NOT FOR PUBLICATION

PER CURIAM.

Appellant, an African-American tenant of a multi-unit apartment building, appeals from an August 1, 2011 final agency determination by the Acting Director of the New Jersey Division of Civil Rights (Division) finding no probable cause to substantiate his allegations that Paramus Affordable Housing (PAH) and Penwal Management (PM) engaged in housing discrimination, in violation of the Law Against Discrimination (LAD), N.J.S.A. 10:5-1 to-49. We affirm.

PAH owns a forty-six unit apartment building. PM manages the apartment complex. In 2006, appellant leased an apartment from PAH for $1037 per month. Appellant qualified for public assistance and received a Section 8 voucher which paid PAH $934 per month.

In March 2011, appellant filed a complaint with the United States Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD). Appellant attached to the complaint a March 29, 2011 letter outlining various incidents which he contended constituted housing discrimination based on his race and Section 8 status. In April 2011, HUD forwarded appellant's complaint to the Division for an investigation and resolution.

In May 2011, appellant filed with the Division a verified complaint against defendants. He alleged that PAH and PM subjected him to differential treatment because he is African-American and a Section 8 recipient, as prohibited by N.J.S.A. 10:5-12(g)(2) of the LAD. In his verified complaint, he asserted that Marge Knudsen, an assistant manager for PAH, "asked him questions about his rent subsidy in a loud voice and in the presence of other tenants."1 The Division then undertook the investigation.

The Division's investigator interviewed four people who witnessed the incident involving Knudsen: appellant, Knudsen, Linda Marrero (a PAH receptionist), and Ronisha Vannoy (an African-American tenant). Appellant and Knudsen also submitted written statements.

Appellant indicated that on March 31, 2011, he accompanied Vannoy2 to PAH's office and asked Knudsen if she received his monthly rental payment. He asserted that Knudsen checked her records and stated in a loud voice, in the presence of Vannoy and Marrero, "check number 134 in the amount of $127.00 cleared his account." Appellant maintained that Knudsen's response "had the effect of informing [those present] that [he] was a rent subsidy recipient."

Knudsen remembered the incident differently. She stated that she did not announce the amount of the check. Knudsen explained that she brought appellant into a conference room where the rent records are located, showed him a copy of his rental check, and verified that PAH received it. Vannoy verified that Knudsen met with appellant in the back room. Marrero corroborated Knudsen's statements to the investigator.3

The investigator issued a written report, recommended that appellant's case be closed, and stated that

The Division then determined "that there is no probable cause to credit [appellant's] allegations," and closed appellant's case. This appeal followed.

On appeal, appellant argues that the Division performed an inadequate investigation. He contends that the Division failed to question other African-American tenants "who received the same differential treatment and harassment based on race."4

Our review of an administrative agency decision is limited. Clowes v. Terminex Int'l, Inc., 109 N.J. 575, 587 (1988). "The court must survey the record to determine whether there is sufficient credible competent evidence in the record to support the agency head's conclusions." Ibid. We must defer to a final agency decision unless it is arbitrary, capricious, unsupported by substantial, credible evidence in the record, or in violation of express or implicit legislative policy. In re Taylor, 158 N.J. 644, 656-57 (1999). If we find sufficient, credible evidence in the record to support the agency's conclusions, then we must affirm even if we would have reached a different result. Clowes, supra, 109 N.J. at 588.

The Legislature created the Division to administer and enforce the State's civil rights laws. See N.J.S.A. 10:5-6. The Division has recognized expertise in investigating and determining the presence or absence of violations of the LAD. See, e.g., Hermann v. Fairleigh Dickinson Univ., 183 N.J.Super. 500, 503-05 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 91 N.J. 573 (1982); Sprague v. Glassboro State Coll., 161 N.J.Super. 218, 225 (App. Div. 1978). By filing his complaint with the Division rather than with the Superior Court, appellant elected a forum in which his claims would be examined, taking advantage of the more expeditious administrative process. Hermann, supra, 183 N.J. Super. at 504. The agency's delegated functions include determining if there is probable cause "strong enough... to warrant a cautious person in the belief that the [LAD] has been violated." N.J.A.C. 13:4-10.2(b).

The investigation focused on appellant's allegation that PAH and PM subjected him to differential treatment when Knudsen answered appellant's question regarding whether PAH received his rent check. In determining whether there is probable cause, the Division must consider the nature and proof of the alleged LAD violation. Ibid. The court will sustain the Division's finding of probable cause where the differential treatment or discrimination is "fully supported by the record." Cf. Jackson v. Concord Co., 101 N.J.Super. 126, 130 (App. Div. 1968) (upholding the Division's finding of LAD violation by prospective tenant against apartment owners where court agreed with the Division that the tenant had been "subjected to all kinds" of differential treatment), modified on other grounds, 54 N.J. 113 (1969). Here, there is no documented proof that appellant suffered from differential treatment or adverse action as a result of the check incident.

We have carefully reviewed appellant's arguments and the controlling law and conclude that the record amply supports the Division's determination that there is no probable cause to substantiate the allegations in appellant's verified complaint. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(D) and (E).

Affirmed.