NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

PER CURIAM.

Defendant appeals his conviction of first-degree murder and related charges resulting from the killing of a thirteen-year-old boy. Defendant argues the trial judge erred: (1) in charging the jury; (2) admitting hearsay statements; (3) permitting the prosecutor to misrepresent crucial facts in his summation; (4) admitting other bad-act evidence for an improper purpose; and (5) permitting the prosecutor in his summation to characterize defendant's recorded statement as a confession. We find no merit in these arguments and affirm.

On June 26, 2009, thirteen-year-old Justin Grisham was fatally shot in the back of the neck on University Place in Irvington. On March 11, 2010, an indictment was returned, charging defendant with: third-degree terroristic threats, N.J.S.A. 2C:12-3(a); first-degree murder, N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3(a); second-degree unlawful possession of a weapon, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(b); and second-degree possession of a weapon for an unlawful purpose, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4(a).

A pretrial hearing led to the denial of defendant's motion to suppress statements he made to police. A seven-day trial took place in January 2011 during which the jury heard testimony regarding the State's theory that Justin was shot by defendant because defendant believed Justin was Farad Williams, who had a running feud with Patia Houston.

Patia testified that earlier in June 2009 she had a verbal altercation with Farad. Several days later, Farad threw an ice pop at Patia from a window in his home. This generated another argument, and Farad and his aunt, Shadequah Williams, came outside, and physically fought with Patia. After this fight, which Patia claimed she won, Farad and a number of others "jumped" Patia.

On the same day Justin was murdered, Patia returned to the area near Farad's home with defendant1 and another male, identified only by his nickname, Hood. Another fight with Farad and others ensued. Patia testified that, shortly after this fight, she was walking down the street with defendant and two other male friends when defendant shot Justin.2

Joseph Delapara testified he resided in the area of University Place in Irvington in June 2009, and on the night Justin was murdered, Delapara heard gunshots as he was driving home. As he turned his vehicle onto University Place while moving toward the sound of the gunshots, Delapara observed two males walking with a female, and a third male running away from a body lying in the street. As the running man passed closely by Delapara's vehicle, he tucked an object into the front of his pants. Although Delapara initially told police he could not identify the running man, he eventually identified defendant.

Several detectives from the Essex County Prosecutor's Office also testified. Detective Gary Farrow provided surveillance footage obtained from a private residence on University Place that recorded an area adjacent to the crime scene. Although the footage did not capture the homicide, it did record defendant, Patia, and two other males walking together near University Place. The footage also captured an image of Delapara's vehicle.

Detective Jose Ramirez testified he investigated Justin's murder and obtained a warrant for defendant's arrest on July 10, 2009. Defendant surrendered himself to police two days later and provided a videotaped statement.

Dr. Lyla Perez, an Assistant State Medical Examiner, testified that Justin had a gunshot entrance wound in the back of the neck, approximately seven inches below the top of his head. Dr. Perez opined that Justin was shot from "a distance of a foot or a foot-and-a-half."

The jury found defendant guilty as charged, and the judge later sentenced defendant to an aggregate thirty-three year prison term, subject to a thirty-year period of parole ineligibility.

Defendant appeals, arguing the strength of the State's proofs were "unfairly enhanced" by the following "variety of errors":

We find insufficient merit in these arguments to warrant discussion in a written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(2). We add only the following brief comments on each argument.

I

Defendant argues the trial judge erred because, when instructing the jury, the judge's choice of words suggested to the jury that both Patia and Delapara had observed defendant shoot Justin, whereas Delapara did not testify he saw defendant shoot Justin and Patia did not expressly state that she observed a bullet leave the muzzle of defendant's gun and strike Justin. The language in question consists of the judge's comment as he proceeded to instruct the jury about identification evidence that "[t]he State also presented testimony that on a prior occasion before this trial, the witnesses identified the defendant as the person who committed these offenses." Defendant recognizes, in urging this point on appeal, that no objection to this particular instruction was uttered at trial.

To start, we first reject as insufficient to warrant further discussion in a written opinion, R. 2:11-3(e)(2), defendant's contention that the judge misspoke when he suggested that anyone had witnessed the shooting. This argument is without merit because Patia testified that defendant shot Justin.3

The balance of defendant's argument in his first point is colorable only to the extent that he expresses concern that the judge's comment may have conveyed to the jury that the State had presented "witnesses" to the shooting instead of "a witness." In other words, defendant is technically accurate in suggesting that, at best, only one witness claimed to have seen defendant shoot Justin; another (Delapara) heard the gunshots and identified defendant as the person running from the scene, but Delapara never said that he saw the shooting. Although colorable, this argument is based on a misconception of the judge's comment. That is, the judge stated that the State presented "witnesses" who "identified the defendant as the person who committed these offenses"; this comment is capable of a number of meanings and it does not necessarily convey the meaning that forms the basis for defendant's concern, i.e., that "the State presented witnesses who saw defendant shoot Justin." In any event, defendant did not object at trial, so the judge did not have the opportunity to clarify the statement, assuming the jury may have interpreted this brief comment in the way that defendant now urges on appeal.

To be sure, the Supreme Court has repeatedly stressed the importance of clear and correct jury instructions. State v. Koskovich, 168 N.J. 448, 507-08 (2001). But the judge's brief comment — a mere segue into his identification charge — was not capable of producing an unjust result. In light of the remainder of the judge's unimpeachable charge, we reject defendant's arguments about this single comment.

II

Defendant argues the prosecution improperly elicited testimony from Detective Ramirez that implied others had identified defendant as Justin's murderer. Specifically, defendant takes issue with the following exchange at trial:

Defendant claims that by allowing this statement into the record, the trial judge permitted the jury to hear inadmissible hearsay that infringed his confrontation right. The State responds that the statements were properly admitted because they were "an accurate depiction of the investigation at that point." Again, defendant did not object to this testimony at trial, so we review it pursuant to the plain-error rule. R. 2:10-2.

Although the detective's statement was likely inadmissible, State v. Bankston, 63 N.J. 263, 271 (1973) (recognizing that "[w]hen the logical implication to be drawn from . . . testimony leads the jury to believe that a non-testifying witness has given the police evidence of the accused's guilt, the testimony should be disallowed as hearsay"), in the absence of a defense objection, the judge did not err by neither striking this testimony nor cautioning the jury.

In short, although somewhat troubling, this brief answer was insufficient "to raise a reasonable doubt" as to whether its admission "led the jury to a result it otherwise might not have reached." State v. Macon, 57 N.J. 325, 336 (1971).

III

Defendant next argues the prosecutor misrepresented a crucial fact by arguing in summation that Patia had observed defendant "put[] a bullet in the back of a boy's head." Certainly, it may be true that Patia did not see a bullet enter Justin's body, but she did testify that she was at the scene and that defendant shot Justin. The prosecutor's assertions, to which there was no objection, represented fair comment on the evidence.

IV

Defendant also argues it was improper for the State to elicit testimony that portrayed Patia, Delapara, Farad, and Sharkeez as fearful of defendant. He argues that this testimony constituted inadmissible character evidence in the form of other crimes, wrongs, or acts that should have been excluded through application of N.J.R.E. 404(b). Although defendant admits that "[a]t no point did the State elicit that [these witnesses] were fearful of defendant," he also asserts that "it strains credulity" to argue the jury would have concluded "anything but precisely that." We disagree.

In furtherance of his argument, defendant alludes to only five instances in which witnesses uttered that these witnesses were in fear. In two, the trial judge sustained defense counsel's objection and instructed the jury to disregard the witnesses' answers. In a third, a defense objection was sustained on other grounds.

In a fourth, there was no objection, but defendant quickly defused the significance of that expression of fear. That is, defendant's fourth example refers to the examination of Delapara, who had initially told police he would not be able to identify the man who ran past his vehicle:

There was no objection to this testimony, but that answer ended the prosecutor's examination, and defense counsel immediately engaged in the following cross-examination of Delapara:

We see no prejudice resulting from this fourth example.

In short, we find nothing to support defendant's concern that the jury may have inferentially assumed from this testimony that defendant was a violent person or had threatened — or posed a threat — to any witness. Defense objections were sustained in three of the five cited instances, in the fourth defense counsel immediately elicited testimony from the witness that "no one had made any threat" to him, thereby defusing the concerns now expressed, and the fifth comment, uttered without objection at trial, was incapable of producing an unjust result.

V

Defendant lastly argues the prosecution improperly elicited testimony and made comments during summation that erroneously interpreted defendant's statement to police as: "That's the guy that I killed?" Defendant argues that the recorded statement contains only the statement: "That's the guy that got killed?"

In summation, a prosecutor "is limited to commenting upon the evidence and the reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom." State v. Bucanis, 26 N.J. 45, 56 (1958); see also State v. Feaster, 156 N.J. 1, 58-59 (1998); State v. Johnson, 120 N.J. 263, 296 (1990). Despite defendant's forceful argument to the contrary, the prosecutor's summation offered a reasonable interpretation of what defendant said in his recorded statement.5 In the final analysis, what defendant said to police in the recorded statement and its probative value were matters for the jury to decide. The prosecutor's argument as to what defendant then said constitutes a fair understanding of what the video reveals. We, thus, reject defendant's fifth and last point.

Affirmed.