PER CURIAM.
This appeal arises out of a determination, after a de novo trial in the Law Division, rejecting plaintiff Henry Meahan's claim that his former employer, defendant Michael Anthony Sign Design, failed to pay him wages and commissions in alleged violation of the Wage Collection Law,
We derive the following factual and procedural background from the appellate record.
Plaintiff began working as a sales representative for defendant on April 4, 2011. As he described it, plaintiff "was responsible for the sale of signs and awnings to customers," most of whom were commercial. His job responsibilities included "going out in the field, doing site surveys, negotiating the terms of the deal with ... the customers, ... getting quotes done in-house and presenting ... them to the customer."
Plaintiff accepted the sales position with defendant in response to an e-mail from defendant's Chief Executive Officer, Michael Bradley, dated March 14, 2011. With respect to plaintiff's initial terms of compensation, the e-mail read in pertinent part:
It is undisputed that plaintiff agreed to these initial terms as offered in the e-mail.
About a month after plaintiff began working for the company, Bradley presented him with a written employment agreement. According to plaintiff's trial testimony, he refused to sign that agreement because he felt that several of its terms, including a non-compete clause
Despite being displeased with the wording of the written agreement, plaintiff continued to work for defendant and receive biweekly paychecks for his services. It is undisputed that between plaintiff's start date in April 2011 and the end of May 2011, he was paid $500 per week, plus five percent commissions on any sales that he made. Plaintiff's paystubs, which were prepared by a third party payroll company for defendant, did not segregate out the amounts for salary or draws versus the amounts for commissions.
On or about May 26, 2011, defendant began paying plaintiff an increased amount of $1000 per week instead of the originally-set $500 amount. Plaintiff contended at trial that defendant orally agreed at that time to increase his base weekly salary from $500 to $1000. Bradley, on the other hand, contended that defendant did not agree to increase plaintiff's weekly base pay. Instead, according to Bradley, the company agreed to advance plaintiff an additional $500 weekly at his request, with the proviso that the extra amounts would be applied as an offset against future commissions earned.
As of August 4, 2011, plaintiff's weekly compensation, apart from any paid commissions, was reduced back to $500. According to plaintiff, the company did this unilaterally without his assent. Defendant, meanwhile, maintains that it justifiably decided to stop paying plaintiff the extra weekly $500.
In particular, the company generated a new written employment agreement changing plaintiff's terms of compensation, effective August 5, 2011. According to the agreement, the $500 weekly amount was now to be treated as "a draw against [future] commissions," rather than as salary. In addition, the company decided to pay plaintiff an enhanced commission of eight percent, rather than five percent, on his sales.
Bradley testified that the company made this change in August 2011, because by that point it had allegedly advanced plaintiff "well over $6,000" in enhanced compensation since May. According to Bradley, those advances were substantially above the commissions that plaintiff was actually earning. Consequently, the company decided to alter the compensation package by treating plaintiff's $500 weekly payments as draws against future commissions rather than as salary, while simultaneously "bumping up" the commission's rate to eight percent.
Plaintiff disputed Bradley's characterization of what had occurred. He denied ever receiving a copy of the unsigned August 2011 revised agreement until after he had resigned and filed his wage claim. He testified that he would not have assented to a revised pay structure with such terms. In any event, as of and after August 2011, plaintiff received biweekly compensation from defendant at a rate of $500 weekly.
Plaintiff resigned on December 6, 2011. At that time, he confronted Bradley and asserted that he had been underpaid. Bradley rejected plaintiff's contention, taking the position that the company had paid plaintiff all of what he was owed, and even more.
Plaintiff then filed an administrative claim with the Department of Labor and Workforce Development ("the Department") pursuant to
On May 17, 2012, the wage collection referee issued a two-page written decision, concluding that no additional wages were due from defendant. Among other things, the referee factually determined that plaintiff "was notified properly about his rate of pay and any subsequent changes to the agreement." The referee also found that "[p]laintiff agreed to the terms and conditions of the employment agreement by continuing to work for the [d]efendant despite not signing the employment contracts." In addition, the referee was satisfied that defendant had proven that "[p]laintiff was overpaid on his draw versus commission[s]."
Plaintiff then filed the present action in the Law Division, seeking de novo review of the wage referee's denial of his claim. The court conducted the de novo trial on August 7, 2012, at which plaintiff represented himself and defendant appeared through its counsel. Plaintiff testified on his own behalf, and Bradley testified for defendant. In addition, the trial court was presented with a host of documentary exhibits, including the March 2011 e-mail, and various charts tabulating plaintiff's commissions and paychecks.
After considering the proofs, Judge Richard S. Rebeck concluded that plaintiff's claims for unpaid compensation had been insufficiently substantiated. In an oral decision issued on August 8, 2012, Judge Rebeck determined, like the wage referee, that plaintiff was not entitled to any additional sums. The judge essentially found defendant's proofs more credible than those of plaintiff concerning the nature of, and reasons for, the change in his original compensation structure. The judge also noted that plaintiff had forfeited some of his commissions due to the timing of his resignation, and also due to the fact that one of his larger accounts had reneged on its sales purchase. Based upon the judge's calculations, plaintiff, in fact, had been overpaid.
Plaintiff now raises the following arguments on appeal for our consideration:
Having fully considered these points and the well-presented oral arguments, we affirm the trial court's decision, substantially for the reasons expressed by both Judge Rebeck in his oral opinion, and also by the wage referee in his written administrative decision.
Pursuant to the Wage Collection Law, the Superior Court may consider, de novo, the Department's administrative decision pertaining to a wage dispute.
Once a trial judge has considered the wage claim evidence de novo, and has made corresponding findings of fact and conclusions of law, our usual standards of appellate review apply. In particular, we will "`not disturb the factual findings and legal conclusions of the trial judge unless we are convinced that they are so manifestly unsupported by or inconsistent with the competent, relevant and reasonably credible evidence as to offend the interests of justice[.]'"
Applying this well-established deferential scope of review, we discern no basis to set aside Judge Rebeck's decision and, in particular, his key finding that defendant's version of the facts was more credible than that of plaintiff. We briefly address several of plaintiff's arguments.
First, the court did not abuse its discretion in denying plaintiff's extemporaneous request to adjourn the trial in order to allow him to present another former employee of the company as an additional witness. Plaintiff concedes that he did not subpoena the witness pursuant to
The Supreme Court has held that a decision of whether to grant or deny an adjournment rests within the sound discretion of the trial court.
We also reject plaintiff's contention that once he agreed to the compensation terms set forth in the March 2011 e-mail, he was inalterably entitled to receive a salary, rather than have his biweekly payments deemed to be a draw against future commissions, because he never signed the ensuing written agreements drafted by his employer. Plaintiff is apparently under the mistaken belief that the terms and conditions of employment must always be in a mutually signed writing in order to be legally effective. That is not so. Employment contracts need not be in writing to satisfy the Statute of Frauds in New Jersey.
"To determine the type of contract the parties intended, a court must closely examine the terms of the contract and the surrounding circumstances."
We recognize that, at one point during the trial, Judge Rebeck did state to the parties that he was not going to rely on "unsigned documents." Even if, for the sake of discussion, the court ignores the two unsigned employment agreements presented by defendant, Bradley's testimony was ample to provide a credible basis for the judge to reject plaintiff's version of the events. Credibility is generally entrusted to the trial judge, who has a unique opportunity to see and hear the witnesses and assess their demeanor.
In fact, plaintiff's course of conduct in continuing to work for defendant and receive the proceeds of his biweekly checks after his payments were adjusted in August 2011 is consistent with a legal conclusion that he impliedly agreed to the adjusted terms of his compensation arrangement as described in Bradley's testimony.
We also find no error in the judge's consideration of an exhibit containing what Bradley attested were his contemporaneous "folder notes," which he said he prepared in August 2011 when plaintiff's compensation terms were changed. Plaintiff contends that the folder notes were contrived and backdated by defendant and, therefore, not what they purported to be. However, the authenticity of evidence is a matter largely within a fact-finder's assessment and sound discretion.
Judge Rebeck acted properly in considering the testimony of Bradley, "the person responsible for [the document's] preparation," in admitting the folder notes. Moreover, even if the folder notes are ignored, there remains a sufficient basis in the record to uphold the judge's ultimate findings concerning the operative terms of plaintiff's compensation.
The balance of plaintiff's arguments lack sufficient merit to warrant discussion.
The trial court's judgment is consequently affirmed.
