NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

PER CURIAM.

Plaintiff Jeffrey Bello commenced this product liability action for personal injury damages, asserting he suffers from multiple chemical sensitivity syndrome as a result of being exposed to either mold or antifreeze because of alleged defects in his motor vehicle. Plaintiff alleges the vehicle was designed, manufactured and placed into commerce by defendant Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc. (Toyota), and serviced by Lexus of Cherry Hill (LCH). Because plaintiff's experts provided only net opinions, we affirm the summary judgment entered in favor of defendants.

The record reveals that plaintiff purchased a non-certified, pre-owned 2004 Lexus SC430, which had been previously driven approximately 14,000 miles, from C&K Auto Imports, a non-party. Plaintiff asserts that, in September 2006, he noticed a "noxious odor" emanating from the vehicle's ventilation system. First in March 2006, and then five more times between September 2006 and July 2007, plaintiff took the vehicle to LCH for diagnosis and repair. In July 2007, plaintiff traded the vehicle as part of his purchase of another vehicle. Nearly a year later, on May 2, 2008, plaintiff commenced this action.

The discovery period was extended four times. During that time, plaintiff served the expert reports of Peter Leiss, a vehicle design expert, Joseph Guth, Ph.D., an industrial hygienist, and Steven Klein, D.O. Approximately four years after the suit was commenced, plaintiff terminated his relationship with his attorneys, who successfully moved to be relieved. The judge's April 27, 2012 order memorializing the disposition of that motion also provided for the completion of discovery, and set July 27, 2012 as the date for a hearing on any substantive motions.

Both defendants thereafter moved for summary judgment. Plaintiff filed a pro se motion to amend his complaint to include claims against Toyota of fraudulent concealment of evidence and spoliation. Plaintiff also filed a pro se motion for summary judgment. By way of a written decision dated July 20, 2012, the trial judge denied plaintiff's and "conditionally" granted defendants' motions pending further consideration by August 6, 2012. The judge "conditioned" his disposition in this manner in order to provide plaintiff with an additional opportunity to retain counsel. Plaintiff failed to retain counsel in the interim and the dismissal of the action became final. Plaintiff filed a timely pro se motion for reconsideration, which was denied on February 21, 2013.

Plaintiff, represented by new counsel, filed this appeal, arguing:

We find insufficient merit in these arguments to warrant discussion in a written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E). We add only the following brief comments.2

Expert testimony is admissible when: (1) the intended testimony concerns matters "beyond the ken of the average juror"; (2) the field in question is at "a state of the art" such that the expert's testimony is sufficiently reliable; and (3) the witness has "sufficient expertise to offer the intended testimony." Kemp v. State, 174 N.J. 412, 424 (2002) (quoting Landrigan v. Celotex Corp., 127 N.J. 404, 413 (1992)).

Plaintiff argues that the trial judge assessed the experts' reliability under an incorrect standard when the judge found the experts presented mere net opinions in this "very complex toxic-tort case that involves theories of causation that have not yet reached general acceptance in the scientific community." It is true that although an expert's opinion is traditionally "sufficiently reliable" when it is "generally accepted within the scientific community," Creanga v. Jardal, 185 N.J. 345, 355 (2005) (internal citations omitted), the standard for reliability has been relaxed for toxic-tort plaintiffs. See Rubanick v. Witco Chem. Corp., 125 N.J. 421, 440 (1991). In such cases, which often concern "novel or emerging complex scientific theories," the more lenient "methodology-based standard" applies. Ibid. This standard allows the admission of expert testimony when based on "a sound, adequately-founded scientific methodology involving data and information of the type reasonably relied on by experts in the scientific field," id. at 449, that other experts in the field "would reasonably rely upon in forming their own, possibly different opinions," id. at 450. "The critical determination is whether comparable experts accept the soundness of the methodology" used by the expert in developing the at-issue novel theory. Id. at 451.

This standard, however, has not dispensed with the rule prohibiting net opinions. See State v. Granskie, 433 N.J.Super. 46, 57 (App. Div. 2013). An "expert's bare opinion that has no support in factual evidence or similar data," Pomerantz Paper Corp. v. New Community Corp., 207 N.J. 344, 372 (2011) (internal quotations omitted), "based merely on unfounded speculation and unquantified possibilities," Vuocolo v. Diamond Shamrock Chem. Co., 122 N.J. 333 (1990), for which the expert cannot provide "the `why and wherefore' of," Koruba v. American Honda Motors Co., Inc., 396 N.J.Super. 517, 526 (App. Div. 2007) (citing Jimenez v. GNOC, Corp., 286 N.J.Super. 533, 540 (App Div.), certif. denied, 145 N.J. 347 (1996)), remains inadmissible under both the traditional and "methodology-based" standards for reliability.

Plaintiffs' experts provided only net opinions. Dr. Leiss' theory, presented to support the notion that the Lexus was defective or rendered defective during repair, lacked proper factual underpinnings. Dr. Leiss did not inspect the vehicle in question because it was no longer available — plaintiff having disposed of it a year before he filed suit. Dr. Leiss also did not know what was done to the Lexus during each repair occasion, nor what training LCH repairmen received. He admitted he could not determine whether the alleged defect was the result of a design or manufacturing defect. Most significantly, he simply could not point to any evidence to demonstrate the Lexus was defective and, instead, merely opined the likely cause of such a defect was a design or manufacturing defect. The trial judge correctly concluded this was insufficient and the report constituted a net opinion.

Dr. Guth's theory, regarding contamination of the Lexus' cabin, relied on mere assumptions as Dr. Guth acknowledged. His opinion was based on, as he described in his deposition, "the types of testing that [he] would have done if [he] had been associated with the case during the time [plaintiff] was having the problem with the car." Without an air sample from the vehicle or a physical inspection of the vehicle, the expert was left to merely opine about the methodologies he "would have" performed if that information was available. This, too, was insufficient.

Dr. Klein's theory was also critically deficient. His report intended to show that exposure to mold and ethylene glycol in the Lexus caused plaintiff's medical condition. Dr. Klein acknowledged, however, that "the history of [plaintiff's] exposure" to mold or ethylene glycol came "strictly from [plaintiff]" alone, and he could not opine whether plaintiff was exposed to "pure ethylene glycol" or whether "other contaminants" were also present. He also admitted he had not "done any analysis of the mold to which [plaintiff] was exposed in this vehicle," nor "any type of analysis, at all." In short, Dr. Klein acknowledged that he possessed "no objective medical evidence linking any exposure to ethylene glycol to [plaintiff's] medical symptoms." In addition, Dr. Klein acknowledged that no one had rendered an opinion within a reasonable degree of medical certainty that plaintiff's condition was caused by mold or ethylene glycol exposure. Indeed, he characterized his own three medical examinations of plaintiff as "totally normal."

For these reasons, we find no error in the trial judge's conclusion that the experts provided only net opinions that were insufficient to allow submission of plaintiff's claims to a jury.

Affirmed.