NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

PER CURIAM.

Plaintiff Beatrice Rybak-Petrolle appeals from the Family Part's January 23, 2013 order emancipating the parties' then twenty-one-year-old son. For the reasons that follow, we reverse and remand for further proceedings.

The parties' judgment of divorce, entered on April 10, 2001, incorporated the terms of their property settlement agreement (PSA). The PSA provides for plaintiff to be the residential custodial parent of the parties' two sons1 and for defendant to pay child support for the minor children until they are emancipated, which is defined by the parties as follows:

On April 16, 2012, the Passaic County Probation Division opened an inquiry concerning whether the parties' son was emancipated for purposes of child support enforcement. Plaintiff submitted documents showing that her son was a full-time student at Berkeley College. The Probation Division was not satisfied with her submitted proof, and requested a court order relieving it of its duties to monitor and collect child support. At an August 15, 2012 hearing, the family court judge, after finding that the son was a full-time college student, denied the Probation Division's request to emancipate the parties' son. The judge also ordered, among other things, that child support be recalculated for one child, and that the Probation Division relist the matter for enforcement. He further ordered the Probation Division to hold the child support it collected until the recalculation was made.

In January 2013, plaintiff requested a child support hearing because the case had not been relisted and her child support was being held by Probation. On January 23, 2013, the parties and the Probation Division appeared before a different family court judge. The Probation Division again asserted it was not satisfied with plaintiff's proof of the parties' son's full-time enrollment.

At the hearing, plaintiff informed the judge that her son was in his sophomore year of college, that he was originally enrolled at Seton Hall, but did not do well. She further related that he took one semester off before transferring full-time to Berkeley College for online classes where he currently maintained a 4.0 grade point average. The judge questioned why the son was taking online classes. Plaintiff responded that it worked better for his schedule as he was also working two jobs in order to pay his $7000 car insurance bill. The judge then asked plaintiff if their son was working full-time. When plaintiff responded affirmatively, the judge determined that their son was emancipated. The judge reasoned that the son was not pursuing a college education with reasonable diligence on a normally continuous basis as required by the PSA. This appeal followed.

Before us, plaintiff argues (1) the court erred by failing to undertake a thorough fact-sensitive analysis to determine whether their son had moved "beyond the sphere of influence and responsibility" exercised by plaintiff such that emancipation was proper; (2) the court improperly disregarded the express terms of the PSA; and (3) the court improperly modified the emancipation provisions of the PSA and should have enforced the terms as written and intended.

Because we find that a plenary hearing is warranted to determine whether the parties' son is emancipated, we decline to reach plaintiff's remaining two arguments. We only note that regardless of prior agreement, the duties of former spouses regarding child support are always subject to review or modification by the courts based upon fairness, equity, and the parties' changed circumstances. See Lepis v. Lepis, 83 N.J. 139, 145-46 (1980).

Emancipation is "the conclusion of the fundamental dependent relationship between parent and child." Dolce v. Dolce, 383 N.J.Super. 11, 17 (App. Div. 2006). Emancipation is appropriate when "the parent relinquishes the right to custody and is relieved of the burden of support, and the child is no longer entitled to support." Filippone v. Lee, 304 N.J.Super. 301, 308 (App. Div. 1997). Emancipation is not automatic upon the child reaching the age of majority,2 and need not occur at a particular age. Dolce, supra, 383 N.J. Super. at 17 (citing Newburgh v. Arrigo, 88 N.J. 529, 543 (1982)). However, when a child reaches the age of majority, it establishes "`prima facie, but not conclusive, proof of emancipation.'" Ibid. (quoting Newburgh, supra, 88 N.J. at 543).

The issue of emancipation is fact sensitive. Filippone, supra, 304 N.J. Super. at 308. The essential inquiry is whether the child has moved "`beyond the sphere of influence and responsibility exercised by a parent and obtains an independent status of his or her own.'" Dolce, supra, 383 N.J. Super. at 17-18 (quoting Filippone, supra, 304 N.J. Super. at 308). It requires "a critical evaluation of the prevailing circumstances including the child's need, interests, and independent resources, the family's reasonable expectations, and the parties' financial ability, among other things." Dolce, supra, 383 N.J. Super. at 18 (citing Newburgh, supra, 88 N.J. at 545).

Parents can voluntarily agree to extend their duty to support a child past majority, and such agreement is enforceable if fair and equitable. Id. at 18. However, "[i]f circumstances have changed in such a way that requiring [a parent] to pay for college would no longer be equitable and fair, the court also remains free to alter the prior arrangement." Lepis, supra, 83 N.J. at 161 n.12.

Our scope of review of a family judge's fact-finding is limited. Crespo v. Crespo, 395 N.J.Super. 190, 193 (App. Div. 2007). Because of the family court's special jurisdiction and expertise, appellate courts give deference to a family court's findings of fact. N.H. v. H.H., 418 N.J.Super. 262, 279 (App. Div. 2011) (citing Cesare v. Cesare, 154 N.J. 394, 413 (1998)). A family court's findings of fact "will only be disturbed if they are `manifestly unsupported by or inconsistent with the competent, relevant and reasonably credible evidence.'" Crespo, supra, 395 N.J. Super. at 193-94 (quoting Rova Farms Resort, Inc. v. Investors Ins. Co., 65 N.J. 474, 484 (1974)). However, we need not defer to the Family Part's legal analysis as "[a] trial court's interpretation of the law and the legal consequences that flow from established facts are not entitled to any special deference." Manalapan Realty, L.P. v. Twp. Comm. of Manalapan, 140 N.J. 366, 378 (1995) (citing State v. Brown, 118 N.J. 595, 604 (1990)).

We agree with plaintiff that the motion judge emancipated the parties' son without first undertaking a critical fact-sensitive analysis as to whether he had moved "beyond the sphere of influence and responsibility" of plaintiff as required under Dolce, supra, 383 N.J. Super. at 17-18. The judge made no findings as to the child's needs and abilities, how many course credits he is taking, his total expenses for school, how many hours he is working, how much he earns, whether those earnings are sufficient to cover the costs of school and living expenses, whether there were scholarships or financial aid packages applied for and received, and other relevant factors.

Moreover, the PSA delineates the circumstances intended by the parties to qualify as events of emancipation, one of which was completion of five years of college. The parties also agreed that if their son had reached his twenty-third birthday, emancipation would be deferred "only if and so long as he pursue[d] college education with reasonable diligence and on a normally continuous basis." The judge did not explain why he used the PSA standard for continuing at college after twenty-three when the son was only twenty-one at the time of the hearing. The contractual nature of matrimonial agreements has long been recognized in New Jersey. Pacifico v. Pacifico, 190 N.J. 258, 265 (2007) (citing Harrington v. Harrington, 281 N.J.Super. 39, 46 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 142 N.J. 455 (1995)). As a general rule, a contract's terms should be enforced as the parties intended. Id. at 266. Accordingly, the terms of the parties' PSA regarding emancipation should be enforced as intended so long as they are fair and equitable.

The record demonstrates that the judge made a determination of the son's emancipation based solely on limited questioning regarding the son's full-time employment while taking online classes, which apparently led to his determination that the son was not pursuing his education with reasonable diligence. This finding is not supported by the limited yet uncontradicted information in the record that the son is doing well in his current school. Moreover, that a child is working while attending school cannot be the sole determinative factor in the decision to emancipate. See Tretola v. Tretola, 389 N.J.Super. 15, 20 (App. Div. 2006) (reversing denial of emancipation where judge failed to consider any documentation of the child's course load, paystubs, or statements of hours worked and earnings). The fact that a child took a semester off before transferring to his present college is also not solely determinative. See Keegan v. Keegan, 326 N.J.Super. 289, 294-95 (App. Div. 1999) (finding a one-and-a-half year hiatus from college during which the twenty-year-old child worked full-time did not result in emancipation). Additionally, the PSA does not expressly preclude working full-time during school; it only states that working full-time in the summers and on school vacations will not be considered an emancipation event.

Accordingly, we reverse the order of emancipation and remand for a plenary hearing to consider the emancipation provision in the parties' PSA in light of the child's educational status, work history, level of financial dependence, and other relevant factors. At the hearing, the judge will have the opportunity to consider the evidence presented and make appropriate findings of facts and conclusions of law. R. 1:7-4(a).

Reversed and remanded for further proceedings in accordance with this opinion. We do not retain jurisdiction.