The opinion of the court was delivered by REISNER, P.J.A.D.

By leave granted, the State appeals from paragraph one of a June 7, 2013 order, suppressing the results of a warrantless blood test, and defendant appeals from paragraph two of the same order, denying his speedy trial motion. Because we conclude that application of the exclusionary rule is not required in the unusual circumstances of this case, we reverse on the State's appeal. We affirm on defendant's appeal.1

I

The suppression issue is novel and arises from the following scenario. On December 16, 2010, defendant was involved in a one-car accident in which his vehicle struck a utility pole and his two passengers were injured. After defendant failed the roadside sobriety tests, the West Deptford police arrested him at about 2:30 a.m., on suspicion of driving while intoxicated (DWI). They transported defendant to police headquarters, where they read him his Miranda2 rights and he invoked his right to counsel. The police later transported defendant to a local hospital. At 4:16 a.m., hospital personnel drew a blood sample at the request of the police.3 The requesting police officer, defendant, and a hospital nurse each signed a Certificate of Request to Withdraw a Specimen, although defendant signed the form two minutes after the blood was drawn. See N.J.S.A. 2A:62A-11.4

At the time of the accident in 2010, New Jersey law permitted the police to obtain a blood sample without first obtaining a warrant, so long as they had probable cause to believe that the driver was intoxicated.5 That principle, derived from Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 86 S.Ct. 1826, 16 L.Ed.2d 908 (1966), was based on the presumed exigency created by the dissipation of alcohol levels in the bloodstream, and was clearly stated in opinions of our Supreme Court. For example, in State v. Dyal, 97 N.J. 229, 478 A.2d 390 (1984), the Court observed: "A drunken driver arrested by police with probable cause to believe he is intoxicated has no federal constitutional right to prevent the involuntary taking of a blood sample. Of course, the sample should be taken in a medically acceptable manner at a hospital or other suitable health care facility." Id. at 238, 478 A.2d 390 (citing Schmerber, supra, 384 U.S. at 771-72, 86 S.Ct. at 1836, 16 L.Ed.2d at 920). The issue in Dyal was whether the police could obtain the results of hospital blood tests drawn for purposes of medical treatment; however, part of the Court's reasoning was that the police had the right to obtain a blood sample from the driver. Dyal, supra, 97 N.J. at 231, 238-39, 478 A.2d 390.

Several subsequent Appellate Division decisions likewise read Schmerber as holding that a warrant was not required. See, e.g., State v. Burns, 159 N.J.Super. 539, 544, 388 A.2d 987 (App.Div.1978) ("[C]onsent is not required to the taking of a blood sample, but the taking of such sample must be done in a medically acceptable manner and environment and without force or violence or the threat of same."); State v. Woomer, 196 N.J.Super. 583, 586, 483 A.2d 837 (App.Div.1984) ("[A] blood sample may be taken involuntarily [from a suspected drunk driver] and no consent is required.").

In State v. Ravotto, 169 N.J. 227, 231-33, 777 A.2d 301 (2001), the Court held that the police used excessive force in obtaining a blood sample from a drunk driving suspect who was terrified of needles. However, the Court reaffirmed that the police did not need a warrant to obtain the blood test:

These rulings were also reflected in Guidelines issued by the Attorney General to county and municipal prosecutors.6 In pertinent part, the Guidelines advised that "[a] defendant has no right to refuse to allow blood to be drawn as long as the police or law enforcement officer has probable cause to believe that the blood sample will contain evidence of alcohol and/or drugs." Attorney General Guideline[s]: Prosecution of DWI & Refusal Violations, at 9 (Jan. 24, 2005); N.J.S.A. 39:4-50.2a (requiring the Attorney General to promulgate guidelines).7 Consequently, when the police obtained the warrantless blood sample from Adkins, they acted pursuant to well-established legal precedent in this State.

However, years later, the United States Supreme Court clarified Schmerber—and dramatically changed the legal landscape in New Jersey and many other states-by holding that there was no per se rule of exigency in drunk driving cases, and that the need to obtain a search warrant before taking a blood sample was to be determined on a case by case basis. Missouri v. McNeely, ___ U.S. ___, ___, 133 S.Ct. 1552, 1563, 185 L.Ed.2d 696, 709 (2013); see id. at 704 n. 2, 133 S.Ct. at 1558 n. 2, 185 L.Ed.2d at 704 n. 2. Further, under well-settled federal precedent, the Supreme Court's construction of the Fourth Amendment must be given pipeline retroactivity. Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314, 328, 107 S.Ct. 708, 716, 93 L.Ed.2d 649, 661 (1987) ("We therefore hold that a new rule for the conduct of criminal prosecutions is to be applied retroactively to all cases, state or federal, pending on direct review or not yet final, with no exception for cases in which the new rule constitutes a `clear break' with the past.").

However, when applied in the federal courts, McNeely would not result in suppression of the blood evidence obtained here, because the United States Supreme Court will not apply the exclusionary rule as a remedy where the police conducted a search in good faith reliance on binding legal precedent in the jurisdiction where the search occurred. See Davis v. United States, ___ U.S. ___, ___, 131 S.Ct. 2419, 2434, 180 L.Ed.2d 285, 302 (2011).8

In Davis, the Court clarified that the retroactivity rule announced in Griffith did not necessarily require application of the exclusionary rule as a remedy where the Court announced a new search and seizure rule. Davis, supra, ___ U.S. at ___, 131 S.Ct. at 2431, 180 L.Ed.2d at 298-99. "[T]he retroactive application of a new rule of substantive Fourth Amendment law raises the question whether a suppression remedy applies; it does not answer that question." Id. at ____, 131 S.Ct. at 2431, 180 L.Ed.2d at 298.

Davis addressed searches conducted prior to Arizona v. Gard, 556 U.S. 332, 129 S.Ct. 1710, 173 L.Ed.2d 485 (2009), a case holding that police could not automatically search the passenger compartment of a vehicle whenever an occupant was arrested. Davis, supra, ___ U.S. at ___, 131 S.Ct. at 2424-25, 180 L.Ed.2d at 291-92. Recognizing that its prior holding in New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 101 S.Ct. 2860, 69 L.Ed.2d 768 (1981), had been widely understood as permitting such searches, the Court concluded that the exclusionary rule was not an appropriate remedy for pre-Gant searches. Davis, supra, ___ U.S. at ___, 131 S.Ct. at 2428-29, 180 L.Ed.2d at 295-97. The Court reasoned that, where the police acted in reliance on established legal precedent, suppressing evidence would not serve the purpose of the exclusionary rule to deter lawless police conduct:

In New Jersey, new State constitutional search and seizure rules ordinarily are applied prospectively. "In cases where the new rule is an exclusionary rule, meant solely to deter illegal police conduct, the new rule is virtually never given retroactive effect. The reason is that the deterrent purposes of such a rule would not be advanced by applying it to past misconduct." State v. Burstein, 85 N.J. 394, 406, 427 A.2d 525 (1981); see also State v. Earls, 214 N.J. 564, 590, 70 A.3d 630 (2013); State v. Purnell, 161 N.J. 44, 54, 735 A.2d 513 (1999); State v. Knight, 145 N.J. 233, 251, 678 A.2d 642 (1996); State v. Young, 87 N.J. 132, 140-41, 432 A.2d 874 (1981); State v. McCann, 391 N.J.Super. 542, 555, 919 A.2d 136 (App.Div.2007); State v. Skidmore, 253 N.J.Super. 227, 236, 601 A.2d 729 (App.Div.1992). Had McNeely been decided by the New Jersey Supreme Court in construing our State Constitution, it would not have been applied retroactively—thus reaching the same result as in the federal system but by a different route.

The Court's recent decision in State v. Earls does not compel a different result here. In Earls, the Court gave the defendant the benefit of its ruling that, under the New Jersey Constitution, "police must obtain a warrant based on a showing of probable cause, or qualify for an exception to the warrant requirement, to obtain tracking information through the use of a cell phone." Earls, supra, 214 N.J. at 588, 70 A.3d. 630. The Court recognized that the holding was novel and law enforcement officers could not have anticipated it. Id. at 589, 70 A.3d 630. The Court also acknowledged that "deterrence is rarely a basis to apply a new rule retroactively," id. at 590, 70 A.3d 630 (citing Knight, supra), and that retroactive application would substantially disrupt the administration of justice. Id. at 591, 70 A.3d 630. In that context, the Court applied the rule "to defendant Earls and future cases only."9 Ibid.; see also State v. Henderson, 208 N.J. 208, 302, 27 A.3d 872 (2011). Unlike Earls, in this case defendant's appeal did not result in a new interpretation of our State Constitution, which might justify giving him the benefit of the new rule; rather, he simply invoked newly-decided federal case law which, in the federal court system, would not benefit him.10

In our view, the real issue here is whether, given the federal retroactivity requirement, we should, as the State argues, apply an approach analogous to that set forth in Davis, or whether, as defendant argues, the result here is dictated by State v. Novembrino, 105 N.J. 95, 157-59, 519 A.2d 820 (1987), which rejected a "good faith" exception to the application of the exclusionary rule.

In Novembrino, our Court, in construing the State Constitution, declined to follow the rule announced in United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 104 S.Ct. 3405, 82 L.Ed.2d 677 (1984). Leon held that the exclusionary rule would not apply where the police acted in objectively reasonable reliance on a facially valid search warrant, which was issued by a judge but was "ultimately found to be unsupported by probable cause." Id. at 900, 922, 104 S.Ct. at 3409, 3420, 82 L.Ed.2d at 684, 698.11 In adopting what it characterized as a "good-faith exception for searches conducted pursuant to warrants," the Leon Court reasoned that "the marginal or nonexistent benefits produced by suppressing evidence obtained in objectively reasonable reliance on a subsequently invalidated search warrant cannot justify the substantial costs of exclusion." Id. at 924, 922, 104 S.Ct. at 3420-21, 82 L.Ed.2d at 698-99.

In declining to adopt the good faith rule, under the auspices of the New Jersey Constitution,12 our Court characterized Leon as solely concerned with deterring unlawful police conduct:

Our Court disagreed with Leon, emphasizing the critical constitutional significance of the probable cause standard. Id. at 107-08, 519 A.2d 820. Indeed, much of the opinion is devoted to a discussion of the probable cause standard and its central importance to the warrant requirement. Id. at 105-22, 519 A.2d 820. The Court also observed that the defects in the Novembrino warrant probably resulted from the hurried actions of an inexperienced police officer. Id. at 129, 519 A.2d 820. The Court concluded that suppressing evidence seized pursuant to invalid warrants would safeguard the integrity of the process by which warrants are sought and issued. "Our view that the good-faith exception will ultimately reduce respect for and compliance with the probable-cause standard that we have steadfastly enforced persuades us that there is a strong state interest that would be disserved by adopting the Leon rule." Id. at 154, 519 A.2d 820.

Our Court also took a broader view of the purpose of the exclusionary rule:

As an intermediate appellate court we are, of course, bound by Novembrino. However, we do not believe that Novembrino applies to the very different circumstances of this case, which has nothing to do with invalid warrants or unlawful police activity. In reaching that conclusion, we note that in very limited circumstances, the Court has signaled that application of the exclusionary rule may not always be appropriate where applying the rule would not serve its well-understood purposes.

In State v. Harris, 211 N.J. 566, 50 A.3d 15 (2012), the Court declined to order the suppression of an illegal handgun seized during a search authorized by a warrant properly issued pursuant to the Prevention of Domestic Violence Act, N.J.S.A. 2C:25-17 to -35. Unlike a warrant issued for a criminal investigation, a domestic violence warrant need not be issued on probable cause. However, the Court reasoned that the gun was discovered and seized during a "special needs search," conducted to protect a victim of domestic violence and not for the purpose of uncovering evidence of crime. Id. at 584, 50 A.3d 15. Ordinarily, the fruits of such a search may be admissible in a subsequent criminal prosecution, so long as the search was conducted pursuant to a valid domestic violence warrant and was not a mere pretext to uncover criminal evidence. Id. at 585-86, 50 A.3d 15 (citing State v. Dispoto, 189 N.J. 108, 123, 913 A.2d 791 (2007)).

In declining to apply the exclusionary rule, however, the Court further stated:

The above-quoted language is readily applicable to this case. Like Harris, and unlike Novembrino, here there was no mistake by the police, good faith or otherwise. At the time of the search, their conduct was lawful under well-established case law in this State. See also State v. Domicz, 188 N.J. 285, 295-96, 907 A.2d 395 (2006) (declining to characterize a thermal scan as "unlawful conduct" by the police, when at the time of the scan, most courts that had considered the issue had held that a thermal scan was not a "search"). The police were not acting pursuant to an invalidly-issued warrant which they mistakenly thought was valid. Nor was there any unreasonable or improper conduct by another State law enforcement employee involved in the search.

This case is not like State v. Handy, where a police dispatcher negligently and inaccurately informed an officer that there was an outstanding warrant for the defendant. Handy, supra, 206 N.J. at 41-42, 18 A.3d 179. Handy was arrested, and a search incident to the arrest yielded contraband. Id. at 42, 18 A.3d 179. The Court distinguished prior federal cases involving "an attenuated clerical error in a database upon which police officials reasonably relied." Id. at 52, 18 A.3d 179. Instead, the Court found that the dispatcher was "an active participant" in the chain of events leading to the defendant's arrest. Id. at 47-48, 18 A.3d 179. The Court concluded that suppression "would have important deterrent value, would underscore the need for training of officers and dispatchers to focus on detail, and would serve to assure that our own constitutional guarantees are given full effect." Id. at 52, 18 A.3d 179. Cf. State v. Pitcher, 379 N.J.Super. 308, 311, 878 A.2d 8 (App.Div.2005) (declining to suppress evidence where the police officer stopped defendant's car based on a computer check of Motor Vehicle records, which inaccurately indicated that the car's owner had a suspended license).

Handy is not on point because, at the time the police obtained the blood sample in this case, they were conducting themselves in a manner sanctioned by decades of precedent from our Supreme Court. No amount of additional police training would have deterred the search in this case, because the police were following the law as it existed at the time. As in Harris, suppressing the evidence would not serve the purpose of the exclusionary rule to prevent illegal police conduct. Nor would admitting the evidence involve the judiciary in what Handy described as "`the taint of partnership in official lawlessness.'" Handy, supra, 206 N.J. at 45, 18 A.3d 179 (citation omitted).

While it could be argued that suppression would, in some abstract sense, vindicate defendant's state and federal constitutional right against illegal searches, it would do so at a cost our Court has not always found justifiable. Retroactivity analysis implicitly recognizes that, where retrospective application of a new rule of law will inflict major disruption on the criminal justice system, some defendants will not get the benefit of the new rule even if it implicates constitutional rights. Thus, in declining to give retroactive application to new search and seizure rulings— and to various other criminal law rulings, see, e.g., Henderson, supra, 208 N.J. at 302, 27 A.3d 872—the Court necessarily deprives some defendants of an avenue to vindicate newly-recognized rights.

In the very narrow circumstances presented here, we conclude that Harris and by analogy, Davis, signal the correct path to our decision. We recognize that there are doctrinal differences between the reasoning in Davis and in Harris. For example, Davis rested in part on the good faith exception articulated in Leon, which our Court rejected in Novembrino. But at the heart of both opinions is the same core of common sense.

"In this case, the State does not seek to admit the fruits of unlawful police conduct since the police fully complied with the law in effect at the time they acted." Skidmore, supra, 253 N.J.Super. at 237, 601 A.2d 729.13 Consequently, application of the exclusionary rule here would not serve the rule's principal purposes articulated by our Court. It would not deter unlawful police conduct, and it would not meaningfully safeguard the integrity of our judicial process. It is one thing for our courts to eschew involvement in admitting evidence seized unlawfully. It is another thing entirely to exclude evidence seized in conformity with the law as it existed at the time of the seizure. Consequently, we reverse the trial court's order suppressing the blood evidence.

In reaching this conclusion, we emphasize the unusual circumstances of this case, where (a) the United States Supreme Court issued a new search and seizure rule that was more restrictive than existing precedent from our Supreme Court; (b) at the time the search was conducted, it was authorized by settled precedent from our Supreme Court; and (c) had the new rule been issued by our Supreme Court as an interpretation of the New Jersey Constitution, it would not have been applied retroactively.

Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for trial.