Filed: Jul. 01, 2014
Latest Update: Jul. 01, 2014
Summary: NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION PER CURIAM. Plaintiff Robert J. Triffin appeals from the July 31, 2013 order dismissing his two-count complaint after a bench trial. We affirm substantially for the reasons expressed in Judge Susan J. Steele's well-reasoned written opinion issued May 16, 2013. Triffin purchased two dishonored checks from Anderson Check Cashing Corporation. The checks were issued by defendant Verizon Corporate Services Group, Inc. to Franchise
Summary: NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION PER CURIAM. Plaintiff Robert J. Triffin appeals from the July 31, 2013 order dismissing his two-count complaint after a bench trial. We affirm substantially for the reasons expressed in Judge Susan J. Steele's well-reasoned written opinion issued May 16, 2013. Triffin purchased two dishonored checks from Anderson Check Cashing Corporation. The checks were issued by defendant Verizon Corporate Services Group, Inc. to Franchise K..
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NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
PER CURIAM.
Plaintiff Robert J. Triffin appeals from the July 31, 2013 order dismissing his two-count complaint after a bench trial. We affirm substantially for the reasons expressed in Judge Susan J. Steele's well-reasoned written opinion issued May 16, 2013.
Triffin purchased two dishonored checks from Anderson Check Cashing Corporation. The checks were issued by defendant Verizon Corporate Services Group, Inc. to Franchise Kings, Inc. Anderson cashed the checks for Benjamin James, Jr., the president and owner of Franchise Kings. The checks were later not honored because Verizon had stopped payment on them.
Wilfredo Martinez, the general manager of Anderson's, testified at trial that Franchise Kings gave him a copy of a corporate resolution and business agreement identifying James as the owner of Franchise Kings and empowering him to cash checks on behalf of the corporation. The documents were not accompanied by any letterhead, seal, or taxpayer identification number. The resolution did not contain any indication that it had been filed by the New Jersey Secretary of State.
Triffin raised the following points in his brief:
POINT I: THE TRIAL JUDGE COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN SHE FAILED TO APPREHEND THAT UNLESS A DEFENDANT ESTABLISHES A PERSONAL DEFENSE AT TRIAL, A PLAINTIFF DOES NOT NEED TO QUALIFY FOR HOLDER IN DUE COURSE STATUS TO RECOVER UPON A DISHONORED CHECK.
POINT II: THE TRIAL COURT'S ALTERNATIVE RELIANCE UPON THIS COURT'S LICCARDI FORD DECISION IS MISPLACED, AND VIOLATIVE OF THE SUPREME COURT'S DISPOSITIVE CITY CHECK CASHING HOLDING, AS WELL AS, THIS COURT'S CHECK CASHERS' REGULATORY ACT HOLDING, AS TO THE RIGHTS AND LIABILITIES OF THE PARTIES IN THE CHECK COLLECTION ARENA.
Our standard of review of a bench trial is whether the trial judge's findings of fact are "supported by sufficient, credible evidence in the record." Fanarjian v. Moskowitz, 237 N.J.Super. 395, 406 (App. Div. 1989). Judge Steele's factual findings are not disputed.
Relying primarily on our decision in Triffin v. Liccardi Ford, Inc., 417 N.J.Super. 453, 456-57 (App. Div. 2011), Judge Steele determined that because Triffin was aware the checks had been dishonored when he purchased them, he was not a holder in due course and therefore had to prove that Anderson was a holder in due course. Neither of the Franchise King corporate documents in Anderson's possession constituted "appropriate documentation" as they were not "readily verifiable official document[s]" as required by N.J.A.C. 3:24-1.3. Because the documents held by Anderson did not meet the requirements imposed on check cashers by the Check Cashers Regulatory Act, N.J.S.A. 17:15A-1 to 52, Anderson was not a holder in due course either. Thus, pursuant to N.J.S.A. 12A:3-301, Triffin was not entitled to collect payment on the checks.
Triffin's other argument is without sufficient merit to warrant discussion in a written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E). We note only that N.J.S.A. 12A:3-308(b), which Triffin relies on in Point I of his brief, also requires that the "plaintiff prove[] entitlement to enforce the instrument under 12A:3-301" before "entitlement to payment[.]"
Affirmed.
