NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

PER CURIAM.

On August 1, 2003, defendant pleaded guilty to third-degree endangering the welfare of a child pursuant to a plea agreement, which included the State's recommendation of a probationary sentence. At the plea hearing, defendant acknowledged his understanding that the "maximum penalty for the crime" to which he pleaded guilty consisted of a prison sentence; he was not advised he would be deported as a result. In response to questioning, defendant admitted he was responsible for taking care of the victim and "slap[ped] her on her buttock" a "[c]ouple times." He also expressed that he was aware his actions "might have endangered or degraded the morals" of the victim.

On November 1, 2003, pursuant to the plea agreement, defendant was sentenced to a three-year probationary term, and the indictment's other counts, which included two first-degree offenses, a second-degree offense, and four other third-degree offenses, were dismissed. He did not appeal and apparently completed the probationary term without incident.

Nearly eight years after his conviction, defendant was detained by federal Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) officials because his 2003 offense arguably constituted "sexual abuse of a minor," 8 U.S.C.A. § 1101(a)(43)(A), and, potentially, an "aggravated felony" subjecting him to removal from this country, 8 U.S.C.A. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii).1

Following his arrest and detention by ICE in Connecticut, defendant filed a post-conviction relief (PCR) petition seeking withdrawal of his guilty plea based on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.2 Defendant's PCR petition was supported by the certification of his trial attorney, who acknowledged he only advised defendant that his guilty plea meant only that "he may be deported."

Even though defendant completed the probationary term, the State opposed the PCR petition, which was denied, and now opposes the following arguments asserted by defendant in this appeal:

Although defendant argues his PCR petition was not time-barred, and the State argues to the contrary, we observe that the PCR judge did not apply any procedural bar in denying relief but instead ruled on the merits. In any event, we reject the application of a procedural bar in this case because the PCR petition was triggered by events occurring more than five years after entry of judgment. Defendant expeditiously sought relief once detained by ICE officials. The interests of justice command that the PCR petition be considered on its merits. See, e.g., R. 3:22-12(a)(1).

In any event, the decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States and our own Supreme Court3 demonstrate that defendant's arguments are without sufficient merit to warrant further discussion. R. 2:11-3(e)(2). Indeed, defendant's guilty plea and the advice rendered at the time — that he "may be deported" as a consequence — are not distinguishable from State v. Telford, 420 N.J.Super. 465, 471-79 (App. Div. 2011), certif. denied, 209 N.J. 595 (2012), where we recognized that many cases present too convoluted a framework for a criminal defense attorney to provide a client with clear and definite advice about the deportation consequences of a guilty plea. Accordingly, we conclude, for the reasons more fully expressed in Telford — where, like here, the defendant pleaded guilty to third-degree endangering after receiving similar advice — that even if the professional norm expressed in Padilla had existed in 2003, the deportation consequence of defendant's guilty plea was far from clear and, therefore, counsel's cursory advice that defendant "may be deported" was not inaccurate or misleading. The advice in question met the minimal level of competence established by precedents binding on this court.

Affirmed.