NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

PER CURIAM.

Defendant D.H. appeals a judgment terminating her parental rights to her seventh child, S.A.H., who was born on December 15, 2007,1 largely as a result of defendant's inability to resolve her long-standing substance abuse problem. We affirm substantially for the reasons set forth by Judge Ronald D. Wigler in his written opinion.

Parents have a constitutionally protected right to the care, custody and control of their children. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753, 102 S.Ct. 1388, 1394-95, 71 L. Ed. 2d 599, 606 (1982); In re Guardianship of K.H.O., 161 N.J. 337, 346 (1999). "The rights to conceive and to raise one's children have been deemed `essential,' `basic civil rights . . .,' `far more precious . . . than property rights.'" Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651, 92 S.Ct. 1208, 1212, 31 L. Ed. 2d 551, 558 (1972) (internal citations omitted). "[T]he preservation and strengthening of family life is a matter of public concern as being in the interests of the general welfare." N.J.S.A. 30:4C-1(a); see also K.H.O., supra, 161 N.J. at 347.

The constitutional right to the parental relationship, however, is not absolute. N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. A.W., 103 N.J. 591, 599 (1986). At times, a parent's interest must yield to the State's obligation to protect children from harm. In re Guardianship of J.C., 129 N.J. 1, 10 (1992). To effectuate these concerns, the Legislature created a test for determining whether a parent's rights must be terminated in the child's best interests. N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1(a) requires that the Division of Child Protection and Permanency (the Division) prove by clear and convincing evidence the following four prongs:

See also A.W., supra, 103 N.J. at 604-11.

After a two-day trial, Judge Wigler rendered a fifty-two page written opinion in which he thoroughly reviewed the evidence, made credibility findings, and determined the Division proved all four prongs by clear and convincing evidence.

As to the first and second prongs, which are interrelated and overlap, N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. R.L., 388 N.J.Super. 81, 88 (App. Div. 2006), certif. denied, 190 N.J. 257 (2007), the judge made extensive findings regarding defendant's long-standing substance abuse problem. Following his birth, the child in question suffered withdrawal symptoms due to defendant's use of opiates and other illegal substances during her pregnancy, leading to the child's removal from defendant's care. Mother and child were reunited in February 2009 while defendant was participating in Straight and Narrow's Mommy and Me Program, but the child was again removed in September 2011 due to a positive drug screen while defendant participated in another program. Notwithstanding, defendant was again reunited with her youngest child in December 2011, after she entered a Renaissance House program. Defendant, however, failed to follow the program's rules and was asked to leave when she relapsed on an overnight pass. Consequently, the child was removed for a third time and placed in foster care in April 2012, where he remains to date. The judge additionally found defendant "has failed to consistently comply with Division services, to address her long-term drug addiction or to demonstrate stability, including appropriate housing and employment" not only during the five years since the birth of the child in question but also for the more than twenty years defendant has been involved with the Division.

We lastly refer to the judge's findings on the fourth prong, which requires a finding that termination "will not do more harm than good." N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1(a)(4). The judge recognized that a Division expert, Dr. Mark Singer, testified the child had formed "dual attachments" to both defendant and his foster mother, a fact Dr. Singer found was unsurprising considering the child's age and history of multiple removals. The judge relied on Dr. Singer's conclusion that "despite the dual attachments and the fact that [the child] would suffer great harm if removed from the care of his biological mother, [the foster mother] is able to mitigate that harm . . . whereas [defendant] is not likely to become a viable parenting option for [the child] now or in the foreseeable future." The judge also observed that the defense expert, Dr. Gerard A. Figurelli, acknowledged the foster mother "possesses the capacity to provide the type of parenting and to access the types of services that would be appropriate to attempt to mitigate the loss [the child] would experience if severed from his mother, and that a transition to the care of [defendant] is unlikely given her long standing and unaddressed substance abuse issues and non-compliance with Division services." In this regard, the judge concluded:

Our standard of review is limited. In re Guardianship of J.N.H., 172 N.J. 440, 472 (2002). Because a judge's findings "are considered binding on appeal when supported by adequate, substantial and credible evidence," we only disturb factual findings when "manifestly unsupported by or inconsistent with competent, relevant and reasonably credible evidence as to offend the interests of justice." Rova Farms Resort, Inc. v. Investors Ins. Co. of Am., 65 N.J. 474, 484 (1974); see also N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. G.L., 191 N.J. 596, 605 (2007); Cesare v. Cesare, 154 N.J. 394, 412 (1998); N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. C.S., 367 N.J.Super. 76, 112 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 180 N.J. 456 (2004). In addition, we defer to the family court's "special expertise in the field of domestic relations." Cesare, supra, 154 N.J. at 412. The judge's findings on each of the four prongs, which we have only briefly recounted, are fully supported by the evidence the judge found credible. We, thus, affirm substantially for the reasons set forth in Judge Wigler's thoughtful written opinion.

Affirmed.