PER CURIAM.
Defendant was convicted by a jury of two counts of first-degree murder,
Defendant was indicted and charged with two counts of first-degree murder and other related offenses, namely: third-degree possession of a weapon for an unlawful purpose,
Over several days in September and October 2005, Judge Paul F. Chaiet conducted a competency hearing and ultimately determined defendant was competent to stand trial "despite his paranoid schizophrenia." In August 2006, defense counsel moved to reopen the record regarding his client's competency. After a second hearing over the course of three days in September 2006, Judge Chaiet ruled that defendant was not competent to stand trial and committed defendant to a secure psychiatric facility for treatment and monitoring. A third competency hearing occurred on April 10, 2007. At that time, the court heard only from a State psychiatrist and found defendant competent to stand trial.
A trial took place over nine days in August 2008. In the midst of the trial, defense counsel again raised the question of defendant's competency after defendant insisted on testifying over counsel's contrary advice. Judge Chaiet conducted a brief voir dire of defendant and found him competent to continue to stand trial.
At the trial's conclusion, the jury found defendant guilty on all counts except the attempted aggravated arson charge, as to which he was acquitted. The jury was then asked to determine the presence of aggravating factors. After further deliberation, the jury found: (1) both murders were "outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible or inhuman in that it involved torture, depravity of mind, or an aggravated assault"; (2) the murder of Julia Miraglia was committed "for the purpose of escaping detection, apprehension, trial, punishment or confinement" for committing the murder of Leigh L. Martinez; and (3) the murder of Julia Miraglia was committed "while the defendant was engaged in the commission of, or an attempt to commit or flight after committing or attempting to commit the murder of Leigh L. Martinez."
After appropriate mergers, the judge sentenced defendant to two consecutive terms of life imprisonment without possibility of parole.
Defendant appeals, arguing:
We find no merit in these three arguments and affirm.
In examining defendant's first argument — that the judge erred in finding defendant competent to stand trial — we: (a) outline the applicable legal principles; (b) discuss at length the testimony adduced during the first, second, and third competency hearings, as well as the trial itself; and (c) conclude that the judge carefully considered the testimony in finding defendant competent to stand trial.
The requirement that a defendant be competent to stand trial arises from the constitutional due process right to receive a fair trial.
"Where evidence raises a bona fide doubt as to a defendant's competence," the trial judge has the responsibility to hold a hearing to determine the defendant's competency.
The Legislature has declared that a person is mentally competent to stand trial on criminal charges if the proofs establish two things. First, the evidence must establish that the defendant "has the mental capacity to appreciate his presence in relation to time, place and things."
"Once the issue is raised, the State bears the burden of establishing competence by a preponderance of the evidence."
"[E]xpert testimony is needed where the factfinder would not be expected to have sufficient knowledge or experience and would have to speculate without the aid of expert testimony."
In this matter, all the experts agreed that defendant met all of the competency requirements under
The record reveals that Judge Chaiet considered defendant's competency to stand trial on three different occasions and continued to examine the matter throughout the trial.
In the Fall of 2005, Judge Chaiet conducted the first of three competency hearings. It took five days.
Dr. Peter David Paul, an expert in psychiatry, was ordered by the trial judge to evaluate defendant's competency to stand trial and was the first to testify. Dr. Paul testified about defendant's prior hospitalizations and other episodes. In June 1991, when he was eighteen years old, defendant was hospitalized after "repeatedly," while under the influence of drugs, driving his car into a tree because he was upset about a breakup with a girlfriend. He was then diagnosed with "polysubstance dependence, severe," and "bipolar disorder type 2, mixed moderate," which suggested "a disturbance of mood where someone cycles between phases of depressed behavior and manic behavior" but "not quite as extreme as [a] true manic individual." Dr. Paul believed this diagnosis was incorrect.
Eleven years later, in April 2002, defendant was hospitalized at Monmouth Medical Center for six days after police found him "walking nude along Route 66" while under the influence. He was then diagnosed with "psychotic disorder, not otherwise specified, delirium, opiate dependence and polysubstance abuse." Dr. Paul again viewed this diagnosis as incorrect because defendant's symptoms could have been caused by a number of factors and "certain drugs could cause someone to look psychotic."
Defendant was again admitted to the same hospital on July 19, 2002. He then described himself as "the son of God," claiming "the judgment day was coming soon." Defendant also asserted he had AIDS, but later told Dr. Paul that "he was just saying that so he would get admitted to the hospital because he was interested in receiving substance abuse treatment." He was diagnosed with antisocial personality disorder and polysubstance abuse. At the time, defendant reported a "considerable history of drug abuse," including alcohol, marijuana, cocaine, heroin and "speed balls."
Dr. Paul interviewed defendant in 2005 for purposes of the competency hearing to establish whether defendant was competent to stand trial. He found defendant to be "very conversational" and "very focused," and that he showed no hesitation in answering questions and was not distracted "by internal stimuli." Although defendant claimed not to know why Dr. Paul was there, he was "cooperative," and his attitude, according to Dr. Paul, was "upbeat, positive."
Defendant was found at that time to be "very well oriented to person, place and time," and aware of the legal charges he was facing, the name of the judge, and what occurs at a trial. Defendant advised Dr. Paul that he was "not interested" in pursuing an insanity defense because "he did not see himself as being mentally ill." After initially denying that he heard voices, defendant eventually spoke about hearing the voice of God. He asserted his belief that he was the son of God, Jesus Christ, and denied having any mental illness.
Dr. Paul found that defendant was "malingering" or "feigning" a mental impairment. He also diagnosed defendant with polysubstance dependence on heroin, cocaine and alcohol, as well as antisocial personality disorder, which was described as a "persistent and enduring pattern of behavior that is somehow self[-]defeating or self[-]destructive." He concluded, based upon a reasonable degree of psychological certainty, that defendant was competent to stand trial.
Dr. Steven Eric Samuel, a psychologist and psychoanalyst, also testified for the State. He interviewed defendant and also administered intelligence and personality tests. Defendant scored an eighty-eight on the IQ test, which was at the high end of the "low average" category. His scores on the personality test revealed "a longstanding pattern of maladaptive behavior" and problems with "impulsivity and anger." The personality-test results also revealed to Dr. Samuel that: defendant was "a dramatic individual, using self[-]dramatic behavior"; had "underlying paranoid thinking"; was "suspicious and guarded"; was "manipulative[] in his personality"; and "could be dangerous when provoked."
Dr. Samuel did not diagnose defendant with paranoid schizophrenia or schizo-effective disorder. Instead, he diagnosed defendant with personality disorder with antisocial personality characteristics, which he further described as "an enduring pattern of behavior which goes contrary to cultural expectations and it ends up being deviant in various kinds of ways." According to Dr. Samuel, this condition did not affect defendant's ability to understand what was happening in the interview, the charges he was facing, or his legal rights and responsibilities. He concluded that defendant was competent to stand trial. When cross-examined about defendant's claim that he was Jesus Christ and other similar delusions, Dr. Samuel asserted that defendant "wants to believe that that is true," and that defendant was either lying or delusional; he could not say whether defendant was malingering, as Dr. Paul had opined, without spending more time with defendant.
Dr. Timothy J. Michals, a physician specializing in clinical and forensic psychiatry, also testified for the State at the competency hearing. Dr. Michals found defendant "very cooperative" and responsive to questions with "no evidence of clouding of his mental state." Defendant understood his competency to stand trial was being evaluated, and Dr. Michaels believed he had "a better understanding of the criminal justice system and the competency issues than most people" he had evaluated. Dr. Michals viewed defendant as being "very articulate and fluent with his understanding" of the legal process, and found no evidence of disorientation. Defendant was able to identify the lawyers, the victims, the specific charges against him, and elements of the grand jury proceeding. Dr. Michals concluded that defendant would be able to "participate in an adequate presentation of his defense."
Dr. Michals also acknowledged that voices on tapes that defendant had listened to "were talking to him" and that "God was commanding him to kill these two people"; he observed that the timing of defendant's "self report of religious ideation" related to the "criminal charges that he's facing." Dr. Michals diagnosed defendant with personality disorder, not otherwise specified, with "both narcissistic and antisocial features to that." He found that defendant had a "history of polysubstance dependence including cocaine, heroin and alcohol." He agreed with Dr. Paul's opinion that defendant was malingering.
Dr. Kenneth J. Weiss, a psychiatrist, testified for defendant. He opined that defendant was not fit to proceed to trial because of his documented psychiatric history dating back to 2002, when he was hospitalized with "bizarre behavior, delusional ideas that he was the son of God, that he had AIDS, and that he had been infecting people." Dr. Weiss observed that defendant was around thirty years old in 2002, a fact that fit the pattern of time for schizophrenia to reach its "peak of intensity." He found that defendant suffered from "grandiose" delusions, which are "fixed and irrational ideas not shared by a subgroup of our society that is recognized, and . . . not amenable to the intrusion of reality." He also found that defendant was "excessively cheerful" and eager to proceed to trial — which he viewed as a "platform" for him to "present himself to the world as the Messiah" — and that defendant's belief of himself as the son of God and the jurors as apostles "does not permit [defendant] to have a rational appreciation of the proceedings."
Dr. Weiss diagnosed defendant with "schizophrenia, paranoid type" and that he suffers from "delusions of grandiosity, namely mania and delusional disorder and schizophrenia disorder." He concluded this was a "major mental illness" that rendered defendant unfit to stand trial. He also viewed defendant's significant drug history as an effort to "self-medicate" his mental illness. He rejected the assertion that defendant was malingering; he viewed defendant's condition as genuine.
Dr. Elliot Atkins, a clinical and forensic psychologist, also testified for defendant. He testified that defendant suffered from "a severe mental illness, schizophrenia, paranoid type, which is being diagnosed because of a very firmly entrenched delusion and that delusion is substantially interfering with his ability to assist in his own defense." He found "no question" that defendant "fully" met "the criteria for the statute for competency A through F." Dr. Atkins concluded that, although defendant fully understood the process and the charges lodged against him, his delusion prevented him from "fully appreciating what it is that would be happening at a trial and what it is that his attorneys would need to do at that time."
Dr. Atkins described defendant's delusions in the following way:
Dr. Atkins found defendant "very consistent" about these delusions, and he rejected the opinion of others that defendant was malingering because the psychological evaluations have "strategies or techniques, methods for determining the malingering."
Dr. Atkins explained at great length why he believed defendant was delusional and, therefore, not competent to stand trial. He also opined that medication could help control defendant's delusional thinking.
Defendant testified, over his counsel's objection, at the competency hearing. He testified that he first believed he was Jesus Christ "around 2002." When asked if he still believed that, defendant responded: "I know. I don't believe, I know." In response to questioning as to why he told Dr. Paul that he was "pretending so that [he] could get drug treatment," defendant claimed that the "only time that [he] ever tried to fake" was when he told the Crisis Unit sometime in 2003 that he had "a problem" in order to avoid going to jail for a missed court date but that "it didn't work."
Defendant also testified that he understood the insanity defense but did not want to use it. He testified that he "[a]bsolutely" recalled the events leading up to the deaths of his grandmother and girlfriend, and that he did not have "any difficulty relating that information to anybody." When asked whether he would cooperate with his attorneys and allow them to use the insanity defense if necessary, defendant said he would "have to" listen to them.
Defendant also testified that he told police he was "on a mission from God" to kill his grandmother because she was "the descendant of a Lebanese King" and the biblical direction that "the descendants be killed was not complete." Defendant called police after the killings but did not tell them he was Jesus Christ or on a mission from God until questioned for the second time. He signed the first
Defendant testified that he did not "have any problem relating to [his] attorneys the facts of what happened on" June 8, 2004, that he understood what his attorneys discussed with him and that he was able to make decisions based on what they told him. He expressed his understanding that he could participate in discussions about witnesses, questions to ask and jury selection. He also understood that the State was seeking the death penalty.
Judge Chaiet thoroughly summarized the testimony, the issues and the legal standards, and was "satisfied that the defendant is competent to stand trial despite his paranoid schizophrenia." The judge understood that defendant has "a psychiatric illness" and "suffer[s] from delusions," but he found that
In August 2006, while preparing for trial, defense counsel again sought the trial judge's consideration of defendant's competency.
The court first heard the testimony of Lois Nardone, a social worker hired by defense counsel to prepare defendant's "social history investigation" for the trial's penalty phase. She testified that, in her most recent contacts,
Nardone felt that defendant "always" expressed what she felt were delusional beliefs, but she had been able to "listen to him and refocus him" in order to collect the necessary information. Defendant began "becoming increasingly more paranoid" in April and she felt he had greatly decompensated" in the prior year and was unable to provide any useful information. Nardone also revealed that defendant's belief he would be acquitted had interfered with "his ability to assist in the preparation of his penalty phase defense."
For example, Nardone reviewed a letter defendant had written to "Aunt Joanne" and a letter defendant wrote to the court containing "proposed questions and a vocabulary section" that defendant wanted to be used during jury selection. In the letter to his aunt, defendant wrote, among other things, that "his attorneys in the court are trying to shut him down," "he's an experiment of the CIA," the CIA "must have wired" his grandfather's house, and "she [the aunt] and the rest of the family have been targeted probably as he has been because of their DNA."
Defendant also demonstrated his "mathematical conclusions" for Nardone "at least three or four times." Nardone did not really understand what it was about except that defendant "obviously finds correlations between numbers and events" and "they have always made a lot of sense to him." The "point" of "the math" was
Nardone testified that defendant's delusions "have been clear from the start," and she had advised defendant's attorneys that "he's suffering from a mental illness." Defendant, according to Nardone, had no trouble communicating those delusions to Nardone. She agreed defendant was "articulate" but "not always willing to cooperate with regard to the information that [she] wanted to discuss."
In lieu of having one of defendant's attorneys, Carl Herman, testify about a telephone conference with defendant on July 18, 2006, the judge accepted the attorney's certification regarding his "difficult time communicating with his client."
At defense counsel's request, Dr. Atkins visited with defendant on August 2, 2006, to conduct a follow-up evaluation. He also reviewed Herman's certification, medical records from the jail, defendant's letter to the court, and the videotape and transcripts from interviews by Drs. Michals and Samuels in May 2006. Dr. Atkins spent about an hour-and-a-half to two hours with defendant and found defendant to be "far more focused" on his "delusional system" and "on his perception that his legal team could not be trusted." He also reached the same diagnosis as before:
Dr. Atkins again opined that defendant was not competent to stand trial, especially because of his "fixed delusion that God would intervene at his trial, implant something in the jurors' minds to make them acquit him." With that delusion, defendant's need to work with his attorneys on a defense was "undermined" and "would interfere with any attempts to use an insanity defense." Defendant's delusional system also interfered with his ability to make a rational decision to take a plea or testify or appreciate the death penalty aspect of the case.
Dr. Atkins testified he was able to get defendant to respond to questions but his responses were "rambling, they were tangential. They were animated. He was agitated." The content of defendant's delusions have changed because "now he believes that it was the devil and other agents, aliens, CIA, but particularly the devil that was responsible for him being injected with or instilled with the perception that it was God's wishes that he was following at the time of the instant offense." On cross-examination, Dr. Atkins agreed defendant was no longer sure he would be acquitted.
Dr. Atkins opined that defendant needed treatment for his "severe mental illness" and the jail medical records did not reflect "any psychiatric treatment" other than "an interview or two by the prison psychiatrist" that were "interrupted." Defendant was not given medication, and Dr. Atkins opined that without treatment or medication, defendant was "going to become increasingly more agitated and more delusional and will have a progressively more difficult time assisting in his defense."
Steven Reed, a psychologist and the Director of Mental Health Services at the Monmouth County Correctional Institute, testified for the State. Dr. Reed testified he had no personal knowledge of defendant or his mental health status but testified the records revealed defendant had "not received any form of psychiatric treatment" while in jail; he was unaware of the court order to provide treatment for defendant.
Dr. Michals conducted his third examination of defendant on August 16, 2006. He also reviewed letters written by defendant to the court, Dr. Atkins's recent report, and other recent documentation. Dr. Michals disagreed with Dr. Atkins's opinion that defendant was not competent to stand trial. In the interview, which was videotaped, defendant claimed not to be aware of the competency evaluation and maintained that no evaluation was needed because he was competent.
Dr. Michals found defendant to be "marginally cooperative" with the interview and that defendant "[m]ade statements rather than answered questions." He found defendant "[w]as controlling in his behavior concerning the interview. And really tried to control and direct the interview." Defendant expressed no delusional thinking, as in the May 2006 interview, and only expressed "opinions concerning his interaction with his attorney, their conduct." On cross-examination, Dr. Michals agreed defendant did not share his delusional thinking in that interview because he refused to talk or cooperate. Dr. Michals found no evidence of the expansion or change in delusional thinking that Dr. Atkins found. He felt it was "highly unusual" and "atypical" for delusional people to make such a "dramatic change" from "good to evil directing his actions." He did see evidence of defendant's "apparent delusional thinking" in a July 17, 2006 letter to the court, in which defendant stated, "[q]uite absurd under the circumstances that a human facing the most stringent penalty under the constitution of the U.S. has to ask puppeteering aliens, permission to communicate with the implanted entities to be impaneled in what is said to be fair and impartial proceedings." In that letter, defendant also stated that his "state of mind has taken a . . . turn"; Dr. Michals opined that it was very unusual for a schizophrenic to have a radical "change in their belief system." He found that "[p]eople who have the illness of paranoid-schizophrenia basically are controlled by their thinking, their behaviors, control their moods, their thoughts, their action . . . they believe what they believe to be true and they don't see any reason for any change."
Dr. Michals was also critical of Dr. Atkins's opinion that defendant's so-called "fixed delusions" had "expanded," and he found the fact that defendant did not tell Dr. Atkins about his thoughts about the CIA to be "a significant omission." Dr. Michals also noted that the medical records from the jail indicated first "no urgent need for treatment" and then "no need for treatment evident." But, he also agreed, on cross-examination, that the records did not show that "a comprehensive psychiatric evaluation" was conducted.
In his August 24, 2006 report, Dr. Michals found "the testimony of Dr. Atkins and Ms. Nardone, the self-report by Mr. Miraglia, the expansive nature of his complaints had changed from God to the devil, to the CIA, to the correction officers, to other inmates," which was "a very atypical type of pattern in people who have this mental illness, schizophrenia." He was also influenced by the fact that there were no reports from the jail of any "behavioral manifestations" of the expanded delusions. Dr. Michals diagnosed defendant with "a personality disorder" with "narcissistic and borderline features" and opined defendant was competent to stand trial and could cooperate with his attorneys "[i]f he chose to." He still believed defendant was a malingerer and a "calculating, clever person."
The judge also heard the testimony of an operations sergeant with the Monmouth County Sheriff's Office, who testified about his observations of defendant in the prison, and Dr. Edward Samuel Hume, one of two psychiatrists with the Center for Family Guidance hired by the Monmouth County Correctional Institution to provide medical services at that facility.
Over defense counsel's objection, defendant was permitted to testify at the second hearing. When asked by the trial judge if he still felt he was Jesus Christ, defendant testified he could not answer that with a "yes-or-no answer." He explained that "[t]here can be many Christs" and he was "not sure" if he was. Defendant claimed he also "traveled time" but could not tell whether it was "forward or back."
Defendant felt he was competent to stand trial and testified he understood the role of the judge, the prosecutor and the defense attorneys. When the judge asked if defendant understood why his attorneys were saying they had difficulty "cooperating with" defendant, he responded that he had "no problem going forward with an insanity defense" and that his "point-of-view has changed drastically." He continued:
On cross-examination by the prosecutor, defendant stated he was now committed to the insanity defense as his "only viable defense."
Defendant also disputed statements Dr. Atkins attributed to him during that interview and denied filling out a second MMPI questionnaire:
Defendant felt "they're watching [him] in the jail" and his books were being taken away for no reason; he believed his attorneys "put this motion in to open up this competency evaluation again" just because he said "[t]he devil told me to do it."
The judge asked defendant to explain how mathematics informed certain events in his life, as he told Dr. Michals. Defendant said he was "sorry [he] said anything to these people because they're taking everything out of context" and he was just "playing with some numbers and it's quite coincidental." Defendant also explained what he meant when he said strange things about the CIA and "[p]uppeteering aliens," claiming that his words were "being taken out of context."
In ruling, the judge expressed that he had been "impressed" with Dr. Atkins's testimony in 2005, and "did accept his testimony as far as concluding that the defendant was a paranoid-schizophrenic and delusional," but he "did not accept his ultimate conclusion" about defendant's competency. The judge explained that because of defendant's "keen understanding of the justice system and his demonstrated above-average intelligence," he could cooperate with his attorneys, "despite delusionary [sic] thinking."
The judge further found that defendant's testimony revealed he "knows the system," "has a strong desire to proceed to trial," and that he "down-played any delusional thinking and even his paranoia":
The judge thus ruled that, "[a]lthough it remains a close call because of [defendant's] understanding of the system and his intelligence," the State failed to meet its burden of showing that defendant was competent to stand trial at the time. The judge committed defendant to hospitalization in a secure facility for treatment and appointed a psychiatrist to examine defendant for the court. The judge also ordered that defendant be medicated if treating physicians feel it appropriate.
A third competency hearing took place on April 10, 2007. The judge heard only the testimony of Dr. Mahmood Ghahramani, a psychiatrist at the Ann Klein Forensic Center. Dr. Ghahramani had treated defendant since December 2006; they met once a week during rounds "and then a few times in team meetings and individually." He diagnosed defendant with "bipolar disorder in spontaneous remission," explaining that defendant:
Dr. Ghahramani opined that a schizophrenia diagnosis was incorrect because schizophrenia "is a very deteriorating condition" and defendant was not deteriorating but was instead "quite relevant, coherent" and "not extremely detached from reality." He also opined defendant had an "appropriate" affect.
Dr. Ghahramani did not discuss defendant's "legal situation" because defendant "was intelligent enough and knowledgeable enough" to stop him when he tried to ask whether defendant believed he was Jesus Christ. He testified defendant was "aware of the difference" between the competency evaluation and an insanity evaluation, which was "not very usual for a psychiatric patient."
During the last two examinations, Dr. Ghahramani found defendant was "well-oriented to time, place and person," his memory was "intact," concentration was "good," and he was knowledgeable of the legal proceedings. There was no evidence of hallucinations or delusions; defendant would not answer questions about whether he thought he was Jesus Christ.
Dr. Ghahramani came to the opinion in January 2007 that defendant
On cross-examination, Dr. Ghahramani admitted he based his opinion mainly on a competency evaluation that lasted about fifty to sixty minutes on January 2, 2007. He acknowledged the rest of his visits with defendant were only maybe five to ten minutes long. Dr. Ghahramani was aware that defendant had previously expressed the belief that God would intervene with the jurors and he would be acquitted; Dr. Ghahramani agreed that "would be a delusional irrational thought." He did not ask defendant if he still held that belief.
In response to the judge's question about defendant's ability to communicate with his attorneys, Dr. Ghahramani testified defendant was "communicating very clearly" with him and "answering the questions quite relevant and coherently." Dr. Ghahramani also reported that "the staff notes actually [were] quite positive [about] his interaction with the peers and the staff" and that defendant needed psychiatric care but "will be able to function in jail."
At the conclusion of the third hearing, at which only Dr. Ghahramani testified, the judge ruled that one of the "motivating factors" in sending defendant to the psychiatric hospital was to have defendant "more closely monitored" and "to get him medicated so that his behavior and thought process would improve." As it turned out, the staff found "no basis to medicate him because he was not acting out in any way, shape or form during the particular proceeding." As a result, the main issue that concerned the judge was defendant's ability to "understand and communicate with his attorneys" and "whether he understood the ramifications of the insanity defense." Because the treating physicians at Ann Klein found no problems with communication, the judge was satisfied the State had "by a preponderance of the evidence shown that he is competent." The judge also noted that the defense failed to recall Dr. Weiss or Dr. Atkins.
Defendant also argues that his incompetency was revealed by his trial testimony. Certainly defendant is correct that the trial judge had a continuing obligation to consider defendant's competency once the trial commenced.
During voir dire regarding defendant's desire to testify, defendant stated, in response to the judge's question, that he had a "legitimate reason" for wanting to testify:
Defendant understood that this was not his "pulpit" and that he would have to respond to questions. When defendant asked if he would be "allowed to use the mathematics," the judge declined to get into the specifics of his testimony and said he could discuss it if it was responsive to questions. At that point, the court ended the voir dire, stating
Before the jury, defendant testified he had an "extensive" heroin addiction from 1994 to 2004, when he entered the Carrier Clinic for thirty-three days and then went to the Mt. Carmel Guild halfway house for a couple of months. Defendant was "in the middle of fighting a DYFS case" and needed to address his heroin addiction. Besides being in prison for about two years, defendant recounted that he had been "in like 17 different rehabs through the course of [his] life."
Defendant testified he was raised a Catholic but started going to a new Christian church "a little bit" in 2002, and then again in April 2004. He considered himself a "Born Again Christian," but only "for lack of better words," and he stated "I believe in the law of God, which is the holy Bible. I believe it's the law of the universe."
Defendant testified that on the morning of the killings, he listened to "the tapes" by southern preachers:
He acknowledged the words were not on the tapes themselves but "[t]hey came out of what would be the Bible." When asked why, defendant responded "[b]ecause God told me to do it."
In describing the killings, defendant explained how he parked his car behind a large hedge row where it could not be seen from the house. After unsuccessfully trying to open the front door, he entered his grandmother's house through a window, took a meat cleaver and a knife from the kitchen and put the cleaver in his pocket. He walked upstairs, looked in his grandmother's bedroom and noted she was sleeping, so he continued to the other bedroom where Leigh was sleeping.
Defendant explained his thought processes as:
Defendant claimed Leigh went into his grandmother's bedroom and told her: "he's nuts, he's talking about God again." Defendant then went into the bedroom, his grandmother screamed "just get out of here" and Leigh hit "three buttons" on the speakerphone, presumably calling 9-1-1. Defendant cut the cord on the phone and then thought "dude, you just signed your own death warrant." Defendant then followed Leigh back into the other bedroom, again saying "just tell me what you did." He explained what happened next:
Defendant testified that it took "anywhere from 45 seconds to a minute" for Leigh to bleed to death and then "her body fell on the bed where all that blood was."
Defendant testified that, because God told him to do it, after Leigh died he "pulled her down [and] chopped off her head. [He] chopped off her hands. [He] chopped off her feet." When asked if God gave him a reason to do that, defendant responded, "[f]or all intents and purposes, he doesn't owe anybody an explanation. So, that's the best I could tell you. He told me to chop them off." Defendant then picked up "the head" and said, "this one is for John the Baptist, and [he] threw the head on the ground."
While he was "[i]n the process of chopping her up," defendant saw his grandmother watching. He said "dude, just get out of here." His grandmother left for "a split second" and came back asking: "is she dead yet." When defendant said yes, she said "well, call the cops," which defendant planned to do after he killed her too, but he did not tell his grandmother that.
Defendant's grandmother then went downstairs and defendant was "just like frozen for a second" before "the voice says, you got to go get her." Defendant reached his grandmother as she was unlocking and opening the front door:
Then defendant "killed her by cutting her neck off" with the meat cleaver.
Defendant claimed he then tried to call police but his cell phone battery was dead. His "goal" had been "to go there, chop them up, and call the cops, deliver a message, that's it." When asked why he planned to call the police, defendant said "[b]ecause God told me to go to the house . . . chop them up, kill them, call the police on your cell, tell them that you're Jesus Christ, I got a message for you to deliver today" — that he was "just a messenger."
According to defendant, after "everybody is dead about 15 minutes," his uncle "start[ed] banging on the door" and defendant thought "God delivered a cell phone to the door." During that fifteen minutes, defendant was "flustered" because he "just chopped up two people [he] didn't want to kill." He opened the door, "skip[ped] out the door," told his uncle not to go inside, and asked to borrow his cell phone. When his uncle asked about the blood, defendant said "[d]on't worry about it, just don't go in the house." Defendant dialed 9-1-1 and police arrived within four minutes; on cross-examination, defendant agreed he did not tell police how the victims were killed or that God told him to kill them during that phone call.
When the first officer arrived, defendant put his hands on his head and told the officer to arrest him. On cross-examination, defendant agreed that when one officer defendant had known for his "whole life" asked, "what's happening, Russ," defendant said, "Timmy, I killed her, I killed that fucking bitch." He testified that God told him to use those particular words, something he had never told any of the doctors who questioned him in the four years since the killings.
On direct examination, defendant denied he was "mentally ill." He explained that "[m]athematics is absolute. I speak one language, mathematics. Mathematics is nothing delusional about it. The definition of mathematics is absolutely certain, precise, exact." When asked to explain why he did not want to use the insanity defense, defendant explained there was "a fair and impartial jury without no preconceived ideas and not guilty is still on the verdict sheet. So, what's the problem?" He felt that the jury would "be a fool" not to find him not guilty because "if I'm telling the truth and God told me to kill them and they are 12 of the 16 people that are going to be in there, listen to the message that I have." Defendant then went on to explain his mathematics:
When asked what the numbers proved, defendant responded "[f]irst of all, we're speaking the English language. English equals 74, Jesus equals 74 and Lucifer equals 74," and "[m]athematically, Lucifer and my name add up to be the same."
Defendant continued explaining how the mathematics proved that his
In response to several questions about why God wanted Leigh and his grandmother killed, defendant continued in this fashion, giving long speeches about what number he assigned to particular words, claiming it said in the Bible that "God is going to order Jesus to kill" and he had "to deliver a mathematical message for God." He maintained that he "got math that proves I'm not delusional."
When asked to explain why he signed the second
On cross-examination, defendant agreed he stabbed Leigh multiple times in the chest, shoulder and back and that God helped him. He said that "[t]he God of Israel" and "[t]he Invisible God" killed the two women and he was "blaming it on God." Defendant also agreed it was his hand that held the knife and meat cleaver and that "chopped them up."
The crux of defendant's argument at trial and on appeal is that his delusional thinking — that he was the son of God and that God would implant the idea for acquittal in the juror's minds — was clear evidence of his inability to participate in an adequate presentation of his defense. Defendant contends this was evident throughout the three competency hearings, during the voir dire when defendant decided to testify in his own defense, and throughout the course of his trial testimony. We reject this contention not because we find a lack of evidence of mental illness but because, after painstakingly examining the question on multiple occasions, Judge Chaiet determined that defendant was competent to stand trial by applying the standards contained in
Defendant also argues he was denied a fair trial because the model jury charge on insanity was not modified to explain that, if defendant were found not guilty by reason of insanity, he would be committed to a secure state psychiatric facility and would not be released until the court determined he was no longer a danger to himself or others. Defendant maintains that the added language would eliminate or reduce the possibility of a compromise verdict based on the jury's fear that an acquittal on insanity grounds would lead to defendant's release from incarceration.
At the charge conference, counsel proposed a charge that would explain to the jury that, if found insane, defendant would be committed to a secure facility, would not be entitled to be released until the court determined that he was no longer a danger to himself or others, and that the jury should not speculate as to what would or would not happen to defendant as a result of its verdict.
As a result, Judge Chaiet instructed the jury using the
The judge then gave an extended definition of the term "preponderance of the evidence" and added the following after the section of the model charge that asks the jury to determine whether defendant had sufficient mind to comprehend whether his actions were right or wrong:
Thereafter, in accordance with the model charge, the judge instructed the jury:
And, in response to defendant's concerns about the jury's potential fear if it were to acquit a violent person because he was found to be insane, Judge Chaiet instructed the jury that it "should not speculate as to what will or will not happen to defendant, nor should that issue play any part whatsoever in your deliberations."
In
In this case, Judge Chaiet not only gave the model jury charge, but also further instructed the jury not to speculate on what would happen to defendant as a result of its decision. Because the judge's charge was accurate and designed to further ensure the jury would not speculate as to the consequences of the verdict, he did not err by refusing to add the additional language suggested by defense counsel at trial.
Defendant argues that the judge erred in denying defense counsel's motion, to which defendant objected, for a bench trial. He argues that finding defendant competent to stand trial "does not moot the question whether the defendant is competent to make the decision whether to waive a jury trial" and there was "no evidence that [defendant] had any rational basis for refusing to waive a jury trial."
Just before jury selection, defense counsel moved for a bench trial despite defendant's desire for a jury trial. Counsel claimed that even though defendant was found competent to stand trial, his reason for wanting a jury trial is "not reality based" because he believed God would intervene with the jury and he would be acquitted. Because "people don't believe in the insanity defense" and they fear releasing someone who will later commit a violent act, counsel argued that the only way for defendant to receive a fair trial was to have a bench trial. The State objected.
Judge Chaiet correctly concluded that defendant was not entitled to a nonjury trial without the waiver required by
The judge additionally stated he would "take great pains during the voir dire process" to deal with the issue of jurors adverse to the insanity defense. The judge also considered the State's objection to a bench trial and the fact that the evidence was not "going to be particularly complex" in denying the request, as well as the fact that defendant was charged with "a severe crime," with the insanity defense implicated and a "[h]ighly charged emotional atmosphere," and that he would be required to make numerous rulings on the admissibility of evidence and deal with "particularly technical matters."
Defendant possessed the constitutional right to a jury trial.
While a defendant may waive the right to a jury trial, the right to insist on a bench trial is not of constitutional dimension.
The "relevant factors" include:
Another consideration is public confidence in the administration of justice, which is best vindicated by a jury finding.
We review the grant or denial of a request to waive a jury trial under an abuse of discretion standard.
Here, the judge denied defense counsel's request for a non-jury trial because defendant did not waive his right to a jury trial and defense counsel could not waive that right for him. Moreover, Judge Chaiet reviewed the
In this vein, defendant lastly argues that the trial judge erred in failing to address whether defendant, although found competent to stand trial, was capable of "knowingly, intelligently, and competently refusing to waive a jury trial." Citing
The trial judge addressed this argument, noting that, in
We agree with Judge Chaiet's analysis that whether someone is competent to represent themselves at trial is not the same as whether that person was competent to waive their constitutional right to trial by jury. Although defendant presented the delusional thinking that a deity would intervene on his behalf and instruct the jury to acquit him, defendant also quite rationally stated that he wanted a jury trial because "[w]ith 12 other individuals over here, [he] only need[ed] one of them in order to be — draw a hung jury."
The trial judge did not err in denying defense counsel's motion for a bench trial over defendant's objection.
Affirmed.
