NOT FOR PUBLICATION
PER CURIAM.
Plaintiff appeals from a post-judgment order that, in part, denied his motions to compel defendant to stop using her married name and awarded counsel fees to defendant. We affirm.
Plaintiff has filed a number of post-judgment motions since the parties divorced in December 2009. We will discuss only those facts that pertain to the motions and orders dated August 19 and October 1, 2010, that are the subject of this appeal.
The parties' amended judgment of divorce (JOD) provided in pertinent part:
Plaintiff shall provide Defendant with a copy of his life insurance in the amount of $100,000.00, for the benefit of the children and Defendant shall provide a copy of her life insurance policy in the amount of $50,000.00, for the benefit of the children, within thirty days,
... Defendant, Yanic Louis, shall resume her maiden name of Yanic Desforges,....
The JOD also addressed child support, visitation, the dismissal of Docket No. FD-07-001249-09P, and provided that "[e]ach party shall retain his or her own pension, IRA and other personal property[.]" The JOD further stated, "Any and all other issues not mentioned [have] previously been divided[,]" and that "any and all issues raised in the pleadings and not disposed of in the Judgment shall be considered abandoned by the parties."
In June 2010, plaintiff filed a post-judgment motion which included requests for the following relief: a copy of defendant's life insurance policy with the names of the children designated as beneficiaries; "concrete proofs that the defendants [sic] Yanic carries no longer my last name in any bills such as Mortgages, Alien card resident, telephone bills, PS&G [sic] bills, but more importantly her Motor Vehicle License[;]" and "Medical Cards Coverage for children." Defendant filed a cross-motion, asking that she and defendant "share the claiming of the children on [their] tax returns."
On August 19, 2010, the court entered an order that, inter alia, required defendant to supply copies of the medical insurance cards, provided a means for the parties to share the benefits of claiming the children as dependents and awarded defendant counsel fees in the amount of $1925.1 In a written decision, the trial judge stated her reasons for the counsel fee award:
Defendant's application for court costs and attorney's fees is hereby granted; Defendant has brought this opposition and cross-motion in good faith in an attempt to defend against yet another motion filed [by] the Plaintiff (the fourth in five months). Defendant's opposition is in response to Plaintiff's request that the court [o]rder Defendant to do something which the court believes she already has done (providing copies of the children's insurance cards to Plaintiff); and her cross-motion is to prevent future disputes with Plaintiff regarding the claiming of the children as dependents on the parties' respective income tax returns; a matter easily resolved without the necessity of Court intervention, but adamantly and vehemently opposed to by Plaintiff. Further, despite Defendant's regular assertions that she cannot afford to take time off from work to defend against Plaintiff's motions, and that she may lose her employment as a result, Plaintiff eagerly "welcomes" oral argument, but to date has not prevailed on any of his motions. It is the Court's finding that, Plaintiff's motions and requests for oral argument have been brought in bad faith, in an attempt to harass and embarrass the Defendant, and not resolve substantive issues before the court. Moreover, although Plaintiff bemoans his difficulty in paying his child support obligations, his actions (in routinely filing motions and requesting oral argument) demonstrate that he is in a superior financial position than Defendant (paying for filing fees without hesitation and his willingness to take time from his employment to appear).
The order and written statement of reasons did not address plaintiff's requests for "concrete proofs" that defendant was no longer using plaintiff's surname and for proof that the children were designated as beneficiaries on defendant's life insurance policy.
Plaintiff filed another motion, which is not included in the record. On October 1, 2010, the court entered an order that, in part, granted plaintiff's application to compel defendant to comply with the JOD requirement that she obtain and maintain a life insurance policy for the children in the amount of $50,000, and denied his request "for the court to order Defendant to cease using her married name of `Louis' and to resume using her maiden name of `Desforges' as ordered by the final order of divorce[.]"
In this appeal, plaintiff argues that the trial court erred in failing to compel defendant to cease using his surname and in awarding counsel fees to defendant. In addition, he asks this court to compel defendant to produce proof of her life insurance policy. After reviewing these arguments within the context of this record and the applicable legal principles, we are satisfied that none of plaintiff's arguments have merit.
As a preliminary matter regarding the name change issue, we note there is nothing in the record to show that defendant has not resumed the use of her maiden name.
N.J.S.A. 2A:34-21 provides that the court, upon granting a divorce, "may allow either spouse... to resume any name used by the spouse... before the marriage... or to assume any surname." (Emphasis added.) The statute grants the authority to permit a name change; it does not provide the authority to compel a name change.
Plaintiff concedes as much and has cited no legal authority to support his position that the court can require a party to change her name. Rather, plaintiff argues that the court may do so as an enforcement of the terms of the JOD. We disagree.
As the trial court observed, there is typically a period of transition from married name to maiden name. Although the JOD uses the term "shall" rather than "may" regarding the resumption of defendant's maiden name, it does not reflect any agreement between the parties that defendant would cease any use of her married name or do so immediately. Therefore, neither any enforceable provision of the JOD nor any independent legal authority exists for the relief sought by plaintiff.
Plaintiff next asks this court to enforce the trial court's order compelling defendant to provide proof that she has obtained and maintained a $50,000 life insurance policy with the children as beneficiaries. Since plaintiff has not sought enforcement of this order in the trial court, this issue is not properly before us. See State v. Robinson, 200 N.J. 1, 20 (2009); Neider v. Royal Indem. Ins. Co., 62 N.J. 229, 234 (1973); R. 2:10-2.
Finally, plaintiff argues that the trial court erred in awarding counsel fees to defendant. Our review of a trial court's award of counsel fees is limited. Generally, "fee determinations by trial courts will be disturbed only on the rarest of occasions, and then only because of a clear abuse of discretion." Packard-Bamberger & Co. v. Collier, 167 N.J. 427, 444 (2001).
Defendant was permitted to seek counsel fees pursuant to Rules 4:42-9 and 5:3-5. She did so following an earlier post-judgment motion by plaintiff and supported her application with an affidavit of services as required by R. 4:42-9(b). The trial court considered the factors set forth in Rule 5:3-5(c) to support its decision and specifically provided reasons for a finding that plaintiff brought multiple motions in bad faith. We discern no abuse of discretion in the award of $1925 in fees to defendant.
Affirmed.
