her settlement were limited to the one-page document. Accordingly, we vacate the provision compelling plaintiff to sign the Agreement and Release.

The post-mediation document provides simply for payment to plaintiff. Any award of counsel fees to Hyderally from plaintiff's proceeds, based on a retainer agreement or otherwise, exceeds the parameters of this settlement with defendants. Accordingly, we vacate that portion of the order directing payment to Hyderally & Associates and remand to the trial court for further proceedings.

Both parties alternatively sought enforcement of the May 3 document. However, on remand, we provide the parties an opportunity to flesh out a mutually acceptable Agreement and Release or, if unsuccessful, to seek approval from the court of a formal agreement by appropriate motion.

Affirmed in part; vacated and remanded in part. The stay is dissolved. We do not retain jurisdiction.