NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

PER CURIAM.

Plaintiff appeals from the Law Division's January 17, 2014 order granting defendants' motion for summary judgment and dismissing plaintiff's complaint. We reverse and remand for further proceedings.

Plaintiff is an employee of the New Jersey Department of Corrections. On December 28, 2011, she filed a 237-paragraph complaint against the Department and four of its employees. In the complaint, plaintiff alleged defendants discriminated against her on the basis of her race and gender in violation of the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination, N.J.S.A. 10:5-1 to — 42, and took retaliatory action against her in violation of the Conscientious Employee Protection Act (CEPA), N.J.S.A. 34:19-1 to -14. Plaintiff also raised claims involving breach of contract; breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing; "and tortuous interference with prospective business relations."

On April 18, 2012, defendants filed their answer. In response to almost all of plaintiff's factual assertions, defendants stated they were "without sufficient knowledge or information upon which to form an opinion or belief as to the truth or falsity of [plaintiff's] allegations...."1 Defendants even provided this same response to plaintiff's assertions that she worked as a corrections officer and that the individually-named defendants held supervisory positions in the Department.

On June 13, 2012, plaintiff's attorney served interrogatories and a request for production of documents upon defendants' attorney. Defendants did not respond to these discovery requests and plaintiff did not file a motion to compel discovery. At oral argument, defendants' attorney stated that he "served discovery on the plaintiff[,]" but that he also never followed up.2 In May 2013, the parties consented to a sixty-day extension of the discovery period and the discovery end date was set for September 3, 2013. However, neither party asked for, or provided, any discovery prior to that date.3 The court set a November 4, 2013 trial date.

On September 23, 2013, defendants filed a motion for summary judgment, which plaintiff opposed. On October 25, 2013, the motion judge denied defendants' motion as "untimely" because it had been made returnable within thirty days of the trial date. See R. 4:46-1.

On the day the judge denied their motion, defendants' attorney asked for an adjournment of the November 4, 2013 trial date because "our client is unavailable on that date." Plaintiff consented to this request, and the judge rescheduled the trial for January 6, 2014.

Three days after the judge set a new trial date, defendants' attorney filed a second motion for summary judgment. Defendants' one-sentence-long statement of material facts merely stated, "There are no material facts in the record as [p]laintiff did not conduct any discovery." Defendants did not file any certifications with their motion and the only exhibit they submitted was a copy of plaintiff's complaint.

Plaintiff's attorney filed a brief in opposition to defendants' motion, together with a statement of material facts. This statement referred to the allegations of discrimination and retaliation set forth in plaintiff's complaint. Plaintiff also did not file any certifications.

The judge conducted oral argument on January 17, 2014. Defendants' attorney argued that, because plaintiff "produced no discovery, there's no basis on which to proceed, there's no cause of action that has ... been buttressed by any type of discovery whatsoever. So, there's nothing to try. That's basically our position." However, the judge observed that,

The judge also noted that, if defendants were now complaining about a failure to provide discovery on plaintiff's part, the "preferable method" of proceeding would be "to file a motion to compel and then ... to strike" plaintiff's claims or complaint. Plaintiff's attorney pointed out that defendants had also not responded to her discovery requests, and reiterated that the parties had exchanged extensive discovery in the federal action.

Nevertheless, the judge granted defendants' motion for summary judgment and dismissed plaintiff's complaint. In a very brief oral opinion, the judge summarized the unrebutted assertions made in plaintiff's statement of material facts, and specifically noted that he was required to "review the pleadings... in the light most favorable to the non-moving party to determine if there is a genuine issue of material fact." The judge also noted that "remarkably, neither party followed up regarding any discovery whatsoever."

However, the judge stated that "plaintiff present[ed] absolutely no competent evidential material in opposition to defendant[s'] motion." The judge ruled that, because "plaintiff has made no affirmative demonstration as to the existence of the facts at issue, summary judgment is granted." This appeal follows.

On appeal, plaintiff argues the judge mistakenly granted defendants' motion for summary judgment. We agree.

A court may grant summary judgment only if "the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories and admissions on file, together with affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact challenged and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment or order as a matter of law." R. 4:46-2(c). The facts must be viewed in a light most favorable to the non-moving party. Polzo v. Cnty. of Essex, 209 N.J. 51, 56-7 n.1 (2012) (citing Brill v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 142 N.J. 520, 523 (1995)). The slightest doubt as to an issue of material fact, Saldana v. DiMedio, 275 N.J.Super. 488, 494 (App. Div. 1994), or even simply an issue of credibility, D'Amato v. D'Amato, 305 N.J.Super. 109, 114-15 (App. Div. 1997), must be reserved for the factfinder, and precludes a grant of judgment as a matter of law.

Summary judgment should be denied unless "the right thereto appears so clearly as to leave no room for controversy." Saldana, supra, 275 N.J. Super. at 495. Our review of a ruling on summary judgment is de novo, applying the same legal standard as the trial court. Nicholas v. Mynster, 213 N.J. 463, 477-78 (2013).

Applying these principles here, we conclude the judge mistakenly granted defendants' motion for summary judgment. Plaintiff filed a very detailed complaint setting forth her factual allegations. Defendants did not dispute any of plaintiff's factual contentions and did not provide any factual basis for the grant of summary judgment in their favor. Instead, defendants claimed "[t]here [were] no material facts in the record as [p]laintiff did not conduct any discovery."

However, defendants also failed to "conduct any discovery" in this matter. While defendants might have been able to file a motion to dismiss plaintiff's complaint for noncompliance with discovery obligations, our courts have consistently observed that the sanction of striking a pleading is "drastic" and should be resorted to only "sparingly." See, e.g., Georgis v. Scarpa, 226 N.J.Super. 244, 250 (App. Div. 1988). In view of defendants' own failure to respond to plaintiff's discovery demands, it is unlikely that any such motion would have been successful. Thus, the parties' mutual failure to engage in discovery was an insufficient basis for granting summary judgment to defendant.

The judge stated that plaintiff was required to present "competent evidential material in opposition to defendant[s'] motion." However, defendants motion papers were devoid of any factual contentions or evidence to which plaintiff could respond. Indeed, the only exhibit defendants attached to their motion was a copy of plaintiff's complaint. Thus, plaintiff could reasonably rely upon the uncontradicted factual allegations set forth in her complaint and statement of material facts to defeat defendants' unsupported motion for summary judgment. R. 4:46-2(c).

We therefore reverse the judge's decision granting defendants' motion for summary judgment, reinstate plaintiff's complaint, and remand for further proceedings.

Reversed and remanded. We do not retain jurisdiction.