NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

PER CURIAM.

Following a jury trial, defendant was convicted of third-degree, N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1b(7), and fourth-degree, N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1b(3), aggravated assault. She was sentenced to concurrent three-year terms of probation conditioned upon her completion of concurrent 180-day jail terms. On appeal, defendant argues the trial court erred in denying her motion for acquittal and in erroneously instructing the jury regarding negligently-caused bodily injury with a deadly weapon. We affirm.

By way of background, defendant and her husband, Anthony Hardrick, separated in early August 2011. Tension regarding Hardrick's unfaithfulness came to a head on August 24, 2011, when defendant intercepted a text message to his cell phone, which he had left in her vehicle. Intending to return the cell phone, defendant drove to Hardrick's residence, which was next door to the residence of the woman with whom defendant suspected her husband of being unfaithful. She found defendant down the street in front of a barbershop. Following a brief altercation with Hardrick, defendant returned to her car, purportedly to drive home. As she drove down the street, defendant veered off the road, striking Hardrick's suspected paramour, who was standing with others in front of her residence. The victim was taken to the hospital where she was treated for lacerations and abrasions to her face. Thereafter, she underwent two surgical revisions of a complex scar on her right forehead.

On appeal, defendant raises the following arguments:

We find insufficient merit in these arguments to warrant discussion in a written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(2). We add only the following brief comments.

A trial judge must deny a motion for acquittal made at the close of the State's case if, upon "viewing the State's evidence in its entirety, be that evidence direct or circumstantial, and giving the State the benefit of all" reasonable inference, "a reasonable jury could find guilt of the charge beyond a reasonable doubt." State v. Reyes, 50 N.J. 454, 459 (1967); see also R. 3:18-1. In reviewing such a motion, we apply the same standard as the trial court, State v. Moffa, 42 N.J. 258, 263 (1964), and consider only the evidence adduced during the State's presentation of its case. Reyes, supra, 50 N.J. at 459. In addition, we will not consider an argument that a jury verdict is against the weight of the evidence unless the defendant moved for a new trial on that ground. R. 2:10-1; State v. Perry, 128 N.J.Super. 188, 190 (App. Div. 1973), aff'd, 65 N.J. 45 (1974).

Here, defendant moved for a directed verdict prior to her case-in-chief. In denying defendant's motion, the trial court determined that the State's witnesses had presented evidence of "purposeful and knowing conduct," and that "all of the [eye]witnesses who testified, . . . indicated that [defendant] was just simply driving down the street and then directed her car at those standing on the curb." Reviewing this motion, we agree there was ample evidence in the record to support defendant's conviction. In addition, because defendant failed to move for a new trial, her contention that the jury verdict was against the weight of the evidence is not cognizable on appeal. R. 2:10-1.

Defendant also contends for the first time on appeal that the trial judge erred in instructing the jury as to negligently-caused bodily injury. In reaching its verdict, however, the jury determined that defendant acted recklessly and accordingly, did not proceed to the lesser-included negligent conduct question. Therefore, even if we were to agree the instruction was faulty, it was not "clearly capable of producing an unjust result." R. 2:10-2; see also State v. Robinson, 200 N.J. 1, 20-22 (2009); State v. Macon, 57 N.J. 325, 337-38 (1971).

Affirm.