NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
PER CURIAM.
Appellant Judith A. Grignon appeals from the final agency decision of the Board of Review, denying her claim to unemployment benefits. We affirm.
The question presented is whether Grignon is entitled to the protection of New Jersey's Unemployment Compensation Law, N.J.S.A. 43:21-1 to-24.30, because she voluntarily left her employment "for good cause attributable to [her] work." Utley v. Bd. of Review, 194 N.J. 534, 543-44 (2008). The burden to prove good cause falls upon the employee. Morgan v. Bd. of Review, 77 N.J.Super. 209, 213 (App. Div. 1962). Such "good cause" exists when the cause is "sufficient to justify an employee's voluntarily leaving the ranks of the employed and joining the ranks of the unemployed." Domenico v. Bd. of Review, 192 N.J.Super. 284, 287 (App. Div. 1983) (citations omitted). In defining the circumstances that satisfy this requirement, we have said:
In scrutinizing an employee's reason for leaving, the test is one of ordinary common sense and prudence. Mere dissatisfaction with working conditions which are not shown to be abnormal or do not affect health, does not constitute good cause for leaving work voluntarily. The decision to leave employment must be compelled by real, substantial and reasonable circumstances not imaginary trifling and whimsical ones. . . . [I]t is the employee's responsibility to do what is necessary and reasonable in order to remain employed.
[Id. at 288 (emphasis added) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).]
In essence, in determining whether the employee voluntarily left employment for good cause attributable to the work, the employee must show that he or she did all that was "necessary and reasonable in order to remain employed." Heulitt v. Bd. of Review, 300 N.J.Super. 407, 414 (App. Div. 1997) (quoted with approval in Utley, supra, 194 N.J. at 549, and Brady v. Bd. of Review, 152 N.J. 197, 214 (1997)). The record fails to show that Grignon did so.
Grignon was hired by the New Jersey Agricultural Society (NJAS) in June 2001 and served as the Program Director of the Farmers Against Hunger Program (FAH) until February 2011, when she submitted her letter of resignation. Grignon filed a claim for unemployment benefits. A determination was made by the Deputy Director of the Division of Unemployment and Disability Insurance that she was disqualified for benefits on the ground that she voluntarily left work without good cause attributable to the work, N.J.S.A. 43:21-5(a). The determination stated in part,
YOU VOLUNTARILY LEFT [YOUR] JOB BECAUSE YOU WERE UNHAPPY WITH THE NEW MANAGEMENT AND THE DIRECTION THE COMPANY WAS HEADING. THERE IS NO EVIDENCE THAT THE CONDITIONS OF YOUR EMPLOYMENT WERE SO SEVERE AS TO CAUSE YOU TO LEAVE AVAILABLE WORK AND BECOME UNEMPLOYED.
Grignon appealed this determination and a hearing was conducted over several days before the Appeals Tribunal.
At the hearing, Grignon testified that donors expressed concern that their contributions go specifically to FAH and not to the general funds of NJAS. It was her belief that FAH should have a checking account separate from that of NJAS. Grignon stated she received income statements, expense statements, and profit and loss statements, but was never given the cash position of FAH. Because she was not satisfied with the completeness of the financial information she received, Grignon felt she could not represent to donors that their money was indeed going directly to FAH.
Joan Elliott, the Executive Director of NJAS, testified that every piece of information requested by Grignon was provided. Specifically, she tried to give Grignon monthly reports on the profit and loss, balance sheet, activity of the organization, actual year-to-date budget ratios, and the amount over and above the budget. This information also showed how the money was separated out among the organizations. Carry-over balances, an item that Grignon repeatedly complained was missing, were not included because they are not traditionally included in a budget report. When Grignon was sent the reports, a note was attached at the bottom to report anything that seemed suspicious or to ask questions of anything that was not clear. To Elliott's knowledge, Grignon never followed through with reporting anything she found to be incorrect. However, Grignon testified that she reported several mistakes in the bookkeeper's reports that were not corrected.
Grignon was not alone in her criticism. Pamela Mount, former NJAS President, testified that all charges made for FAH are on the general NJAS account, making it difficult to identify what charges were incurred by each entity. She also claimed she was refused the information she requested of the NJAS Treasurer and that she had received information from New Jersey's Secretary of Agriculture that FAH needed its own bank account.
In December 2010, after a donor offered to contribute $20,000 on the condition that the money go into an account labeled "Farmers Against Hunger," the Advisory Board of FAH met and voted to open its own bank account. Mount opened an account for FAH at Wells Fargo with $100 of her own money. Mount testified she was ordered to close the account by the NJAS Executive Board and told she had stolen money from NJAS by putting money in a separate account. Elliott stated that the vote to open a separate bank account was invalid because all decisions made by the Advisory Board must be approved by the NJAS Board of Trustees, and though the Advisory Board had approved the account, the Board of Trustees had not. The donor withdrew his donation as a result.
Grignon attended a meeting on January 19, 2011, with four of the five members of the FAH Board of Trustees where, she testified, she was "threatened, . . . bullied . . . [and] intimidated." She also said she was told that if she worked for another company, she would have been fired; "that [she] could not go public, and that [she] . . . needed to keep [her] head down." Grignon decided to resign after this meeting "because it was ethically [and] morally wrong to never be able to get the. . . financial information that so many of us wanted." She felt she was forced to resign because she was not appreciated and that "they did not deserve" a one-week or two-week notice.
Elliott testified she knew Grignon had concerns about the fact that FAH did not have a separate checkbook and believed she resigned for that reason. Elliott testified that FAH is a program of the NJAS and, although it has its own Advisory Board, it lacks the power to make decisions without the approval of the Board of NJAS. Elliott refuted claims of fiscal impropriety, noting the NJAS has a "complete yellow book audit every year by a very reputable A++ accountant." The audits never reported that something was being done incorrectly with FAH or that there needed to be a separate account for FAH. According to these audits, all money that comes in for FAH is spent on FAH.
The Appeal Tribunal affirmed the determination of the Deputy, stating in part:
In this matter, the claimant has not met her burden of proof to reflect that she resigned with good enough cause related to the working conditions. While the claimant was frustrated with the employer, it is very clear she was thriving in her job duties in the recent years without this [FAH] having their own separate checking account. Also, the employer did consistently provide the claimant with legitimate monthly reports, which specified the profit and loss, versus the actual budget numbers for this FAH program. As there is no evidence the employer was attempting to force the claimant out of her position, and no evidence that the FAH program funds were misappropriated, it is considered that the claimant left work voluntarily without good cause attributable to such work and is, therefore disqualified for benefits under N.J.S.A. 43:21-5(a) as of 01/30/11.
Grignon appealed to the Board of Review, which affirmed the decision of the Appeal Tribunal.
In this appeal, Grignon argues that the Board's decision was not supported by sufficient evidence to support its findings, requiring its reversal. We disagree.
The scope of our review in an appeal from a final decision of an administrative agency is limited. Circus Liquors, Inc. v. Governing Body of Middletown Twp., 199 N.J. 1, 9 (2009). Normally, when reviewing agency decisions, we defer to matters that lie within the special competence of an administrative tribunal. Balagun v. N.J. Dep't of Corr., 361 N.J.Super. 199, 202 (App. Div. 2003). We must sustain the agency's action in the absence of a "`clear showing' that it is arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable, or that it lacks fair support in the record[.]" Circus Liquors, supra, 199 N.J. at 9. Furthermore, an appellate court may not substitute its judgment for the fact-finding of an administrative agency. Campbell v. N.J. Racing Comm'n, 169 N.J. 579, 587 (2001). "`If the Appellate Division is satisfied after its review that the evidence and the inferences to be drawn therefrom support the agency head's decision, then it must affirm even if the court feels that it would have reached a different result itself.'" Ibid. (quoting Clowes v. Terminix Int'l, Inc., 109 N.J. 575, 588 (1988)).
The record supports a finding that Grignon was a concerned employee who harbored doubts about a lack of financial transparency of the NJAS/FAH records. Although she was not satisfied with her employer's response to her concern and request for information, the conditions described fall short of the "working conditions . . . shown to be abnormal or [that] affect health" which will constitute good cause for leaving work voluntarily. Domenico, supra, 192 N.J. Super. at 288. While her regard for fiscal propriety may be commendable, her claim required proof that she did what was "necessary and reasonable in order to remain employed," ibid., rather than evidence that she left her work as an exercise of conscience. Accordingly, we find the decision of the Board to be supported by sufficient evidence in the record.
Affirmed.
