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STATE v. ROBERTS, A-1406-13T3. (2015)

Court: Superior Court of New Jersey Number: innjco20150227346 Visitors: 2
Filed: Feb. 27, 2015
Latest Update: Feb. 27, 2015
Summary: NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION PER CURIAM . Defendant Brett Roberts appeals from his de novo conviction for the disorderly persons offense of harassment in violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:33-4a. We affirm. By way of background, defendant and his neighbors, Jane and her husband John, and another neighbor Jerry, 1 were involved in litigation concerning the scope of an easement governing the shared driveway each used to access their respective properties. The ni
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NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

Defendant Brett Roberts appeals from his de novo conviction for the disorderly persons offense of harassment in violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:33-4a. We affirm.

By way of background, defendant and his neighbors, Jane and her husband John, and another neighbor Jerry,1 were involved in litigation concerning the scope of an easement governing the shared driveway each used to access their respective properties. The night before the incident that formed the basis for the harassment charge at issue in this appeal, defendant and John had a verbal argument about the ongoing dispute.

The next morning, Jane's daughter, Allison, who was nine years old, went outside to take a walk. As she was putting on her shoes, she saw defendant walking down the driveway from his property. Allison testified that, as defendant was walking past her home, he raised his hand over his head and she saw he had a small silver hammer in his hand. Allison stated that defendant said, "I'm going to fucking kill you with one swipe of a hammer." The child became so frightened that she ran through the screen door of her home in an attempt to get inside. The child broke the door and bruised her arm.

Jane went to the door, saw defendant walking past her property, and called the police. Allison also immediately called her grandparents, who were on their way to her home, to tell them about the incident, and warn them about the defendant. At trial, Allison's grandmother confirmed Allison was hysterical when they arrived at the home.

The second neighbor, Jerry, was outside of his home as defendant was walking past Allison's home. Although his view of the incident was partially blocked by shrubbery, Jerry testified he saw and heard defendant tell the child that "she's a fucking whore like her mother, and one shot upside the head with a hammer and she'd be dead."

Defendant denied saying anything to Allison as he walked down the driveway. He testified he was going from his property to the main road towards his mailbox at the time he saw the child. He was carrying a tape measure and a camera, but did not have a hammer. Defendant first testified that, as he was going past Allison's home, her mother Jane came to the door and yelled something at him. He responded, but stated he could not remember if either party used profanity. At that point, he saw Allison near her mother and decided to end the exchange and continue on his way to the mailbox. Later in his testimony, defendant admitted Allison may have screamed before her mother spoke to him. Defendant stated that Allison was generally afraid of him because of the family's dispute with him, but he had never done anything to her to frighten her.

The police arrived at Jane and John's home in response to Jane's call. They interviewed Allison, Jane, Jerry, and defendant. A videotape from the Jane and John's security cameras was also obtained. The tape showed defendant walking down the driveway from his home. There was a five or six second break in the tape as defendant began walking past their home, as he moved from the coverage of one security camera to another. No hammer is visible in the footage. As the break ends, defendant is seen speaking to someone on the Henderson property and he then turns and continues walking down the driveway toward his mailbox.

As a result of the investigation, defendant was charged with two counts of harassment. The first count alleged that defendant made a communication to the child in offensively coarse language in a manner likely to cause her annoyance or alarm in violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:33-4a.2 The second count charged defendant with threatening to strike Allison with a hammer, in violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:33-4b.

Following a bench trial, the municipal court judge found defendant not guilty of threatening to strike Allison in violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:33-4b, but guilty of harassment in violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:33-4a, based upon the profane language he used in a manner likely to cause the child annoyance and alarm. In so ruling, the judge specifically found Allison and Jerry's testimony to be credible in relation to defendant's contrary account. The judge ordered defendant to pay appropriate fines and penalties.

Defendant then filed an appeal to the Law Division. Following oral argument and a thorough review of the record, Judge Stephen B. Rubin issued a written opinion in which he found defendant guilty of harassment under N.J.S.A. 2C:33-4a. Like the municipal court judge, Judge Rubin found Allison and Jerry's account to be more credible than defendant's version of the incident.3 This appeal followed.

On appeal, defendant argues there was insufficient credible evidence in the record to support a finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. We disagree.

When a defendant appeals a conviction following a trial de novo, the scope of our review is both narrow and deferential. State v. Stas, 212 N.J. 37, 48-49 (2012). Our function as a reviewing court is to determine whether the findings of the Law Division "could reasonably have been reached on sufficient credible evidence present in the record." State v. Johnson, 42 N.J. 146, 162 (1964). When we are satisfied that the findings and conclusions of the Law Division meet that criterion, our "task is complete[,]" and we "should not disturb the result" even if we "might have reached a different conclusion" or if the result was a "close one. ..." Ibid. As the Supreme Court observed, "the rule of deference is more compelling where ... two lower courts have entered concurrent judgments on purely factual issues ... appellate courts ordinarily should not undertake to alter concurrent findings of facts and credibility determinations made by two lower courts absent a very obvious and exceptional showing of error." State v. Locurto, 157 N.J. 463, 474 (1999); Midler v Heinowitz, 10 N.J. 123, 128-29 (1952).

N.J.S.A. 2C:33-4 defines harassment, in relevant part, as follows:

[A] person commits a petty disorderly persons offense if, with purpose to harass another, he a. Makes or causes to be made, a communication or communications anonymously or at extremely inconvenient hours, or in offensively coarse language, or any other manner likely to cause annoyance or alarm[.]

Subsection (a) "targets a single communication" and focuses on the mode of the speech employed. State v. Hoffman, 149 N.J. 564, 580 (1997). Proof of a purpose to harass is an essential element of N.J.S.A. 2C:33-4. See L.D. v. W.D., 327 N.J.Super. 1, 5 (App. Div. 1999). "A person acts purposely with respect to the nature of his conduct or a result thereof if it is his conscious object to engage in conduct of that nature or to cause such a result." Hoffman, supra, 149 N.J. at 577 (quoting N.J.S.A. 2C:2-2(b)(1) (internal quotation marks omitted)). "A finding of a purpose to harass may be inferred from the evidence presented," and "[c]ommon sense and experience may inform that determination." Ibid. Because direct proof of intent is often absent, "purpose may and often must be inferred from what is said and done and the surrounding circumstances," and "[p]rior conduct and statements may be relevant to support an inference of purpose. State v. Castagna, 387 N.J.Super. 598, 606. State v. Castagna, 387 N.J.Super. 598, 607 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 188 N.J. 577 (2006).

Applying these principles, we conclude there was sufficient evidence to support Judge Rubin's determination that defendant harassed Allison within the intendment of N.J.S.A. 2C:33-4a. Both Allison and Jerry testified that defendant used profane language to address the child. Judge Rubin found this testimony to be "more credible" than that provided by defendant. This finding was corroborated by Jane's spontaneous call to the police, and Allison running through the screen door into her house. Because defendant had no legitimate purpose for engaging the child in the vulgar manner he did, the record also fully supports the judge's conclusion that it was defendant's intent to annoy and alarm the child.

Therefore, we conclude there was sufficient credible evidence in the record to support Judge Rubin's decision, and we affirm defendant's conviction for the reasons set forth in the judge's thorough written opinion.

Affirmed.

FootNotes


1. In order to protect the privacy of the victim, we use fictitious names to identify the neighbors.
2. A grand jury had initially indicted defendant for third-degree terroristic threats, N.J.S.A. 2C:12-3a, and other offenses. However, the court subsequently dismissed the indictment on the State's motion. The State thereafter pursued the two disorderly persons offenses discussed above.
3. Judge Rubin imposed the same monetary penalties assessed by the municipal court judge.
Source:  Leagle

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