NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

PER CURIAM.

Defendant appeals from the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief (PCR) without an evidentiary hearing. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.

On March 7, 1994, defendant entered a guilty plea, pursuant to a negotiated plea agreement, to an amended charge of fourth-degree criminal sexual contact, N.J.S.A. 2C:14-3(b). Defendant was sentenced to a three-year probationary term and required to pay applicable fines. At the time of his plea, defendant was on parole in the state of Kansas.

Prior to entering the plea, defendant asserts his trial counsel advised him that he would not be held in violation of his parole in Kansas on a fourth degree conviction because it would be deemed a misdemeanor. However, defendant alleges his New Jersey conviction had a material effect on his Kansas parole status. Defendant claims, if he "had been aware that the State of Kansas would treat the [plea] as a felony instead of a misdemeanor, [he] would never have taken the plea agreement." Currently, defendant is incarcerated in Leavenworth, Kansas.

Defendant did not file a direct appeal from his conviction and sentence. On July 30, 2012, defendant filed a petition for PCR challenging his conviction, alleging his counsel provided him with ineffective legal representation by providing incorrect advice about the ramifications of his New Jersey guilty plea on his parole status in Kansas. In a written opinion, the PCR judge denied his petition as untimely pursuant to Rule 3:22-12(a).

On appeal, defendant presents the following issues for our consideration:

Defendant argues that the PCR court erred by concluding his petition was barred pursuant to Rule 3:22-12(a). We disagree. "`Post-conviction relief is New Jersey's analogue to the federal writ of habeas corpus.'" State v. Goodwin, 173 N.J. 583, 593 (2002) (quoting State v. Preciose, 129 N.J. 451, 459 (1992)). A defendant must bring a PCR petition within five years of the contested judgment or sentence, unless the petition alleges that the delay was due to the defendant's "excusable neglect," and there is a "reasonable probability" that a "fundamental injustice" would result if the petition's assertions were barred. R. 3:22-12(a)(1). Rule 1:1-2(a) further permits the court to disregard the five-year time bar when defendant demonstrates an injustice by a preponderance of the credible evidence. State v. Mitchell, 126 N.J. 565, 579 (1992). These exceptions are only applied in extraordinary circumstances. Id. at 577.

Demonstrating excusable neglect "encompasses more than simply providing a plausible explanation for a failure to file a timely PCR petition." State v. Norman, 405 N.J.Super. 149, 159 (App. Div. 2009). In determining whether a defendant has demonstrated excusable neglect, we "consider the extent and cause of the delay, the prejudice to the State, and the importance of the petitioner's claim in determining whether there has been an injustice sufficient to relax the time limits." State v. Milne, 178 N.J. 486, 492 (2004) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).

Here, defendant filed his PCR application on July 30, 2013, more than eighteen years after the entry of the judgment of conviction. Defendant alleges the five-year time bar should be waived because he demonstrated excusable neglect and a resulting fundamental injustice. Defendant claims inexperience and ignorance of the law prevented him from filing his PCR petition in a timely manner. He further alleges that, during his incarceration in Kansas, he was unable to access information regarding New Jersey law. However, "[i]gnorance of the law and rules of court does not qualify as excusable neglect." State v. Merola, 365 N.J.Super. 203, 218 (Law Div. 2002) (citing State v. Murray, 162 N.J. 240, 246 (2000)), aff'd o.b., 365 N.J.Super. 82, 84 (App. Div. 2003), certif. denied, 179 N.J. 312 (2004). Furthermore, the extent of the delay would likely prejudice the State by significantly diminishing the State's ability to present reliable evidence at trial. See Milne, supra, 178 N.J. at 492.

Defendant further alleges that the time bar should be waived because he was unaware of the impact of his guilty plea in New Jersey until notified by Kansas authorities. Although defendant does not provide a date in which he was aware of the implications of pleading guilty, State v. Tolen, No. 84,058 (Kan. App. Jan. 11, 2002) (slip op. at 9-11) evinces that he was aware his plea in New Jersey was deemed a felony in Kansas no later than January 2002.1 Defendant did not petition for PCR until more than ten years after January 2002, well outside the five-year time bar. See R. 3:22-12(a)(1).

The PCR judge correctly found that defendant's PCR petition was procedurally barred as untimely. Defendant has failed to show excusable neglect. When a PCR petition is properly determined to be untimely, an evidentiary hearing is not required. See State v. Marshall, 148 N.J. 89, 158 (1997) ("If the court perceives that holding an evidentiary hearing will not aid the court's analysis of whether the petitioner is entitled to post-conviction relief, . . . then an evidentiary hearing need not be granted." (citations omitted)).

Affirmed.