PER CURIAM.
Defendant Espy Road Condo Association (Association) appeals from a judgment in favor of plaintiff Doris Bresnowitz following a bench trial in the Small Claims Division of the Special Civil Part. Plaintiff owns one of the forty-one units in this Association. She has not participated in this appeal.
Plaintiff alleged that the Association had her vehicle towed because it was parked in violation of a new regulation that the Association enforced without reasonable notice. One of her two cars was towed from the newly restricted parking space on a Sunday, while she was away on business. She sought reimbursement for a $444.60 towing and storage fee and $75 she paid an attorney to write a letter to the Association. Following a bench trial, the judge determined that the Association did not give adequate notice and awarded plaintiff judgment in the amount of the fee plus court costs.
The Association's operations are governed by its master deed, bylaws and the Condominium Act,
The Condominium Act also addresses rules and regulations governing common elements of an association's property. Pursuant to
In this case, the Association's bylaws give the Board limited authority to enforce the obligations of the Association's members. The pertinent section provides:
Neither the bylaws nor the Act specify how the Board must give written notice of a new or revised rule or regulation. Although the Board had not assigned or restricted any parking spot prior to the adoption of this parking regulation, plaintiff was one of two residents who regularly parked in the newly restricted space. The other resident affected by the adoption of this rule was the spouse of a Board member.
The parking space at issue is positioned near the entrance to the lot, and when a car is parked there large trucks cannot enter. The regulation was adopted at a time when the Association was expecting a delivery of new washers for the laundry room, a common element, and the installation of "FIOS by Verizon."
The notice of the new parking regulation was printed on a single piece of paper. An employee of the Association's management company folded copies and placed one in the mailbox for each unit at about 4:00 p.m. on Thursday April 8, 2010. It provides:
Plaintiff returned home after the delivery, but does not recall whether she went to her mailbox that evening. She left for a business trip on April 9 and found the notice in her mailbox when she returned home on April 13. Before she found the notice, she had seen that her car was missing and called the police. She later discovered a message that the Association's management company left on her answering machine while she was away, warning that her car would be towed if she did not move it.
The Association presented testimony from plaintiff's neighbors to establish that she received notice on April 8. One neighbor admitted that she and plaintiff were "not very friendly" and the other admitted that he had been hired by the Association to paint the laundry room. By their accounts, at about 11:00 p.m. on April 8, plaintiff walked to the mailboxes in front of her building, retrieved her mail and looked at it before entering her unit. The Association also presented evidence establishing that plaintiff previously failed to claim letters from the Association that had been sent by certified mail, return receipt requested.
As noted above, plaintiff's challenge was limited to the reasonableness of the notice the Association gave before enforcing the new parking regulation. She conceded that the Board had the authority to prohibit parking in the newly restricted spot. The trial judge determined that plaintiff proved that the notice was insufficient by a preponderance of the evidence.
On appeal, the Association argues that the judge misread the bylaws to require the Association to give notice of and an opportunity to be heard at a meeting prior to the Board's adoption of a rule or regulation restricting parking. We agree that the bylaws require the Association to give advance notice of Association meetings, but they do not require that notice of Board meetings be given to anyone other than the trustees.
The Association's objection to the judge's reading of the bylaws is unavailing for two reasons. First, a provision of the Condominium Act,
There was no dispute that parking in the space at issue was permitted when plaintiff last parked there. The notice was not placed in her mailbox until 4:00 p.m. on April 8, and her car was in that spot when the truck driver delivering the washing machines arrived later that evening. The question is whether she had adequate notice that her car would be towed at her expense if she did not move it from that spot after the regulation was adopted.
Plaintiff testified that she did not find notice of the regulation in her mailbox until April 13, when she returned from a business trip that she took on April 9. Her car had been towed two days earlier, on Sunday April 11. Although witnesses for the Association testified that they saw plaintiff retrieve and look at her mail at 11:00 p.m. on April 8, the judge did not credit their testimony and explained why she found the witnesses to be less than impartial.
The judge noted that if the Association had phoned plaintiff on April 8 and advised that her car was illegally parked and would be towed, there would have been no need for the Association to tow it. While the judge did not mention the Association's bylaw governing enforcement quoted above, it is clear that the Association was required to demand that plaintiff cure her violation before acting to remedy the violation at her expense. If there was any urgency, it was when the washers were delivered on April 8. The Association could have addressed that urgency by calling plaintiff then, as the Association did days later, and demanding she move the vehicle because it was parked in violation of the recently adopted rule and would be towed. But that was not done.
A condominium association must act in accordance with its master deed, bylaws and the Condominium Act.
Accepting, as we must, the trial court's credibility determinations and the findings of fact that are supported by substantial evidence in the record, there is no basis for concluding that the judge was clearly mistaken in determining that the notice plaintiff was given prior to the towing of her car was unreasonable.
Affirmed.