NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

PER CURIAM.

Following a jury trial, defendant was found guilty of second-degree insurance fraud, N.J.S.A. 2C:21-4.6 and 2C:2-6; second-degree aggravated arson, N.J.S.A. 2C:17-1a(2) and 2C:2-6; third-degree arson, N.J.S.A. 2C:17-1b(3) and 2C:2-6; and third-degree theft by deception, N.J.S.A. 2C:20-4, 2C:5-1 and 2C:2-6. On June 27, 2012, after appropriate mergers, the trial judge sentenced defendant to seven years on both the insurance fraud and aggravated arson counts, to run concurrent with each other.

Defendant appeals and raises the following arguments:

We have considered these arguments in light of the record and applicable law and we affirm.

I.

Because defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support the jury's verdict, we view the facts and all inferences in a light most favorable to the State. State v. Nero, 195 N.J. 397 (2008) (citing State v. Brown, 157 N.J.Super. 110, 114 (App. Div. 1978), rev'd on other grounds, 80 N.J. 587 (1979)). We glean the facts from the trial record.

Defendant held title to a 2002 Mercury Mountaineer that he purchased in 2006 on behalf of his friend, Anthony Govan. The vehicle was in defendant's name, but Govan made monthly payments to defendant to cover the full purchase price and insurance costs. In early April 2008, defendant informed Govan that he needed the vehicle "off his credit." Defendant and Govan thereafter devised a plan to fake a carjacking and burn the vehicle, thereby triggering an insurance payment.

On April 9, 2008, defendant and Govan set their plan in motion. At 1:45 a.m., defendant called the Hamilton Police Department from the parking lot of an apartment complex in Hamilton Township and reported he had been carjacked. Police Officer Lugo responded to the call and found defendant and Govan at the parking lot seated in a black Honda Accord. At that time, defendant told the officer the following, fabricated story.

Defendant informed Lugo that he went to the parking lot in his 2002 Mountaineer to meet a woman he met on the "Philly Donut Party Line." When he arrived, four or five black men surrounded him and demanded the keys to the Mountaineer, which he gave to them. Defendant could not recall any identifying features of any of the men and he did not notice the direction in which they exited the parking lot in his Mountaineer. Defendant explained that he ran from the parking lot and hid in a "dark spot," the location of which he was unable to disclose.

Defendant told Lugo that he called Govan from his hidden location and instructed Govan to go to his house, find the keys to his Honda Accord, and meet him at the parking lot. Defendant's explanation for calling Govan before the police was that he did not know whether the police would be "proactive." Defendant called the police as soon as Govan arrived.

At the conclusion of their encounter with Lugo, defendant, driving the Honda Accord, and Govan, driving the Mountaineer, traveled to an isolated location in Ewing Township. Defendant waited in the Accord while Govan set the Mountaineer on fire. Defendant and Govan then drove back to Govan's apartment, where defendant spent the night.

At 4:00 a.m. on April 9, Detective Litz of the Ewing Township Police Department responded to a call reporting a burning motor vehicle. An empty bottle of lighter fluid next to the vehicle and a gas can under the steering wheel, raised investigators' suspicions that the fire was a possible arson.

Detective Litz ran the license plates and learned that the car was reported stolen and that it belonged to defendant. Litz called defendant, and they met later that morning at police headquarters to discuss defendant's reported carjacking.

Defendant provided Litz with the same story he had earlier given to Lugo. Before hearing defendant's story, Litz considered defendant a victim and had scheduled the meeting with the purpose of gaining information that might help him identify the perpetrators of the carjacking and the arson. However, after defendant told his story, Litz "concluded that [defendant's] version of events raised significant questions" and, now considering defendant a suspect, "he administered an oral Miranda warning."

Defendant opted not to continue the interview and was permitted to leave the precinct. At 11:30 a.m., that same day, defendant called Litz and informed him that he wanted to speak again. When defendant returned, he recounted the same sequence of events, but clarified that before he went to the parking lot, he stopped for gas — an event he had denied earlier.

Govan was first interviewed by police at 6:00 p.m. on April 9. Govan's story was remarkably similar to that of defendant, and Litz concluded their stories were rehearsed. Having discovered Govan's fingerprints on the bottle of lighter fluid found outside the Mountaineer, as well as surveillance footage showing Govan buying lighter fluid and a gas container shortly before the alleged carjacking, Litz arrested Govan. Govan shortly thereafter confessed to the scheme with defendant to fabricate the carjacking and burn the Mountaineer.

On April 10, 2008, apparently unaware that Govan had given a confession to Litz, defendant contacted Geico and reported his vehicle stolen and burned. Several months later, during an examination under oath requested by Geico, defendant again repeated his fabricated carjacking story to a Geico attorney.

Prior to trial, defendant moved to suppress his first statement to the police at 7:30 a.m. on April 9, arguing that the he was subjected to a custodial interrogation without having been read his Miranda1 rights. This motion was denied. The trial court also granted the State's motion to introduce Govan's first statement to Litz as evidence against defendant. As we have noted, the jury returned a guilty verdict on all counts of the indictment.

II.

We turn first to defendant's argument that he did not commit five acts of insurance fraud either because each of his statements constituted part of one false narrative, or because Govan's statement to the Ewing police is not attributable to him. We then turn to defendant's argument that the trial court improperly denied suppression of the 7:30 a.m. statement to Litz. We find appellant's remaining arguments to be without sufficient merit to warrant discussion in a written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(2).

A.

A person is guilty of insurance fraud if that person:

Violation of this statute constitutes a second degree offense when a defendant engages in five or more acts of insurance fraud and the aggregate value of insurance proceeds sought is at least $1,000.

In State v. Fleischman, 189 N.J. 539 (2007), the Supreme Court concluded that false statements made to police constitute acts of insurance fraud when made in connection with the fraudulent claim. Id. at 554. "[W]hen a defendant provides to officials in connection with a fraudulent claim a document or oral narrative that contains a material fact or facts relating to the claim, each such document or narration is a `statement' equating to an `act' of insurance fraud." Id. at 553. The Court also recognized that "there can be multiple `statements' in a single document or narration," but rejected the notion that the "[l]egislature intended every discrete fact within a narrative assertion about a single claim would amount to an `act' of insurance fraud." Id. at 554.

In Fleischman, the defendant provided statements on separate occasions, thereby generating three separate reports: (1) a December 4, 2003 police report falsely alleging that her car had been stolen; (2) a telephone call to her insurance carrier reporting her car stolen; and (3), a December 12, 2003 affidavit submitted to her insurance carrier swearing that her car was stolen from a mall parking lot. 189 N.J. at 543. Within the December 4, 2003 police report, the defendant made two separate false statements, each of which was material to her claim for insurance benefits. Ibid. These two statements, along with the three separate reports, were alleged by the State to support second degree insurance fraud. Ibid.

The Fleischman Court agreed that the three reports constituted individual "acts" of fraud, but found that the misstatements of fact within the police report amounted to "discrete fact[s] within a narrative," and could not be considered "acts" of fraud. Id. at 553-54.

Here, defendant's conviction was supported by the following statements:

These statements are clearly separate acts, and, just as clearly, are not multiple statements contained within the single police report like those in Fleischman.

Initially, none of the statements was given as a part of the narrative of another. Additionally, each statement — which contained material facts relating to defendant's fraudulent insurance claim — was given at a different time and place, to a different person. Accordingly, each statement constitutes an individual act of insurance fraud.

Defendant's argument that Govan's statement was erroneously attributed to him is similarly without merit. Statements made "at the time the party and declarant were participating in a plan to commit a crime" and "made in furtherance of that plan" are admissible in evidence against another member of the conspiracy. N.J.R.E. 803(b)(5). The indictment need not charge conspiracy for statements to be admissible under this rule. State v. Clausell, 121 N.J. 298, 336 (1990).

Here, the trial court correctly observed that Govan's "post-arson false statements were not simply efforts to avoid responsibility of the arson; they were part and parcel of the second phase of the alleged conspiracy, which was to obtain insurance proceeds. Thus, the false statements to the police. . . were `statements relating to past events . . . [that] `serve some current purpose."" Savage, supra, 172 N.J. at 403 (quoting State v. Taccetta, 301 N.J.Super. 227, 253 (App. Div. 1997)). This conclusion is amply supported by the facts and applicable case law and we decline to disturb the trial court's ruling on the admissibility of Govan's statement. Ibid.

B.

The Miranda Court defined "custodial interrogation" to mean "questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way." 384 U.S. at 477, 86 S. Ct. at 1629, 16 L. Ed. 2d at 725. An interrogation is not rendered "custodial" simply because it occurs in a police station, or because the person questioned perceives an element of coercion. Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492, 495, 97 S.Ct. 711, 714, 50 L. Ed. 2d 714, 719 (1977). The court must determine "whether there has been a significant deprivation of the suspect's freedom of action." State v. P.Z., 152 N.J. 86, 103 (1997).

Here, defendant voluntarily reported to the police station, at a time that he suggested, and was immediately informed that he was not a suspect. At the close of the interview, defendant left without hindrance and drove home in his own vehicle. We defer to the trial court's assessment of the credibility of the police witnesses' testimony that they "considered [defendant] a victim prior to the decision to administer Miranda warnings later in the interview." State v. Elders, 192 N.J. 224, 243-44 (2007). And in any event, the officers were not obliged to disclose subjective suspicions. See State v. Patton, 362 N.J.Super. 16, 32 (App. Div. 2003), certif. denied, 178 N.J. 35 (2003).

Rather, the proper inquiry is whether the officers' conduct and surrounding circumstances led defendant reasonably to conclude that he was in custody. It is clear from these facts that defendant was neither in custody, "`[n]or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way.'" Mathiason, supra, 429 U.S. at 495, 97 S. Ct. at 714, 50 L. Ed. 2d at 719 (quoting Miranda, supra, 384 U.S. at 444, 86 S. Ct. at 1612, 16 L. Ed. 2d at 706).

Affirmed.