NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

PER CURIAM.

After his fourth jury trial on charges that he murdered Zebedee Newmones, defendant Brian Wilson was convicted of the lesser-included charge of reckless manslaughter. Defendant was first charged, with co-defendant William Lamont Parker, with first-degree murder in the shooting death of Newmones by a grand jury sitting in Atlantic County.

Defendant's first trial in 2004 resulted in a hung jury. His second trial in 2005 ended in a mistrial. He was convicted of murder after his third trial in 2006, but we reversed due to discovery and jury instruction errors. State v. Wilson, No. A-4588-05 (App. Div. Sept. 1, 2009).

Defendant was re-tried in 2012 and found not guilty of murder but guilty of reckless manslaughter. N.J.S.A. 2C:11-4(b)(1). He was sentenced to a ten-year term of incarceration and ordered to pay $1,231 in restitution. He now appeals that conviction.

I.

We glean the following facts from the trial record. In 1984, defendant and William Parker lived in New York City. Whenever Parker would visit Atlantic City, he would stay at his grandmother's house. On occasion, defendant would accompany Parker to Atlantic City.

On August 11, 1984, Parker's cousin, Derrick Ingram, was shot in the back in Atlantic City and spent over a month in a hospital recovering from his injuries. On September 13, 1984, Parker, defendant, and Jeffrey Simpson visited Ingram in the hospital. Parker was angry that Ingram had been shot and upset that someone sold his mother narcotics that had made her ill. Ingram testified that Parker, defendant, and Simpson believed Newmones was present when Ingram was shot and Newmones was responsible for giving Parker's mother the narcotics. Ingram testified that the three men discussed killing Newmones.

That night, Richard Barber visited Parker at his grandmother's house. At the time, Barber was driving a red Renault Alliance, which he had borrowed from his girlfriend. Around 3:00 a.m., Barber, Parker, and Simpson left Parker's grandmother's house to go to a local bar. Barber drove.

On their way to the bar, Parker observed Newmones walking with Rodney McNair. Parker asked Barber to turn around and drive back to his grandmother's apartment. Parker then got on a bicycle and told Barber and Simpson to meet him at the Lincoln Hotel. At the hotel, Parker and defendant got into the car and Barber drove back to the area where they had seen Newmones. Barber parked the car on Linway Avenue and remained in the car while Parker, defendant, and Simpson walked toward the area where they had seen Newmones. Barber recalled defendant saying that he would be "taking care of Zebedee Newmones."

Shortly thereafter, Barber heard approximately five gunshots. Parker, Simpson, and defendant ran up the street and returned to the car. Barber testified that defendant was carrying a Smith and Wesson.38 caliber gun under his clothing. The three men told Barber to drive. As they drove away, defendant said, "I got him, I unloaded the gun on him.... [I] shot him in the face." Parker said, "we got that nigger, that's good, that was for my cousin[.]"

During cross-examination, Barber testified that Parker and Simpson had a "beef" with Newmones as they belonged to the "Abdullahs" and he was a "Salaam," a rival gang.

Pamela Lamb testified that, during the early morning hours of September 14, 1984, she observed Newmones, McNair, and Michael Bailey outside a bar at the corner of Arctic and Kentucky Avenues. Lamb knew Newmones because he was the father of her sister's children. Lamb testified that she gave Newmones two cigarettes and she went back inside the bar. Moments later, she heard a commotion out on the street and left the bar. She followed a crowd toward Indiana and Arctic where she saw Newmones lying on the ground. Lamb recalled that Newmones had been shot in the shoulder and it looked like "his bottom lip was shot off."

At approximately 4:00 a.m., Officers Charles Sutton and Gregory Farmer of the Atlantic City Police Department were traveling in a marked police car in the area of Arctic Avenue when they were flagged down by McNair, who reported that someone had just been shot. Sutton ran down toward Indiana Avenue and found Newmones, bleeding from his mouth and back. Newmones was subsequently transported to the hospital where he died.

Later that morning, Tracy Vance saw defendant riding a bicycle near her apartment on North Pennsylvania Avenue. Vance is Barber's sister and was a friend of Parker's grandmother. Defendant approached Vance, asked her to hold a "piece" for him, and said that he would be "right back to get it." She agreed, and defendant gave her a large gun. Shortly thereafter, Vance learned that Newmones had been shot and became concerned that the gun she was holding might have been used in the shooting. She called Barber for help.

Barber testified that he went to Vance's apartment and she showed him the.38 caliber Smith and Wesson in her closet. Barber believed that this was the same gun that defendant had in the car on the night of the shooting. Barber took the gun from Vance's home and threw it in the bay. Barber testified that he disposed of the gun because Vance had children, he knew the gun was used in the shooting, and he was afraid of what Parker and defendant would do to Barber and his family if the police found the weapon.

That same morning, Ingram received a call from Simpson, who told him that they killed Newmones. That afternoon, Parker and defendant visited Ingram at the hospital. During this visit, defendant told Ingram that they found Newmones and that defendant had "shot him in the face" and "tried to blow his effing head off."

Timothy Bunch, a friend of Newmones, testified that, after Newmones was killed, he was playing basketball when defendant pulled up in a car driven by Parker. Defendant told Bunch he had "shot [Newmones] in the eyes." Bunch observed defendant carrying a.38 caliber firearm in his waistband.

Although an arrest warrant was initially issued in 1984 for defendant in the name "Brian Doe," he was not arrested until October 21, 2002 in New York.

Defendant testified that he was "probably" in Atlantic City in September of 1984, but he denied any involvement in the shooting. Defendant also denied ever speaking to Bunch about the shooting, visiting Ingram in the hospital, owning or carrying a.38 caliber handgun, or giving a handgun to Vance.

On cross-examination, the prosecutor asked defendant if the State's witnesses, whose testimony directly contradicted defendant's testimony, were "the liars." Defendant responded, "Exactly." During closing arguments, the prosecutor made the following comments about the State's witnesses:

On December 21, 2012, the jury convicted defendant of reckless manslaughter, and this appeal followed. Defendant raises the following points:

In his pro se supplemental brief, appellant provided the following arguments for our consideration:

II.

Defendant argues that we should vacate the verdict and dismiss the indictment because the five-year statute of limitations for manslaughter in effect at the time of the offense expired long before the State began prosecuting defendant. Defendant contends that the Legislature did not remove the statute of limitations for manslaughter until 1988 and, in the absence of clear legislative intent for the amended statute to apply retroactively, defendant's conviction for the 1984 homicide is time-barred.

Prior to 1988, the crime of manslaughter was subject to a five-year statute of limitations. See L. 1986, c. 166, § 1. Effective July 20, 1988, the Legislature amended the statute to remove the limitations period. L. 1988, c. 68, § 1. Under the current statute, a prosecution for manslaughter under N.J.S.A. 2C:11-4 "may be commenced at any time." N.J.S.A. 2C:1-6(a)(1).

In State v. Nagle, 226 N.J.Super. 513, 517-18 (App. Div. 1988), we held that "an extended statute of limitations may constitutionally apply to a charge of crime occurring before its effective date, if that date is before expiration of the period provided by the prior statute." The Legislature amended the statute of limitations for manslaughter in 1988, one year before the expiration of the limitations period for defendant's crime under the old statute. Thus, the extended period of limitations may constitutionally apply to defendant's crime.

Defendant contends that, absent clear legislative intent, the extended statute of limitations should not be retroactively applied to his crime. He argues that our decision in Nagle, which concerned the retroactive application of an extended limitations period to the crime of sexual assault, is distinguishable. We disagree.

In Nagle, the defendant was indicted for aggravated sexual assault. Id. at 515. At the time the offense was committed, the statute of limitations for that crime was five years. Ibid. Before the limitations period was to expire, the Legislature amended the statute to extend the limitations period. Ibid. Defendant moved to dismiss the indictment, arguing that his prosecution was barred under the old statute. Ibid.

In reviewing whether the statute should be retroactively applied to defendant, we noted "[t]he general rule is that new statutes operate prospectively in the absence of a clear expression of contrary legislative purpose." Id. at 516. The legislative history of the amendment in that case suggested that the Legislature was concerned that young victims of sexual assault were not provided sufficient time under the prior statute to understand the effects of the criminal conduct and decide whether to file a complaint. Ibid.

We concluded that "the amendment was meant to apply to crimes already committed." Id. at 515. "[B]ecause the Legislature's purpose was to remedy what it saw as a serious problem arising in the prosecution of sexual crimes with young victims," we concluded that "[t]here was no reason to reserve the remedy for future crimes, and continue to burden the prosecution of crimes already committed with the targeted defect." Ibid.

Here, the legislative history of the 1988 amendment, which removed the statute of limitations period for the crime of manslaughter, indicates that the Legislature sought to remedy what it perceived to be a problem in homicide prosecutions. Specifically, the Senate Judiciary Committee Statement accompanying the bill provided as follows:

Based on this statement, it is clear that the Legislature intended the extension to apply to already-committed crimes for which the limitations period had not yet expired. Like the situation in Nagle, supra, the Legislature here "had no reason to withhold the remedial measure from reachable situations." 226 N.J. Super. at 516.

Defendant next argues that the trial court committed "plain and reversible error" when it failed to provide a limiting instruction that jurors could not use evidence of the gang affiliations of Parker and Simpson as proof of defendant's guilt. Defendant contends that, under N.J.R.E. 404(b), the trial court was required to provide a limiting instruction because evidence of gang affiliation is "strongly suggestive" of criminal activity and may potentially "taint" a defendant in the same manner as other crime or "bad acts" evidence. Defendant also argues that, with respect to testimony that defendant threatened Ingram, the trial court erred in not providing a limiting instruction that such evidence should not be used to infer consciousness of guilt or actual guilt.

As defendant concedes, he neither objected to the testimony that he now challenges nor did he request a limiting instruction during trial. Thus, any error will be disregarded unless a reasonable doubt has been raised whether the jury came to a result that it otherwise might not have reached. State v. R.K., 220 N.J. 444, 456 (2015).

"Although evidence of membership in a street gang is not ... evidence of actual criminal activity, it is at the very least strongly suggestive of such activity." State v. Goodman, 415 N.J.Super. 210, 227 (App. Div. 2010). In Goodman, we held that when evidence of gang membership is proffered, N.J.R.E. 404(b) is applicable because the average juror would likely conclude that a gang member has engaged in criminal activity. Id. at 228. Such evidence has the potential to "taint" a defendant in much the same way as evidence of actual criminal conduct. Ibid.

Here, the testimony that defendant now takes issue with was elicited at trial by his counsel. Thus, defendant's arguments are barred by the doctrine of invited error. See State v. Williams, 219 N.J. 89, 100 (2014) ("The invited-error doctrine is intended to prevent defendants from manipulating the system and will apply when a defendant in some way has led the court into error while pursuing a tactical advantage that does not work as planned.").

Here, it appears defense counsel elicited this testimony in an attempt to discredit the State's witnesses and did not request that a limiting instruction be given. Thus, even if we conclude that the trial court erred in not providing a limiting instruction sua sponte, defendant should not be permitted to benefit from this purported error that he led the court to commit.

Next, defendant argues that the prosecutor committed misconduct by asking defendant, during cross-examination, whether the witnesses who implicated him in the shooting had lied and by making comments during summation that the State's witnesses were "courageous" and "not liars." Defendant asserts that it is improper for a prosecutor, on cross-examination, to compel a witness to characterize the testimony of another witness. In addition, defendant contends that the prosecutor "violated her duty not to express her personal belief or opinion as to the truth or falsity of any testimony." Defendant argues that the prosecutor's "misconduct was especially prejudicial in this case because there was no physical evidence that tied [defendant] to the shooting and, therefore, the case was essentially a question of credibility."

A prosecutor may not express a personal belief or opinion as to the truthfulness of a witness's testimony or personally vouch for a witness or refer to evidence beyond the record to support a witness's credibility. State v. R.B., 183 N.J. 308, 337 (2005). However, a prosecutor may argue that a witness is credible, based on the evidence. State v. Walden, 370 N.J.Super. 549, 560-61 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 182 N.J. 148 (2004). Prosecutorial misconduct does not warrant reversal unless the conduct was "so egregious as to deprive defendant of a fair trial." State v. Echols, 199 N.J. 344, 360 (2009) (quoting State v. Wakefield, 190 N.J. 397, 437 (2007), cert. denied, 552 U.S. 1146, 128 S.Ct. 1074, 169 L. Ed. 2d 817 (2008)). When defense counsel fails to object to the allegedly improper remarks, the remarks will not be deemed prejudicial, as "[f]ailure to make a timely objection indicates that defense counsel did not believe the remarks were prejudicial at the time they were made." Ibid.

Here, the prosecutor's allegedly improper comments could reasonably be understood as responding to defense counsel's arguments, which largely questioned the credibility of the State's witnesses. Defense counsel did not object to these comments during trial, and we are satisfied that they were not so egregious that they substantially prejudiced defendant's fundamental right to have a jury fairly evaluate the merits of his defense.

Finally, defendant's pro se supplemental brief raises several arguments that appear to challenge the trial court's denial of his motion to dismiss the indictment. Specifically, defendant argues that he was illegally arrested on a void warrant, that the indictment was defective because the grand jury was presented with a dismissed warrant after an eighteen-year delay, and that the indictment violates his rights under the Fourteenth Amendment.

Defendant challenged the trial court's denial of his motion to dismiss the indictment on his previous appeal before this court. Wilson, supra, slip op. at 17. We rejected defendant's arguments on the purported invalidity of the indictment, id. at 19, and need not reconsider these arguments on this appeal. See State v. Cusick, 116 N.J.Super. 482, 485 (App. Div. 1971) (holding that an issue decided on the merits in a prior appeal may not be re-litigated in a subsequent appeal, even if it is of constitutional dimension).

The remainder of defendant's arguments raised in his pro se brief lack sufficient merit to warrant any further discussion in our opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(2).

Affirmed.