NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

PER CURIAM.

Defendant appeals from an order entered by the Law Division on June 28, 2013, which denied her petition for post-conviction relief ("PCR"). We affirm.

A Sussex County grand jury charged defendant with first-degree aggravated sexual assault, N.J.S.A. 2C:14-2a (count one); second-degree sexual assault, N.J.S.A. 2C:14-2b (count two); and second-degree endangering the welfare of a child, N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4a (count three). On August 19, 2008, defendant pled guilty to count three.

The plea agreement required defendant to testify truthfully against her paramour, co-defendant M.O. The State agreed to dismiss the other charges and recommend that defendant be sentenced to five years of incarceration, with the understanding that defendant would be subject to sex-offender registration and community notification under N.J.S.A. 2C:7-2, and parole supervision for life under N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6.4.

At the plea hearing, defendant stated that between February 1, 2007, and March 20, 2007, she was in a community in Sussex County. She had a son, K.J., who was born in June 1997, and who had been diagnosed with Asperger syndrome. According to defendant, at some point, the children in the neighborhood were "poking fun" at and "taking advantage of" K.J. They gave him "bad information" about sex and the "facts of life."

Defendant said that M.O. thought the best way to "instruct" K.J. regarding sex was to demonstrate certain sex acts for him. Defendant and K.J. agreed to this. Defendant acknowledged that she and M.O. engaged in oral sex in front of K.J. She admitted that K.J. was less than thirteen years old at the time. Defendant stated that in retrospect, she thought that she and M.O. had willingly engaged in this conduct. Defendant also said that in retrospect, she understood that having oral sex with M.O. in front of K.J. would impair or debauch the minor's morals.

Defendant was sentenced on April 16, 2009, to five years of incarceration. The court recommended that the Commissioner of Corrections provide defendant with psychotherapy "to deal with her underlying mental health issues[.]" The court ordered that defendant was to comply with the registration requirements of Megan's Law, N.J.S.A. 2C:7-1 to-23, and stated that defendant would be subject to parole supervision for life pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6.4. The court also imposed appropriate penalties and assessments. The court entered a judgment of conviction ("JOC") dated April 16, 2009, and filed an amended JOC on September 1, 2009.1 Defendant did not file a direct appeal.

On February 19, 2010, defendant filed a pro se petition for PCR, alleging that she had been denied the effective assistance of counsel. Defendant claimed her attorneys erred by failing to develop and present a "strong psychiatric defense of diminished capacity" based on "multiple mental illnesses" that she was suffering from; and by failing to discuss with her "details and ramifications" of the plea and its "penal and collateral consequences[.]" The court appointed counsel to represent defendant, and counsel filed a brief in support of the petition.

The court considered the petition on June 19, 2013, and placed its decision on the record. The court determined that defendant's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel failed because defendant's mental health status was "adequately addressed" and a diminished capacity defense would not have been viable. The court also determined that an evidentiary hearing was not required. The court entered an order dated June 28, 2013, denying the petition. This appeal followed.

On appeal, defendant argues that

We reject these arguments and affirm.

Defendant's claim that she was denied the effective assistance of counsel as guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution is considered under the standards enunciated in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1984). In order to prevail on such a claim, a defendant first must show that his attorney's handling of the matter "fell below an objective standard of reasonableness." Id. at 688, 104 S. Ct. at 2064, 80 L. Ed. 2d at 693.

A defendant also must show that there exists a "reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different." Id. at 694, 104 S. Ct. at 2068, 80 L. Ed. 2d at 698. Our Supreme Court has adopted this standard for evaluating ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims under our state constitution. State v. Fritz, 105 N.J. 42, 58 (1987).

Defendant alleges that she was suffering from certain mental illnesses at the time of the offense, and she was not capable of having the mental state required for conviction. She claims her attorneys should have explored diminished capacity as a viable defense. In addition, she maintains that the case presented a "form" of battered person syndrome. She claims that, while she was not physically beaten, she was "emotionally tormented, exposed, and turned into a sex slave." She argues that counsel should have investigated this defense as well.

We are convinced, however, that the record supports the PCR court's determination that defendant was not denied the effective assistance of counsel because her mental status was adequately explored. The record shows that defendant was examined twice as to her competence, once by her own expert, Phillip H. Witt, Ph.D., A.B.P.P. ("Dr. Witt"), and once by the court's appointed doctor, Peter D. Paul, Ph.D. ("Dr. Paul").

In his report dated December 12, 2007, Dr. Witt stated that defendant was competent to stand trial. There were "clear signs of emotional disturbance" but no indications of a cognitive impairment that would have prevented defendant from understanding the fundamentals of the legal process or adequately assisting her attorney. Dr. Witt also stated that there was "some uncertainty" regarding defendant's mental state at the time of the offense.

Dr. Witt noted that defendant said that M.O. had coerced her into having a sexual encounter with her son. He stated that defendant's statements about the incident presented factual rather than clinical issues. The doctor also noted that defendant's description of her relationship with M.O. was "consistent with her dependent, masochistic, borderline personality style."

In addition, in a report dated July 7, 2008, Dr. Paul stated that defendant was then suffering from post-traumatic stress disorder, and personality disorder, not otherwise specified. Dr. Paul found that defendant was competent to stand trial or enter a plea, but noted that treatment was necessary for her to maintain competence. He wrote that defendant was "psychiatrically stable" at that time. He added:

Thus, neither Dr. Witt nor Dr. Paul opined as to defendant's mental capacity at the time of the offense. Furthermore, when defendant pled guilty, she stated that her attorney had explained to her the defenses that could have been raised and had assessed the strengths and weaknesses of those defenses.

Moreover, defendant did not present the PCR court with an affidavit or certification supporting her claim that her attorney should have presented diminished capacity and battered person syndrome defenses. See State v. Cummings, 321 N.J.Super. 154, 170 (App. Div.) (noting that affidavits or certifications are required to support a claim that counsel's performance was substandard because counsel failed to conduct an adequate investigation), certif. denied, 162 N.J. 199 (1999). The PCR court correctly found that defendant failed to establish that the result here probably would have been different if her attorney had raised these defenses.

We are also convinced that the PCR court correctly determined that an evidentiary hearing was not required on the petition. Defendant failed to present a prima facie case of ineffective assistance of counsel, there were no material issues of disputed fact that could not be resolved by reference to the trial court record, and an evidentiary hearing was not required to resolve defendant's claims. R. 3:22-10(b); see also State v. Porter, 216 N.J. 343, 354 (2013).

In view of our decision, we need not address defendant's contention that her petition was not barred by Rule 3:22-3 because she did not file a direct appeal. We note, however, that the PCR court did not find that the petition was barred, and the State has not advanced this argument in response to defendant's appeal.

Affirmed.