NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

PER CURIAM.

Defendant Edgar Parada appeals from the August 28, 2013 order denying his petition for post-conviction relief (PCR) without an evidentiary hearing. We affirm.

After several days of surveillance by local police, Parada was arrested and charged with first-degree distribution of cocaine, N.J.S.A. 2C:35-5(a)(1), (b)(1) (count one), and second-degree employment of a juvenile in a drug distribution scheme, N.J.S.A. 2C:35-6 (count two). Parada was convicted of these charges following a jury trial before Judge Scott J. Moynihan. Defendant's motion for a new trial was denied and Parada was sentenced to fifteen years with six years of parole ineligibility on count one, and a concurrent eight-year sentence with five years of parole ineligibility on count two.

In November 2010, Parada's convictions and sentence were affirmed. State v. Parada, No. A-5605-07 (App. Div. Nov. 3, 2010). A PCR petition was filed by Parada pro se on March 10, 2011, and thereafter a brief was filed by assigned counsel. Parada asserted that his trial counsel was constitutionally ineffective in his failure to seek a severance of the trial,1 failure to object to references to Parada's pretrial incarceration and failing to seek disclosure of a certain witness as an informer.

The judge heard oral argument on Parada's petition and denied relief in a comprehensive oral decision rendered on August 28, 2013. He reviewed the evidence presented against Parada and the arguments made in support of his motion and determined that Parada had failed to make the requisite showing to be entitled to an evidentiary hearing. He further found that Parada had failed to prove that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel. This appeal followed.

Parada raises the following issue on appeal:

"Post-conviction relief is New Jersey's analogue to the federal writ of habeas corpus." State v. Preciose, 129 N.J. 451, 459 (1992). Under Rule 3:22-2(a), a criminal defendant is entitled to post-conviction relief if there was a "[s]ubstantial denial in the conviction proceedings of defendant's rights under the Constitution of the United States or the Constitution or laws of the State of New Jersey." "A petitioner must establish the right to such relief by a preponderance of the credible evidence." Preciose, supra, 129 N.J. at 459. "To sustain that burden, specific facts" that "provide the court with an adequate basis on which to rest its decision" must be articulated. State v. Mitchell, 126 N.J. 565, 579 (1992).

Claims of constitutionally ineffective assistance of counsel are well suited for post-conviction review. R. 3:22-4(a)(2); Preciose, supra, 129 N.J. at 460. In determining whether a defendant is entitled to such relief, New Jersey courts apply the test articulated by the United States Supreme Court in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 694, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2068, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674, 698 (1984), and United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 658-60, 104 S.Ct. 2039, 2046-47, 80 L. Ed. 2d 657, 667-68 (1984). Preciose, supra, 129 N.J. at 463; State v. Fritz, 105 N.J. 42, 58 (1987).

Under the first prong of the Strickland test, a "defendant must show that [defense] counsel's performance was deficient." Strickland, supra, 466 U.S. at 687, 104 S. Ct. at 2064, 80 L. Ed. 2d at 693. Under the second prong, a defendant must demonstrate "a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different." Id. at 694, 104 S. Ct. at 2068, 80 L. Ed. 2d at 698. A court reviewing a PCR petition based on ineffective assistance of counsel claims has the discretion to grant an evidentiary hearing only if a defendant establishes a prima facie showing in support of the requested relief. Preciose, supra, 129 N.J. at 462. The mere raising of a claim for PCR does not entitle the defendant to an evidentiary hearing. State v. Cummings, 321 N.J.Super. 154, 170 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 162 N.J. 199 (1999). When determining whether to grant an evidentiary hearing, the PCR court must consider the facts in the light most favorable to the defendant to determine if a defendant has established a prima facie claim. Preciose, supra, 129 N.J. at 462-63. It follows that a "defendant must allege specific facts and evidence supporting his allegations," State v. Porter, 216 N.J. 343, 355 (2013), and "do more than make bald assertions that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel." Cummings, supra, 321 N.J. Super. at 170. PCR petitions must be "accompanied by an affidavit or certification by defendant, or by others, setting forth with particularity the facts that he wished to present." State v. Jones, 219 N.J. 298, 312 (2014).

Parada's sole argument on appeal is that his trial counsel failed to object to this specific line of testimony during the prosecutor's cross-examination of a defense witness:

Parada contends that the reference to his incarceration is a violation of his due process rights under State v. Taplin, 230 N.J.Super. 95 (App. Div. 1988), and that his trial counsel's failure to object to the testimony2 is a prima facie case of ineffective assistance of counsel under Strickland. We disagree.

In his ruling the judge referenced Taplin, noting that "caution is warranted where the references [to incarceration] pertain to defendant's prior criminal involvement." He also cited to State v. Childs, 204 N.J.Super. 639 (App. Div. 1985). He paraphrased Childs for the proposition that "courts have declined to find a due process violation in cases involving brief, `vague' or `fleeting' references to the defendant's incarceration or criminal history" and that "[t]he Childs court found no error as a result of a passing reference to a defendant's incarcerated status." As in Childs, the judge noted that the reference to incarceration in this trial testimony is to an arrest for the offense before the court, not a reference to Parada's prior criminal history. He found it important that "[t]he jury already knew [Parada] was arrested in connection with this matter."

In finding that counsel's failure to object to this testimony at trial and on appeal did not fall below an objective standard of reasonableness under Strickland, the judge stated that the reference was cursory and the defense witness does not state that Parada is in custody. Finally, he noted that Parada "[c]an show no prejudice from the reference to his arrest. . . . No reference can be inferred to any other arrest."

We affirm substantially for the reasons expressed by Judge Moynihan. The questioning was for the purpose of eliciting testimony as to a specific conversation between Parada and a witness, the jury was aware that he had been arrested after the events and there was no reference to any prior criminal history. We find that the judge properly analyzed the two prong standard articulated in Strickland and his opinion was factually supported.

Affirmed.