The opinion of the court was delivered by
SABATINO, P.J.A.D.
This automobile negligence case arises out of a rear-end collision on the Atlantic City Expressway. After a six-day trial, the jury found that defendant Ellen I. Hugelmeyer,
Defendant appeals the verdict and final judgment solely with respect to her liability to Mr. Gonzales,
Because of multiple errors that deprived defendant of a fair trial, we vacate the judgment as to Mr. Gonzales and order a new trial.
The evidence shows that at about 5:00 p.m. on April 22, 2008, Mr. Gonzales was driving his Lexus on the Atlantic City Expressway when he encountered congested traffic due to an accident. Mr. Gonzales drove from the far-right lane into the far-left lane of the three-lane highway. According to the testimony of an eyewitness, Stephanie Blount, the Lexus moved across the center lane in front of Hugelmeyer's car. After Gonzales needed to stop short, Hugelmeyer's Mazda struck his Lexus from behind, damaging its rear bumper and the Mazda's front bumper.
A State Trooper, Vaughn Crouthamel, responded to the scene. The Trooper interviewed
At trial, Mr. Gonzales testified that the accident had aggravated a pre-existing degenerative disc disease. His main testifying expert, Dr. John C. Baker, a Board-certified orthopedic surgeon, testified that he had arthritis dating back to 1998, and that the accident had greatly worsened his pre-existing disease, causing permanent spinal damage. Mr. Gonzales also presented testimony from Dr. Ira Greg Warshaw, his family physician from 2001 to 2008. Dr. Warshaw testified on direct examination that Mr. Gonzales had never commented on any back problems when treated by him. However, Dr. Warshaw conceded on cross-examination that he had treated Mr. Gonzales in 2006 for lower-leg pain and radiating cervical spine or neck pain, and in 2004 for cervical radiculopathy. Mr. Gonzales also presented videotaped testimony from a chiropractor, Dr. Michael Gerber, who had examined him at the behest of his insurer in connection with his claims for personal injury protection benefits. Based upon tests Dr. Gerber performed, he opined that the condition of Mr. Gonzales's neck and low back had been "exacerbated or aggravated" by the accident.
The defense presented testimony from Blount and Dr. John Cristini, a Board-certified orthopedic surgeon who had evaluated Mr. Gonzales. Hugelmeyer did not testify because she was living in a distant state and seven months pregnant. However, portions of her deposition testimony were read aloud to the jury.
As we have already noted, the jury found that Hugelmeyer was negligent but that Mr. Gonzales was not, and awarded substantial monetary damages to both Mr. Gonzales and Mrs. Gonzales. The trial judge denied Hugelmeyer's motion for a new trial or remittitur, and ordered fee-shifting pursuant to Rule 4:58. The judge declined to address defendant's constitutional challenge to the Offer of Judgment Rule.
This appeal ensued, which, as we have noted, is confined to the judgment obtained by Mr. Gonzales. Defendant argues that the trial judge erred in (1) allowing Trooper Crouthamel to present inadmissible lay opinion asserting that she was at fault in causing the accident, and also relied on hearsay statements from an unidentified witness he had interviewed at the accident scene; (2) excluding Dr. Warshaw's treatment office notes that would substantiate the severity of Mr. Gonzales's preexisting condition; (3) allowing the chiropractor, Dr. Gerber, to present expert opinions on permanency without proper qualifications and to discuss the hearsay findings of a non-testifying radiologist; (4) permitting this "verbal threshold" case brought under N.J.S.A. 39:6A-8(a) to go to the jury without appropriate objective evidence of aggravated injury; and (5) awarding fees and other funds to plaintiffs under the Offer of Judgment Rule.
For the reasons that follow, the first two claims of prejudicial error are meritorious. Singularly and cumulatively, they warrant a new trial.
Defendant rightly contends that she was unfairly prejudiced by two critical aspects of Trooper Crouthamel's testimony, which plaintiffs' counsel punctuated in his closing argument to the jury.
We first consider the Trooper's reference to hearsay statements by an unidentified eyewitness he interviewed at the accident scene. The Trooper could not recall the accident at trial with much detail and instead relied substantially on the accuracy of his written accident report. The report reflected that he had interviewed an eyewitness, who was not a passenger in either the Mazda or the Lexus.
The eyewitness statement, which plaintiffs
An even more troublesome aspect of the Trooper's testimony is the court's allowance, over objection, of his opinion that defendant was at fault in causing the accident. The first time this occurred, plaintiffs' counsel elicited the Trooper's opinions by asking him about the "contributing circumstances" for the collision:
By opining that Mr. Gonzales had no "contributing circumstances" and that defendant Hugelmeyer, by contrast, had the
Later in the Trooper's direct examination, Mr. Gonzales's counsel drew from him an even more explicit opinion of defendant's fault:
These opinions of fault were improperly elicited by Mr. Gonzales's counsel from the Trooper.
Moreover, the Trooper had no personal observation or recollection of the accident and his opinions thus failed the foundational requirements of Rule 701. The Supreme Court has instructed that "a police officer cannot provide an opinion at trial when that opinion is based primarily on the statements of eyewitnesses." Neno v. Clinton, 167 N.J. 573, 585, 772 A.2d 899 (2001). "Any other conclusion," the Court cautioned in Neno, "would allow an officer to subvert the prohibition against hearsay and pass along the essence of those hearsay statements to the jury even when the officer is not permitted to testify to the substance of the witness's statements under the hearsay rule." Id. at 585, 772 A.2d 899. That is exactly what happened here.
These errors were not harmless. Mr. Gonzales's counsel explicitly reminded
As we recently held in James v. Ruiz, 440 N.J.Super. 45, 72, 111 A.3d 123 (App.Div. 2015), trial counsel may not misuse hearsay or other inadmissible proof in summation by advocating to jurors that they treat such proof as a "tiebreaker" to resolve the competing positions of the parties.
Counsel apparently intended the term "tiebreaker" to refer to the unidentified eyewitness that the Trooper interviewed at the accident scene, who plaintiffs alleged was Blount. For the reasons we have already noted, the interviewee's out-of-court statement to the officer was inadmissible hearsay. Counsel should not have made substantive use of that statement in his summation. It was likewise improper for counsel to showcase the Trooper's inadmissible personal conclusion by advocating to the jurors that the Trooper "got the bottom line."
We cannot ignore these highly prejudicial circumstances and conclude with any confidence that the jurors were not swayed by the Trooper's improper testimony. A new trial is warranted.
Defendant is also entitled to a new trial because her trial attorney was wrongfully foreclosed from admitting into evidence notes from Mr. Gonzales's medical chart prepared by his regular family physician, Dr. Warshaw. The notes were admissible business records under N.J.R.E. 803(c)(6). See also Konop v. Rosen, 425 N.J.Super. 391, 405, 41 A.3d 773 (App.Div.2012) (recognizing that "routine" findings contained in patient medical records generally are admissible hearsay). Relevant statements made by Mr. Gonzales during those visits to his family physician were admissible statements by a party opponent, N.J.R.E. 803(b)(1), and also admissible as statements made to a medical provider for treatment or diagnosis under N.J.R.E. 803(c)(4). The records were highly relevant to substantiate Mr. Gonzales's pre-existing spinal injuries and condition.
In excluding these office notes, the trial judge broadly asserted they "do not come into evidence ... [b]ecause the jury has already heard [about] it" through the doctor's testimony. The judge cited no authority for this blanket proposition, and we have not been made aware of any. Although the court has the authority to exclude cumulative evidence under N.J.R.E. 403 where its probative value is "substantially outweighed" by countervailing factors, no such compelling showing in favor of exclusion is present here. The records would have provided the jurors with relevant, tangible proof that Mr. Gonzales had been suffering from serious spinal problems for many years. The defense should not have been forced to limit its evidence to the doctor's spoken testimony. The judge misapplied his discretion in excluding the notes. Because the degree of Mr. Gonzales's pre-existing condition was a critical disputed issue, the error was not harmless. This also mandates a new trial.
We turn to defendant's additional contention that Dr. Gerber, the chiropractor, improperly discussed in his testimony spondylosis, a condition which had been identified by a non-testifying radiologist who interpreted MRI studies of Mr. Gonzales's spine. The chiropractor was not shown to be qualified to interpret those studies himself. Absent such expertise, the complex hearsay opinions of a radiologist are not to be conveyed through a testifying chiropractor acting as a conduit. See Agha v. Feiner, 198 N.J. 50, 965 A.2d 141 (2009); James, supra, 440 N.J.Super. at 61-70, 111 A.3d 123; see also N.J.R.E. 808.
Mr. Gonzales's orthopedic expert, Dr. Baker, was clearly qualified to interpret the MRI studies and he commented on them in his own testimony. However, the chiropractor, Dr. Gerber, who was not shown to have such qualifications, should not have been likewise permitted to testify that his own opinions were specifically "based on ... [the absent radiologist's] MRI findings of spondylosis," if those findings were disputed. The testifying chiropractor went beyond "the bare fact that he considered the absent radiologist's report." James, supra, 440 N.J.Super. at 73 n. 17, 111 A.3d 123. Instead, Dr. Gerber passed over that line and "delv[ed] into" the MRI report's actual contents. Ibid.
We cannot tell from the record, including the phrasing of the questioning and testimony of the medical experts, whether the diagnosis of spondylosis for Mr. Gonzales was, in fact, disputed. The prohibition in N.J.R.E. 808 and case law on an expert's testimony about the complex hearsay opinions of a non-testifying expert does not apply if the opinion is undisputed. See N.J.R.E. 808; James, supra, 440 N.J.Super. at 63, 111 A.3d 123; see also Nowacki v. Community Med. Ctr., 279 N.J.Super. 276, 652 A.2d 758 (App.Div.), certif. denied, 141 N.J. 95, 660 A.2d 1194 (1995). Defense counsel did not object to this portion of Dr. Gerber's testimony at trial, which suggests that the defense was not disputing the spondylosis diagnosis. If there is no such dispute, then Dr. Gerber's reference to the hearsay finding was innocuous. On retrial, defense counsel shall clarify whether the MRI finding is indeed disputed and, if so, Dr. Gerber's videotaped testimony must be redacted accordingly.
The final judgment is vacated in its entirety, and the case is remanded for a new trial on liability and damages as to the claims of Mr. Gonzales.