PER CURIAM.
Plaintiff Ellen Nevins appeals from three Law Division orders dated: April 29, 2009, directing that plaintiff serve her expert's report by August 30, 2009; September 9, 2009, directing that plaintiff serve her expert report by October 13, 2009; and November 30, 2011, barring her expert from testifying beyond the scope of his report and dismissing her complaint with prejudice. Plaintiff's claims related to alleged defects in defendants' construction of her custom-built home. We previously addressed her complaint in an earlier decision, reversing a trial court's dismissal of her claims based on its determination that her expert supplied a "net opinion," and remanding the matter for trial.
In order to understand our reasoning, a description of the procedural posture of this case at the time the court entered its final order is necessary. On September 13, 2001, plaintiff filed her first amended complaint alleging breaches of contract, guaranty, implied warranty and the covenant of good workmanship and habitability, as well as negligence and a claim for consequential loss. On August 27, 2004, the court granted defendant's motion for partial summary judgment dismissing several counts of the amended complaint.
On April 29, 2009, the trial court ordered the parties to exchange expert reports by August 30, 2009. In its September 9, 2009 order, the court extended the deadline for plaintiff to serve her expert's report to October 13, 2009.
Before that deadline, on September 18, 2009, the court granted defendant's motion for partial summary judgment limiting plaintiff's damages "in accordance with paragraph 10 of the parties July 22, 1995 Agreement of Sale, to the repair of the Premises in accordance with the applicable Builder's Limited Warranty on the Premises." The court's order further stated,
On October 13, 2009, plaintiff's then counsel wrote to the court seeking to extend the deadline for the expert's report to November 20. According to counsel's letter, plaintiff had retained a new expert, and the extension was necessary "d[ue] to the expert's schedule." The letter did not mention the limitations imposed by the court's September 18 order. Defendant objected to plaintiff's request, and the court denied it, but allowed plaintiff an extension to October 22.
Plaintiff timely served her expert's report dated October 22, 2009.
After our decision reversing the earlier grant of summary judgment, the court scheduled a November 18, 2011 trial date. In advance of that date, defendant filed a motion in limine seeking an order barring plaintiff's expert from testifying to "matters outside the scope of his October 22, 2009 report." In response, the court scheduled a
After the hearing, on November 30, 2011, the court granted defendant's motion to bar plaintiff's expert's testimony and to dismiss the complaint with prejudice as plaintiff had no other experts to testify on her behalf. Plaintiff did not file a reconsideration motion but, rather, filed this appeal.
As previously stated, the only argument plaintiff raises on appeal is her "expert witness was not given adequate time to complete his task." Based on our review of the record, we find this argument to be without sufficient merit to warrant an extensive discussion in a written opinion,
Specifically, there is no testimony or certification from her expert or any other competent witness that was presented to the trial court indicating that her expert needed more time to issue an opinion limited to the parameters stated in the court's September 18, 2009 order. Also, notably, the record indicates that neither the plaintiff nor her attorney even gave the expert the court's order until after the trial date arrived, years after the September 2009 order. In addition, neither her attorney in his letter to the court, nor the expert during his testimony relative to the warranty issue, ever even raised the need for more time so that the expert could tailor his opinion to the limitations of the court's order.
While we are sympathetic to the plaintiff's frustration with the situation in which she finds herself, she has advanced no reason for us to disturb the outcome of this case.
Affirmed.