NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
PER CURIAM.
Plaintiff Kristen Auciello appeals from a January 24, 2014 order granting summary judgment to defendant Franklin Township (Franklin or the township) in her personal injury lawsuit resulting from her single car accident on a dangerous curve on Demott Lane. We agree with the trial judge that provisions of the Tort Claims Act, N.J.S.A. 59:1-1 to 12-3, provide Franklin with absolute immunity. We thus affirm.
Plaintiff has no memory of the accident that occurred shortly before 11:00 a.m. on October 27, 2009, when her car skidded on a wet roadway and hit a tree.
In December 2007, the Franklin Traffic Safety Official, concerned about the high number of traffic accidents at that location, recommended lowering the speed limit and adding additional signage indicating "Slippery When Wet" 250 feet before the entrance to the curve.
Two months later the township engineer determined that there were four options open to the town: do nothing, reduce the speed limit from thirty to twenty-five miles per hour, reduce the speed limit from thirty to twenty-five miles per hour and add a flashing amber light to the advisory sign, and, finally, realign the curve so that it would be straightened out and enable a smoother transition through the area. Realigning the roadway would take between twelve and eighteen months to complete and cost approximately $175,000. He recommended the third choice as the most time and cost effective. However, on April 23, 2008, the Franklin Traffic Safety Official, while concurring with the township engineer recommendation, also recommended that the advisory speed be further reduced to twenty miles per hour.
By the end of July 2008, Franklin had implemented the third option, which now included the reduction of the speed limit from thirty to twenty miles per hour and a flashing light. Nonetheless, between July 28, 2008 and October 24, 2009, seven accidents occurred at the Demott curve.
A court may grant summary judgment only "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories and admissions on file, together with affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact challenged and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment or order as a matter of law." R. 4:46-2(c). The facts must be viewed in a light most favorable to the non-moving party. Polzo v. Cnty. of Essex, 209 N.J. 51, 56 n.1 (2012) (citing Brill v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 142 N.J. 520, 523 (1995)). The slightest doubt as to an issue of material fact, Saldana v. DiMedio, 275 N.J.Super. 488, 494 (App. Div. 1994), or even simply an issue of credibility, D'Amato by McPherson v. D'Amato, 305 N.J.Super. 109, 114-15 (App. Div. 1997), must be reserved for the factfinder, and precludes a grant of judgment as a matter of law. "[S]ummary judgment should be denied unless the right thereto appears so clearly as to leave no room for controversy." Saldana, supra, 275 N.J. Super. at 495 (citation omitted).
Our review of a ruling on summary judgment is de novo, applying the same legal standard as the trial court. Nicholas v. Mynster, 213 N.J. 463, 478 (2013) (citation omitted). Thus, we must first determine whether any genuine issue of material fact exists, and, if not, evaluate whether the trial court's ruling was correct as a matter of law. Henry v. N.J. Dep't of Human Servs., 204 N.J. 320, 330 (2010) (citation omitted).
N.J.S.A. 59:2-3 (a) and (c) state:
a. A public entity is not liable for an injury resulting from the exercise of judgment or discretion vested in the entity;
....
c. A public entity is not liable for the exercise of discretion in determining whether to seek or whether to provide the resources necessary for the purchase of equipment, the construction or maintenance of facilities, the hiring of personnel and, in general, the provision of adequate governmental services[.]
Our Supreme Court has "made clear that the exercise of ... discretion in N.J.S.A. 59:2-3(a) refers to actual, high-level policymaking decisions involving the balancing of competing considerations." Coyne v. State of N.J. Dep't of Transp., 182 N.J. 481, 489 (2005) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Here, the township clearly considered the positive and negative criteria for various practical improvements to the dangerous curve in the roadway. It chose the method calculated to make the improvements expeditiously and cost-effectively.
The flashing light drew attention to the reduction in speed. Had the town realigned the curve, the work would most likely not have been completed at the time of plaintiff's accident.
Plaintiff has no memory of the accident and therefore cannot present a contrary version of the facts. No reasonable jury could find that the township's remedial steps were "palpably unreasonable" as she claims.
Affirmed.
