Elawyers Elawyers
Washington| Change

STATE v. PEGESE, A-1257-13T1. (2015)

Court: Superior Court of New Jersey Number: innjco20150114442 Visitors: 9
Filed: Jan. 14, 2015
Latest Update: Jan. 14, 2015
Summary: NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION PER CURIAM. Defendant Marion Pegese appeals the dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief, contending that he established a prima facie case of ineffective assistance of counsel that required an evidentiary hearing. Because the trial judge properly found the evidence inadequate to sustain defendant's burden on the application, we affirm. Following a jewelry store robbery committed with two co-defendants in which emp
More

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

PER CURIAM.

Defendant Marion Pegese appeals the dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief, contending that he established a prima facie case of ineffective assistance of counsel that required an evidentiary hearing. Because the trial judge properly found the evidence inadequate to sustain defendant's burden on the application, we affirm.

Following a jewelry store robbery committed with two co-defendants in which employees and patrons were threatened with a handgun and several escorted to the basement where their hands and feet were bound with duct tape, a grand jury indicted defendant for conspiracy to commit armed robbery, N.J.S.A. 2C:5-2 and 15-1; armed robbery, N.J.S.A. 2C:15-1; possession of a handgun without a permit, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5b and 58-4; possession of a handgun for an unlawful purpose, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4a; kidnapping, N.J.S.A. 2C:13-1b; and a certain persons offense, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-7b(1). Pursuant to a negotiated agreement, defendant pled guilty to conspiracy to commit armed robbery and armed robbery in exchange for the State's agreement to forego a motion for an extended term, to recommend a twenty-year term of imprisonment on the merged charges subject to the periods of parole ineligibility and supervision required by the No Early Release Act (NERA), N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.2, and to dismiss the remaining charges.

Because defendant had expressed reservations about the plea at the scheduled hearing, Judge Neafsey adjourned the proceeding for two days to allow defendant additional time to meet with his counsel. When defendant reappeared, his counsel advised the court on the record that she had met with defendant twice during that period, "enumerated and memorialized the plea offer, in writing, to him," spoken several times with his family members, answered his questions, addressed all of his concerns and expressed that she was "very confident that Mr. Pegese is entering this [plea] voluntarily and with a full understanding of all the facts." Defendant confirmed his counsel's representations, then entered into an extended colloquy with the judge about the expected length of his sentence.

After defendant expressed his understanding that his maximum exposure would be eighteen years and not twenty, the judge recapitulated the agreement and his discussions with counsel regarding defendant's record, defendant's anticipated sentencing memorandum and the presentence report. Defense counsel advised that she had discussed with defendant her intention to argue for seventeen years. Before allowing defendant to proceed further with the plea, Judge Neafsey engaged the defendant as follows.

Judge Neafsey: Right. And I think you know what your lawyer's going to do. I know she's written things to you, and I know she's gone over it. She's even told me in chambers that she was going to present a sentencing memorandum. I just don't want you to have questions. The State's going to ask for 20. The court could give 20. You understand? Defendant: Yes. Judge Neafsey: But I will read everything, I'll consider everything and I'll listen to you. I just want you to understand that it's hard for me to envision going below 18 in your case. Do you understand that? Defendant: Yes, I do. Judge Neafsey: So it's going to be somewhere between 18 and 20, I think, is what I'm saying. Do you understand? Defendant: Yes. Judge Neafsey: All right. Do you have any questions about that? Defendant: No. Judge Neafsey: And do you want to proceed with your plea? Defendant: Yes.

The judge then continued with the plea, reviewing with defendant, in painstaking detail, the plea forms, including defendant's maximum exposure, the required periods of parole ineligibility and supervision, and defendant's understanding of and willingness to enter into the plea. Subsequent to defendant's guilty plea, the judge merged defendant's convictions and sentenced him to eighteen years in State Prison subject to the periods of parole ineligibility and supervision required by NERA.

Defendant appealed his sentence, which we reviewed on a sentencing calendar, R. 2:9-11, and affirmed. Thereafter, defendant filed a petition for post-conviction relief claiming that his plea counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to adequately communicate with him and in failing to inform him of the actual consequences of his plea.

After hearing argument by assigned counsel, Judge Mullaney issued a comprehensive written opinion denying the petition on the basis that defendant had failed to establish a prima facie claim for relief. State v. Preciose, 129 N.J. 451, 462-64 (1992). The judge noted that defendant, although claiming that his counsel did not adequately inform him of the consequences of his plea, nowhere specified the consequences of which he was unaware. Quoting extensively from the plea transcript, the judge concluded that it proved without doubt that counsel had informed defendant of the consequences of his plea. He further reasoned that even were he to assume counsel did not do so, defendant could not prove prejudice as the record established that Judge Neafsey advised defendant of the consequences of his plea, and defendant acknowledged those consequences on the record.

On appeal, defendant presents the following arguments:

POINT I: DEFENDANT'S PETITION FOR POST CONVICTION RELIEF SHOULD BE REMANDED WITH INSTRUCTIONS TO THE TRIAL COURT TO ORDER THE OFFICE OF THE PUBLIC DEFENDER TO APPOINT NEW PCR COUNSEL WHO WILL FULFILL HIS OR HER OBLIGATION TO PROVIDE DEFENDANT WITH THE EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL. POINT II: THE PCR COURT ERRED WHEN IT FAILED TO GRANT DEFENDANT'S REQUEST FOR AN EVIDENTIARY HEARING. POINT III: AS A RESULT OF TRIAL COUNSEL FAILING TO SUFFICIENTLY COMMUNICATE WITH DEFENDANT, HE LACKED A FULL UNDERSTANDING OF THE CONSEQUENCES OF HIS GUILTY PLEA, THUS DEPRIVING DEFENDANT OF HIS CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO THE EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL.

We reject these arguments as without sufficient merit to warrant discussion in a written opinion, R. 2:11-3(e)(2), and affirm the denial of defendant's petition substantially for the reasons set forth in Judge Mullaney's July 24, 2013 cogent and comprehensive written opinion.

Affirmed.

Source:  Leagle

Can't find what you're looking for?

Post a free question on our public forum.
Ask a Question
Search for lawyers by practice areas.
Find a Lawyer