NOT FOR PUBLICATION

PER CURIAM.

Appellant J.C. appeals from that part of the April 5, 2012 Law Division order, which denied his petition for expungement of records pertaining to an arrest on June 1, 1993 (the June 1993 arrest). On appeal, appellant argues that the trial judge erred in denying expungement of the June 1993 arrest based on appellant's failure to comply with N.J.S.A. 2C:52-7f, which requires "[t]he court's disposition of the matter and the punishment imposed, if any." We reverse the denial of expungement of the June 1993 arrest, exercise our original jurisdiction to grant expungement of that arrest and remand for entry of an amended order.1 Accardi v. Accardi, 369 N.J.Super. 75, 91-92 (App. Div. 2004); R. 2:10-5.

For the first time on appeal, appellant asks this court to hold that a petitioner shall be identified by initials, not by full name, on orders, judgments, and opinions addressing expungement. We decline to consider this request.

Appellant was arrested in Mansfield Township on June 1, 1993, and charged with possession of a controlled dangerous substance (CDS), N.J.S.A. 2C:35-10a(4), and possession or distribution of a hypodermic syringe or needle, N.J.S.A. 2C:36-6, both as disorderly persons offenses (DPOs). Appellant was arrested in Camden on August 31, 1993, and charged with possession of a CDS, N.J.S.A. 2C:35-10a(1) (the August 1993 arrest). He was also arrested in Hillsborough Township on March 8, 2008, for theft by unlawful taking, N.J.S.A. 2C:20-3a (the March 2008 arrest), and on January 19, 2009, for hindering apprehension, N.J.S.A. 2C:29-3b(4) (the January 2009 arrest).

The June and August 1993 arrests were consolidated in the Camden municipal court for the purposes of the entry of a plea and sentencing. On November 30, 1994, the Camden municipal court disposed of both matters; however, appellant was unable to obtain the record of the actual disposition of the June 1993 arrest.

Appellant filed a petition for expungement. The State initially objected because appellant had not included the June 1993 arrest in the petition. On January 12, 2012, appellant filed an amended petition for expungement, which included the June 1993 arrest. In an effort to comply with N.J.S.A. 2C:52-7f regarding the June 1993 arrest, appellant's attorney submitted an affidavit, which explained his paralegal's exhaustive, and ultimately fruitless, search for information about the disposition of that arrest.2

The State submitted no objection to the amended petition. The judge considered the matter on the papers on April 5, 2012, granted expungement as to the August 1993, March 2008, and January 2009 arrests, and denied expungement as to the June 1993 arrest. The judge noted the June 1993 arrest could be eligible for expungement pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:52-3 or-4, and he determined appellant had made a "comprehensive and diligent" search for information regarding that arrest. Nonetheless, the judge strictly interpreted N.J.S.A. 2C:52-7f to require disclosure of the actual disposition of the June 1993 arrest. The judge indicated he would possibly reconsider his decision if the State articulated its position.

Thereafter, the judge and appellant's counsel received a letter from the State agreeing that appellant had "seemingly exhausted every possible inquiry" about the disposition of the June 1993 arrest. The State also acknowledged it could not determine what measures were required to comply with N.J.S.A. 2C:52-7f. The State, therefore, took no position on the amended petition and deferred to the judge's determination. Appellant did not thereafter seek the judge's reconsideration. Instead, he proceeded with this appeal.

We discern no reason why expungement of the June 1993 arrest should not be granted under the facts of this case. We are satisfied that appellant exhausted every available avenue to verify the actual disposition of that arrest. Further, it appears that the DPOs stemming from the June 1993 arrest were disposed of on November 30, 1994. Assuming the worst case scenario — that appellant was convicted of those offenses — the arrest was eligible for expungement pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:52-3, which provides as follows:

Because more than five years have passed from the date of appellant's conviction of the DPOs, the June 1993 arrest is eligible for expungement.3 We reverse the denial of expungement of the June 1993 arrest, and grant expungement of that arrest.

We decline to consider appellant's request for this court to hold that orders, judgments, and opinions addressing expungement shall identify the petitioner by initials, not by full name. "In the absence of statutory or rule authorization or some other compelling reason, a party will not be permitted to prosecute a civil action anonymously or by pseudonym...." Pressler & Verniero, Current N.J. Court Rules, cmt. 2.3 on R. 1:2-1 (2013). Rule 1:38-3 lists court records excluded from public access, and the list includes "[e]xpunged records pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:52-15." R. 1:38-3(a)(7). Although there is no statute or rule providing for the use of initials to identify a petitioner granted expungement, the expungement statute addresses court records. N.J.S.A. 2C:52-1a provides that "expungement means the extraction and isolation of all records on file within any court, detention or correctional facility, law enforcement or criminal justice agency concerning a person's detection, apprehension, arrest, detention, trial or disposition of an offense within the criminal justice system." In addition, N.J.S.A. 2C:15-1b provides that "[e]xpunged records shall include complaints, warrants, arrests, commitments, processing records, fingerprints, photographs, index cards, `rap sheets' and judicial docket records." Because the trial court partially granted J.C.'s petition and we have ordered additional relief, and because this opinion will be available to the public, we conclude that use of petitioner's initials in this opinion is consistent N.J.S.A. 2C:52-1.

The denial of expungement of the June 1993 arrest is reversed and expungement of that arrest is granted; the matter is remanded for entry of an amended order.