NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

PER CURIAM.

Defendant M.T. (Mary),1 the biological mother of W.T. (Walter), born in October 2009, and M.H. (Mark), born in June 2011, appeals from the August 1, 2014 judgment of guardianship, which terminated her parental rights to the children. On appeal, Mary contends that plaintiff Division of Child Protection and Permanency (Division) failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence the four statutory prongs contained in N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1(a). Mary also contends the court erred in terminating her parental rights based only on her poverty and permanency concerns.

Defendant F.H. (Frank), Mark's biological father, also appeals. He contends that the Division failed to prove prongs two and three of N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1(a) and that the court erred in terminating his parental rights based on his status as a convicted sex offender. After reviewing the evidence presented to the trial court, and in light of prevailing legal standards and arguments presented, we affirm as to both defendants.

We will not recite in detail the history of the Division's involvement with defendants. Instead, we incorporate by reference the factual findings and legal conclusions contained in Judge Bernadette N. DeCastro's comprehensive written opinion rendered on August 1, 2014. We add only the following brief comments.

The Division first became involved with the family in January 2011, and provided services, including a safety protection plan, homemaker services, and assistance with welfare benefits. In July 2012, the Division removed the children from Mary's care due to her lack of safe and stable housing and inability to adequately care for them. By the time of the trial nearly two years later, Mary had not resolved her housing situation and had no plan for securing stable housing or addressing her children's special needs.2 In addition, during the time her children were in foster care, Mary did not consistently visit them. She seemed almost uninterested in them and asserted frivolous excuses for not attending visits. She placed her needs ahead of the children's needs and did not take advantage of the services the Division offered.

We reject Mary's contention that Judge DeCastro terminated her parental rights based only on her poverty and permanency concerns. Mary's lack of safe and stable housing stemmed from her actions and inactions, not from poverty. Her chronic instability included the failure to maintain employment or contact with her children and failure to follow through with the services the Division offered.

We also reject Frank's contention that Judge De Castro terminated his parental rights based on his status as a convicted sex offender. Frank was incarcerated at the time of Mark's removal in July 2012, remained incarcerated during most of the litigation, and offered no plan for the child during his incarceration. He has an extensive criminal history, including a Megan's Law3 offense, and was incarcerated for failing to register as a sex offender. When not incarcerated, he did not support or visit Mark, contact the Division, or engage in services. He also failed to appear after the first day of the four-day trial. Frank did nothing to foster a parent-child relationship with Mark and is essentially a stranger to the child.

We are satisfied that commencing with the children's removal in July 2012, and continuing up to the trial nearly two years later, the Division provided multiple reasonable opportunities for defendants to reunify with their children and address the issues that led to the children's removal. None of these interventions proved successful.

Judge DeCastro thoroughly reviewed the evidence presented at the trial, made detailed findings as to each prong of N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1(a), and thereafter concluded the Division had met by clear and convincing evidence all of the legal requirements for an order of guardianship. The judge's opinion tracks the statutory requirements of N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1(a), accords with applicable case law, including In re Guardianship of K.H.O., 161 N.J. 337 (1999), In re Guardianship of D.M.H., 161 N.J. 365 (1999), and N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. A.W., 103 N.J. 591 (1986), and is more than amply supported by the record. N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. F.M., 211 N.J. 420, 448 (2012).

Affirmed.