NOT FOR PUBLICATION

PER CURIAM.

In this post-judgment matter, defendant Laurie Ann Aiello (formerly known as Mayer) appeals from the Family Part's June that the judge erred: in awarding her ex-husband, plaintiff Jeffrey Sean Mayer, judgment in the amount of $35,558.88, reflecting overpayments made on account of child support, without a plenary hearing; in denying her request for modification of the parenting time schedule without a plenary hearing; and in denying her request for counsel fees. Plaintiff cross-appeals from both orders, contending that the judge erred in setting the amount of weekly credit to reduce the accumulated overpayment to be deducted from his child support payments going forward, and in denying his request for counsel fees and costs. We have considered these arguments in light of the record and applicable legal standards. We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

I.

The parties were married on October 31, 1999, and their only child was born November 8, 1999. A final judgment of divorce was entered November 3, 2003, which incorporated the terms of a marital settlement agreement placed on the record on October 7, 2003 (the MSA). Under the terms of the MSA, plaintiff was to pay child support of $142.00 per week, beginning October 1, 2003. A prior pendente lite support order setting the amount at $209 per week was expressly declared to be "null and void as of October 1, 2003." Plaintiff was entitled to claim the tax exemption for the parties' child. It is undisputed that the support payments were made via a wage garnishment administered by the Monmouth County Probation Division (probation).

The MSA further provided the parties would share legal custody, with defendant being the child's "primary residential custodial parent." Plaintiff's parenting time with the child was every weekend, from 3:30 p.m. on Friday through 1:00 p.m. on Monday; the MSA also provided for additional shared parenting time on holidays and the child's birthday and summer vacation.

Plaintiff filed a motion on May 3, 2011, seeking an order compelling defendant to reimburse him as he had overpaid child support; suspension of the wage garnishment until the overpayment was recouped; entry of judgment against defendant for the amount overpaid; and counsel fees. Plaintiff certified the overpayment of support resulted because probation mistakenly had been enforcing the earlier pendente lite support order, not the sum agreed in the MSA. He claimed that he made "efforts to address this situation during the past seven . . . years" without success. The probation account was in place since at least 2003, however, plaintiff certified he only became aware of the overcharge mistake "some years later," when he received notice of a cost-of-living adjustment (COLA).

Without specifying a date, plaintiff claimed that he made defendant aware of the overpayment, but she "refused to take any action to return [it]." Plaintiff further asserted, without documentation, that he protested to probation in 2004, 2006 and 2008, advising that the COLA adjustments were improperly calculated upon the pendente lite order, and that they should have been made every two years following entry of the judgment of divorce, i.e., in 2005, 2007 and 2009. See Rule 5:6B(a) (requiring COLAs to be made every two years for support orders entered after September 1, 1998). Plaintiff also stated that, because his income was insufficient, no COLA adjustments should have been made in the first instance.

Plaintiff's attorney first contacted probation to request an audit in February 2010. After various proceedings in and out of court, probation completed its audit on October 4, 2010, and determined that plaintiff had overpaid $35,883.88.1 However, probation refused to stop garnishing plaintiff's wages.

Defendant filed opposition and a cross-motion requesting an order: (1) prohibiting plaintiff from removing the child from the state without express permission, an itinerary and a telephone contact; (2) expanding defendant's parenting time to include alternate weekends; (3) permitting defendant to take the dependant-care tax deduction in alternate years, beginning in 2012 and all even years thereafter; (4) requiring plaintiff to contribute to the cost of all unreimbursed medical expenses, extra-curricular activities and school uniforms on an income-proportionate basis; and (5) awarding counsel fees and costs.

In her certification, defendant claimed that plaintiff must have been aware of the amount of child support being garnished because it was reflected on his pay stubs. She noted that she had been financially responsible for all unreimbursed medical expenses for the child, as well as costs associated with extra-curricular school activities. Defendant stated that she "paid these expenses without seeking contribution . . . because [p]laintiff continued to pay the additional child support." Defendant further claimed that plaintiff never brought the problem to her attention, "nor was it ever discussed between us. . . ." Defendant contended that she would have sought an "upward" modification if she knew plaintiff was contesting the amount of support.

Regarding parenting time, defendant stated that the child, now eleven years old, had an active social life and engaged in extra-curricular activities at school. Allowing plaintiff parenting time on every weekend was "simply no longer practical nor appropriate . . . ." Defendant also sought counsel fees because plaintiff never contacted her regarding the situation and "sat on his rights for seven years . . . ."

Plaintiff filed a reply certification and, on June 23, 2011, the judge issued a tentative decision. See R. 5:5-4(e). She concluded defendant owed plaintiff $35,558.88 for overpayments "from 2002 through October 2010"2; ordered plaintiff's child support be reduced to $100 per week, with a credit of $42 per week toward the overpayment; denied defendant's request to modify the parenting time schedule because "she failed to show a change in circumstances warranting modification," although the judge reset the weekend times as 7:00 p.m. Friday through 6:00 p.m. Sunday; ordered shared reimbursement of unpaid medical expenses in excess of $250 per year; and denied both parties' request for counsel fees.

The judge heard argument on June 24, 2011. Plaintiff's counsel was "fairly satisfied" with the decision, but noted that, applying the credit to plaintiff's overpayment, it was unlikely that the full amount would be reimbursed before the parties' child turned eighteen. Counsel requested a judgment against defendant and agreed that plaintiff would not execute on the judgment. Counsel also requested a minor modification of the parenting time schedule.

Defense counsel objected to the decision not to modify the parenting time schedule and argued that there were sufficient changed circumstances based upon the child's age. He requested a mediator be appointed. Regarding child support, counsel contended that plaintiff had notice of the amount being deducted from his paycheck, but waited years to seek an audit or bring an application to court. He contended that reducing the support to $100 per week posed a "substantial hardship" to defendant. Lastly, counsel argued that defendant "substantially relied" upon the amounts plaintiff paid, thereby forfeiting any chance to seek modification despite being unemployed.

On June 27, 2011, the judge entered an order that essentially tracked her tentative decision, but added a provision entering judgment in favor of plaintiff against defendant for $35,558.88. The order provided that "[p]laintiff shall not act on said judgment while his reduced child support obligation is in effect." The order also modified plaintiff's parenting time from 7:00 p.m. Friday through 7:00 p.m. Sunday and required plaintiff to pay 84% of all unreimbursed medical expenses for the child in excess of $250 per year. Plaintiff brought a minor error to the court's attention by letter dated July 13, 2011, and the judge entered an amended order on July 25. This appeal followed.

II.

We begin by stating the well-known principles that inform our review. "When reviewing decisions granting or denying applications to modify child support, we examine whether, given the facts, the trial judge abused his or her discretion." Jacoby v. Jacoby, 427 N.J.Super. 109, 116 (App. Div. 2012) (citations omitted). The exercise of the court's discretion, however, "remains guided by the law and principles of equity." Ibid. (citation omitted). "If consistent with the law, such an award will not be disturbed unless it is manifestly unreasonable, arbitrary, or clearly contrary to reason or to other evidence, or the result of whim or caprice." Foust v. Glaser, 340 N.J.Super. 312, 315-16 (App. Div. 2001) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

We owe substantial deference to the Family Part's findings of fact because of that court's special expertise in family matters. Cesare v. Cesare, 154 N.J. 394, 411-12 (1998). Thus, "`[a] reviewing court should uphold the factual findings undergirding the trial court's decision if they are supported by adequate, substantial and credible evidence on the record.'" MacKinnon v. MacKinnon, 191 N.J. 240, 253-54 (2007) (quoting N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. M.M., 189 N.J. 261, 279 (2007)). But, we owe no special deference to the judge's legal conclusions drawn from established facts. Manalapan Realty v. Manalapan Twp. Comm., 140 N.J. 366, 378 (1995).

A.

We consider defendant's claim that she presented sufficient changed circumstances warranting modification of the parenting time schedule, and, therefore, a plenary hearing should have been ordered. In this regard, in her order the judge stated reasons for denying defendant's request, specifically concluding that she failed to present a substantial change of circumstances such that the agreed-upon parenting time should be modified. We agree and affirm that part of the order.

A party seeking to modify custody or parenting time "must demonstrate changed circumstances that affect the welfare of the child[]." Hand v. Hand, 391 N.J.Super. 102, 105 (App. Div. 2007) (citations omitted). "A plenary hearing is required when the submissions show there is a genuine and substantial factual dispute regarding the welfare of the child[], and the trial judge determines that a plenary hearing is necessary to resolve the factual dispute." Ibid.; see also Segal v. Lynch, 211 N.J. 230, 264-65 (2012) ("[A] plenary hearing is only required if there is a genuine, material and legitimate factual dispute."). "[T]he threshold issue is whether the movant has made a prima facie showing that a plenary hearing is necessary." Hand, supra, 391 N.J. Super. at 106.

Here, there was no factual dispute. Defendant did not allege, for example, that plaintiff was abusing or failing to exercise his parenting time. There was no evidence that defendant's relationship with the parties' child was anything other than appropriate and caring. Instead, defendant relied upon a bald assertion that since the child was now older, the agreed-upon schedule of parenting time was unreasonable because she was responsible for the daily tasks associated with the weekday schedule, and plaintiff received all the benefits of weekend parenting time. In our opinion, the certifications did not present a substantial change of circumstances affecting the child's welfare, and no plenary hearing or modification of the parenting time was warranted.

B.

We turn to the issue of plaintiff's overpayment of child support, and the remedy fashioned by the judge to address the issue. Defendant presents a multi-prong attack. She contends that plaintiff was barred from seeking reimbursement by "the doctrine of laches," the "doctrine of equitable estoppel," and "the statute of limitations."3

"Laches is an equitable doctrine which penalizes knowing inaction by a party with a legal right from enforcing that right after passage of such a period of time that prejudice has resulted to the other parent[] so that it would be inequitable to enforce the right." L.V. v. R.S., 347 N.J.Super. 33, 39 (App. Div. 2002) (citation omitted). "The key ingredients are knowledge and delay by one party and change of position by the other." Ibid. (citation omitted). In a similar vein, "[t]o establish a claim of equitable estoppel, the . . . party must show that the alleged conduct was done, or representation was made, intentionally or under such circumstances that it was both natural and probable that it would induce action. Further, the conduct must be relied on, and the relying party must act so as to change his or her position to his or her detriment." Miller v. Miller, 97 N.J. 154, 163 (1984) (citations omitted). The party asserting estoppel bears the burden of proof. Ibid.

During oral argument, defense counsel specifically raised both laches and equitable estoppel as a defense to plaintiff's request for reimbursement. The judge did not directly address either argument. Neither the tentative decision nor the final order set forth consideration of the issues, and neither contained a statement of reasons why the judge rejected defendant's arguments.

The judge apparently decided that, since there was no dispute that plaintiff overpaid his child support for more than seven years, reimbursement was required. But it is unclear whether she ever considered the equitable claims made by defendant. While the judge noted during oral argument that defendant could have moved for an upward modification of support but never did, that observation missed the thrust of defendant's claim.

It has been recognized that the lack of any findings of fact or conclusions of law does a disservice to the Appellate Division's informed review of any matter. Curtis v. Finneran, 83 N.J. 563, 569-70 (1980). As we noted in Ducey v. Ducey, 424 N.J.Super. 68 (App. Div. 2012), "[f]actfinding `is fundamental to the fairness of the proceedings and serves as a necessary predicate to meaningful review[.]'" Id. at 72 (quoting R.M. v. Supreme Court of N.J., 190 N.J. 1, 12 (2007)). We recognize and support the efficacy of tentative decisions in Family Part motions. But, if the practice is to be employed, the orders that result must clearly evidence consideration of the factual assertions of the parties in the context of the specific issues presented. See Ducey, supra, 424 N.J. Super. at 74 (noting "a trial judge's primary obligation [is] to make factual findings to support all legal conclusions") (citing R. 1:7-4).

Absent the benefit of any findings and conclusions by the judge, we are compelled to reverse and remand the matter for a plenary hearing and further consideration of defendant's claims. We note the following facts that are apparent from the parties' certifications.

Plaintiff's child support was always enforced through wage garnishment by probation. Although the motion record did not include any pay stubs for the period prior to the audit, it did include pay stubs received immediately prior to the filing of the motion. Those clearly reflected the amount withheld on account of child support. We think a reasonable inference could be drawn that plaintiff's excess withholding over the years should have been obvious to him.

In his certification, plaintiff acknowledged making "protests" to probation as early as 2004. The record did not include any documentation of plaintiff's efforts. However, it was apparently not until 2010, when he "was finally able to retain counsel to assist [him]," that he sought an audit.

Meanwhile, defendant certified that she alone paid for various unreimbursed expenses for the parties' child over the years. She further claimed that "[t]he only reason [she] paid these expenses without seeking contribution [was] because [p]laintiff continued to pay the additional child support."

We express no particular opinion as to whether defendant should ultimately succeed on her equitable claims. We note that defendant was expressly notified by probation that she could be personally liable for overpayments made in error. But, based upon the certifications presented, we agree with defendant that a plenary hearing was required.

After remand, if the judge determines that defendant owes plaintiff for overpaid child support and recoupment is appropriate, it is likely she will credit some of that amount against whatever support is appropriately ordered. It is also likely that those credits will be applied through probation on a weekly basis. In other words, plaintiff will undoubtedly be assured of recoupment, although it is unlikely that the full amount will be recouped before the parties' child is emancipated. While we understand the logic that led to the imposition of a judgment against defendant, on remand the judge should consider whether immediate entry of a judgment in the full amount owed to plaintiff is equitable under all the circumstances presented.

Because we conclude a remand is necessary, the issue of counsel fees shall abide the result of the remand.

Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. We do not retain jurisdiction.