NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

PER CURIAM.

Plaintiff William C. Buchanan ("Buchanan") appeals from an order entered by the Law Division on June 18, 2014, granting summary judgment in favor of defendants Jeffrey Leonard, Esq. ("Leonard"), and Morgan, Melhuish, Monaghan, Arvidson, Abrutyn & Lisowski ("Morgan, Melhuish"). We affirm.

I.

The relevant facts are set forth in our opinion in an earlier appeal in this case. Buchanan v. Leonard, 428 N.J.Super. 277, 280-84 (App. Div. 2012), certif. denied, 213 N.J. 534 (2013). As noted therein, Buchanan filed two Chapter 13 bankruptcy petitions on behalf of his clients, Earl Kerr and Sherri Kerr (the "Kerrs"). Id. at 280. The first petition was dismissed because the Kerrs' debts exceeded the limits for Chapter 13 filings by individuals. Ibid.

Before Buchanan filed the second petition, he wrote a letter dated August 21, 1993, to the Kerrs, advising that they should be filing a Chapter 11 petition rather than a petition under Chapter 13. Ibid. Buchanan told the Kerrs they would not be eligible to file a Chapter 13 petition if they treated a second mortgage held by William Wooden on their business property as "almost entirely unsecured[.]" Ibid.

In the letter, Buchanan stated that the Kerrs had declined his advice to retain an attorney with experience in the handling of Chapter 11 proceedings, and had directed him to file another Chapter 13 petition

The Kerrs later brought a legal malpractice claim against Buchanan, claiming that he had filed legally-deficient bankruptcy pleadings on their behalf and, as a result, they lost their residence and their business property. Ibid. Buchanan had a professional legal malpractice policy issued by Legion Insurance Company ("Legion"), which retained the Morgan Melhuish law firm to represent him in the Kerrs' lawsuit. Ibid. The firm assigned the matter to Leonard. Ibid. In 2003, Legion was declared insolvent, and the New Jersey Property-Liability Insurance Guaranty Association ("NJPLIGA") assumed responsibility for administering the Legion policy. Ibid.

In April 2005, Leonard completed and submitted a memorandum to NJPLIGA seeking authorization to settle the lawsuit. Id. at 283. In that document, Leonard noted the letter dated August 21, 1993, that Buchanan had written to the Kerrs. Ibid. Leonard stated that Buchanan had

A week before the trial in the Kerrs' legal malpractice action was scheduled to begin, NJPLIGA advised Buchanan that it was withdrawing coverage and would not defend him in the lawsuit. Ibid. NJPLIGA then filed a declaratory judgment in the Law Division, seeking a determination that it was not required to provide coverage to Buchanan. Ibid. The Law Division judge held, however, that Buchanan was entitled to coverage. Ibid.

Thereafter, Buchanan filed this lawsuit against defendants. Ibid.

Buchanan alleged that defendants were negligent in their representation of him in the Kerrs' lawsuit, and that led to the denial by NJPLIGA of coverage, causing him to file the declaratory judgment action to compel coverage. Id. at 284. Buchanan also asserted claims against defendants for breach of contract, breach of fiduciary duty, tortious interference with a contract, defamation and unjust enrichment. Ibid. In addition, Buchanan claimed that Morgan, Melhuish was negligent in its supervision of Leonard. Ibid.

The trial court granted defendants' motion for summary judgment, finding that all of Buchanan's claims failed as a matter of law because the statements in Leonard's settlement memorandum were covered by the litigation privilege. Ibid. The trial court also determined that Buchanan's defamation claim was time-barred because it had not been filed within one year of the alleged defamatory statement, as required by N.J.S.A. 2A:14-3. Ibid. Buchanan appealed. We affirmed the dismissal of the defamation claim. Id. at 285. However, we held that the trial court erred by finding that the litigation privilege barred Buchanan's legal malpractice claims. Id. at 285-88. We noted that, while Buchanan had asserted a variety of claims, they all appeared to be "restatements of his malpractice claim." Id. at 288. We also determined that Buchanan was required to present expert testimony to support his legal malpractice claim and should be afforded an opportunity to produce an expert report. Id. at 288-90.

II.

On remand, Buchanan produced an expert report from William Gannon, Esq. ("Gannon"). Gannon opined that when an insurer assigns an attorney to represent an insured, the interests of the insurer are subservient to those of the insured. Gannon stated that defense counsel's primary obligation is to the insured. Although the attorney should maintain contact with the insurer, that role is essentially administrative. Gannon asserted that an attorney has an obligation to be informed as to the exclusions under the policy providing coverage to the insured, and must be informed as to the bases upon which the insurer might disclaim coverage.

Gannon commented on the settlement memo that Leonard had submitted to NJPLIGA. He stated:

Defendants presented an expert report prepared by Stanley Fishman, Esq. ("Fishman"), who disputed Gannon's assertion that an attorney assigned by an insurer to represent an insured must be informed as to the bases upon which coverage might be denied. Fishman stated that Leonard did not have any reason to suspect that coverage would be denied under the Legion policy claiming Buchanan's conduct could be the basis of a fraud claim. Fishman noted that the Legion policy was unusual because coverage could be denied for any claims connected to fraud.

Fishman also disputed Gannon's view that Leonard should have worded his settlement memorandum differently if he felt compelled to comment on Buchanan's letter to the Kerrs. Fishman stated that he did not believe there was any legal authority for Gannon's view that a legal malpractice claim can turn on how a report to the insurer is worded. He also said that there was no support for Gannon's opinion that an attorney assigned by an insurance company to represent an insured owes a paramount duty of loyalty to the insured.

Fishman opined that, in this setting, a defense attorney's "most important obligation" is to his client, and not the insurance company. He said the most important part of that obligation is to keep the client "out of harm's way." He stated that, "[w]hen potential problems exist [if] the matter proceed[s] to trial, the defense attorney should attempt to obtain sufficient settlement authority from the insurance company so as to avoid a trial." Fishman wrote that this is "precisely what Leonard was attempting to do" in his settlement report.

Fishman went on to say:

The parties submitted a joint statement of material facts to the trial judge, along with a joint appendix of documents, the expert reports and deposition transcripts. They agreed to have the judge resolve the matter, sitting without a jury, on the papers.

Judge Thomas C. Miller thereafter filed a lengthy written opinion dated June 18, 2014. The judge rejected Buchanan's contention that Fishman's report should be disregarded as a net opinion. The judge found that Fishman's report was supported by the facts. The judge noted that insurance defense counsel has a duty of loyalty to the insured, but also has a duty to accurately and candidly report on the case to the insurance carrier. The judge stated that the attorney has a duty of loyalty to the insurer and the insured, although the primary duty is owed to the insured.

The judge found that the statements that Leonard made in the settlement memo he submitted to NJPLIGA were clearly relevant to the underlying action, and Leonard had a legitimate concern about Buchanan's credibility, as well as other adverse consequences he could face if the August 21, 1993 letter was produced at trial. The judge determined that the settlement memo was necessary so that Leonard could obtain authority to settle the matter in the best interests of Buchanan and the insurer.

Judge Miller noted that it was conceivable that if Leonard had not fully disclosed the weaknesses and pitfalls of the case, NJPLIGA may not have properly evaluated the case for settlement purposes, "thereby exposing Buchanan to significant financial or other liability." The judge rejected Buchanan's assertion that Leonard should have withheld those portions of his evaluation that reflected adversely upon Buchanan. The judge observed that this would have placed Leonard "in a position of being illogical, disingenuous and party to providing half-truths" to the insurer.

Judge Miller also found that Leonard could not reasonably have anticipated that NJPLIGA would withdraw coverage for Buchanan based on the statements in the settlement memo. The judge noted that Leonard had no reason to believe that "coverage issues were in play" because neither Legion nor NJPLIGA had issued a reservation-of-rights letter to Buchanan at any time. The judge noted that, when NJPLIGA informed Buchanan that it would no longer provide coverage, Leonard realized that he was in a "conflict position" and withdrew. The judge said that before this occurred, Leonard had no reason to expect there was a conflict.

The judge concluded that Buchanan had not established that Leonard deviated from the applicable standard of care and that his conduct was appropriate under the circumstances. The judge determined that Buchanan failed to prove that Leonard breached a duty of care owed to him, and for this reason, his legal malpractice claim failed. The judge entered an order on June 18, 2014, dismissing Buchanan's remaining claims. This appeal followed.

III.

On appeal, Buchanan argues: (1) it was plain error for the trial judge to fail to recognize that Leonard's statements in his settlement memo were a breach of fiduciary duty owed to him; (2) the judge's characterization of the Gannon report was inaccurate since that report was authoritative, insightful and addressed the issues presented with clarity; (3) the evidence does not support the judge's finding that Fishman thoroughly considered and analyzed the facts; and (4) the judge's decision is not supported by the weight of the evidence.

We are convinced that these arguments are without sufficient merit to warrant extended comment. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E). We affirm the judgment on appeal substantially for the reasons stated by Judge Miller in his thorough and well-reasoned written opinion. We add the following brief comments.

The standard of review that applies in this matter is well established. Findings of fact made by a trial judge sitting without a jury are binding on appeal if supported by sufficient credible evidence. Rova Farms Resort, Inc. v. Investors Ins. Co. of Am., 65 N.J. 474, 484 (1974) (citation omitted). We may not engage "in an independent assessment of the evidence as if [we] were the court of first instance." State v. Locurto, 157 N.J. 463, 471 (1999).

We are convinced from our review of the record that Judge Miller's findings of fact are supported by sufficient credible evidence. The record supports Judge Miller's determination that, although Leonard owed a duty to both Buchanan and the insurer, under the circumstances presented here, Leonard did not breach any duty owed to Buchanan.

As the judge found, Leonard had a duty to provide the insurer with a candid assessment of the merits of the underlying action in order to obtain authority to settle the matter. Had Leonard not done so, NJPLIGA may not have provided sufficient authority to settle the case, thereby exposing Buchanan to substantial liability and other adverse consequences. The record supports the judge's conclusion that Leonard's actions did not constitute legal malpractice.

We reject Buchanan's contention that the judge erred by considering Fishman's report. The report does not run afoul of the net opinion rule because Fishman did not merely provide a conclusion. See Davis v. Brickman Landscaping, Ltd., 219 N.J. 395, 410 (2014) (citing Pomerantz Paper Corp. v. New Cmty. Corp., 207 N.J. 344, 372 (2011)). Fishman explained the basis for his opinions, and his report has an adequate factual basis. Ibid. (quoting Pomerantz, supra, 207 N.J. at 372). We also reject Buchanan's assertion that the judge erroneously refused to credit Gannon's report. The judge properly considered the expert reports presented by both parties, and reasonably found that Fishman's opinions were more persuasive than those offered by Gannon.

Affirmed.