NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
PER CURIAM.
In this post-judgment matrimonial action, defendant appeals from an August 4, 2014 order of the Family Part awarding her limited equitable distribution from plaintiff's deferred compensation and denying attorney's fees. We affirm.
We discern the following facts from the record. In 1993, after graduating from college, plaintiff obtained a job in the technology field. After a period of dissatisfaction with his job, plaintiff accepted a lower-paying position with International Biometrics Group (IBG) on November 1, 1999. IBG was a start-up biotechnology consulting firm which hired plaintiff to become its first employee. It is uncontroverted that plaintiff expended a great amount of time and effort on his career and the development of IBG. He regularly worked as many as 90 to 100 hours per week, and traveled between 30 to 40 percent of that time.
In May 2002, plaintiff had a discussion with his employers about his position with the company. The discussion led to a "Statement of Understanding" (the "Statement"), which stated that IBG recognized plaintiff's lower pay and significant contribution to the company, and that he would be justly compensated if IBG was ever sold. The Statement did not say how much plaintiff would be compensated or what would transpire if IBG were never sold.
Plaintiff met defendant in 2000. In 2002, the parties moved in together when defendant became pregnant with their daughter. The parties welcomed the news and discussed marriage, but decided to wait. The couple's daughter was born in January 2003.
The parties had a turbulent relationship for a long time. The record is replete with examples of angry confrontations including physical and verbal abuse, many of which concerned defendant's discontent about the amount of time plaintiff spent working and her intrusions into his work life. These episodes did not improve when the couple married on August 19, 2010.
After only fourteen months, plaintiff filed a divorce complaint on November 29, 2011. The parties were divorced on June 20, 2012 after entering into a comprehensive property settlement agreement which addressed alimony, child support, custody, and equitable distribution of property. Defendant immediately moved to Mississippi with the parties' daughter.
Approximately three months after the entry of the final judgment of divorce, IBG gave plaintiff a one-time closing bonus of $2.25 million when the company was purchased, pursuant to the Statement. On October 5, 2012, plaintiff deposited $200,000 of the bonus into a jointly-owned bank account, allegedly unaware that defendant still had access to the account. Defendant withdrew a total of $200,029.60 from that bank account.
Initially, plaintiff filed suit in Mississippi in order to reclaim the money withdrawn from the bank account. The case was transferred to New Jersey, where the Family Part conducted a bench trial in June and July 2014. On July 3, 2014, the Family Part judge issued an oral opinion and determined defendant should only receive a portion of plaintiff's bonus due to the fourteen-month period of the parties' formal marriage. The trial court considered the thirteen years during which plaintiff worked at IBG and considered the $2.25 million bonus on a monthly basis, dividing the total bonus by the number of months plaintiff worked at IBG to arrive at $14,423 per month of work. The Court then multiplied that monthly amount by the fourteen months of the parties' marriage to ascertain an appropriate figure for consideration of equitable distribution. The court determined that the after-tax amount of the equitable share of the bonus was roughly $101,960. The court determined that the asset was not secured by mutual effort, and in particular that rather than enhancing plaintiff's ability to earn, defendant jeopardized it through her conduct.
The court entered an order on August 4, 2014, awarding defendant $30,288 from plaintiff's deferred compensation and ordering defendant to return $169,712 to plaintiff with interest, if any had accrued on the bank account, within fifteen days. Both parties were ordered to pay their own attorneys' fees. This appeal followed.
On appeal, defendant contends that the trial court misapplied New Jersey case law by deciding that the period prior to the parties' marriage did not constitute a marital partnership, and that the court erred in the determination that defendant was only entitled to $30,288 of the $2.25 million deferred compensation from IBG. Defendant relies upon Weiss v. Weiss, 226 N.J.Super. 281, 287 (App. Div. 1998), certif. denied, 114 N.J. 287 (1988), and Berrie v. Berrie, 252 N.J.Super. 635, 646 (App. Div. 1991), for the proposition that when property is acquired in contemplation of marriage and the parties have adequately expressed their intention to create a marital partnership prior to the marriage ceremony, the property will be subject to equitable distribution. Defendant also argues that the trial court erred in the manner it valued the distribution asset; the manner in which the court distributed it; and that the court failed to make appropriate findings under N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23.1. We disagree and affirm for the reasons expressed by Judge Maureen Sogluizzo in her comprehensive oral decision. We add the following comments.
Appellate review of a trial court's findings of fact is limited, and "findings by the trial court are binding on appeal when supported by adequate, substantial, credible evidence." Cesare v. Cesare, 154 N.J. 394, 411-12 (1998) (citing Rova Farms Resort, Inc. v. Investors Ins. Co., 65 N.J. 474, 484 (1974)). "Because of the family courts' special jurisdiction and expertise in family matters, appellate courts should accord deference to family court fact-finding." Id. at 413.
"The trial court has discretion in allocating marital assets to the parties in equitable distribution." La Sala v. La Sala, 335 N.J.Super. 1, 6 (App. Div. 2000), certif. denied, 167 N.J. 630 (2001) (citing Borodinsky v. Borodinsky, 162 N.J.Super. 437, 443-44 (App. Div. 1978)). An appellate court affirms an equitable distribution ruling if "the trial court could reasonably have reached its result from the evidence presented, and the award is not distorted by legal or factual mistake." Ibid. However, "[a] trial court's interpretation of the law and the legal consequences that flow from established facts are not entitled to any special deference." Manalapan Realty v. Twp. Comm. of Manalapan, 140 N.J. 366, 378 (1995).
The purpose of "equitable distribution law . . . is at least in part an acknowledgment `that marriage is a shared enterprise, a joint undertaking, that in many ways it is akin to a partnership.'" Smith v. Smith, 72 N.J. 350, 361 (1976) (quoting Rothman v. Rothman, 65 N.J. 219, 229 (1974)). Family judges must conduct a three-prong analysis in determining the equitable distribution of marital assets; the court must: (1) "decide what specific property of each spouse is eligible for distribution[;]" (2) "determine its value for purposes of such distribution[;]" and (3) "decide how such allocation can most equitably be made." Rothman, supra, 65 N.J. at 232. The court must make an equitable allocation based on the factors set out in N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23.1.
Here, the record indicates that the trial judge analyzed all relevant evidence regarding the parties' relationship before rendering her decision. All of the parties' assets, including the home, were equally distributed. With regard to the bonus, the trial judge allocated only a portion of it after weighing all of the evidence, including: alimony and child support payments; the PSA's equal division of the shared assets; plaintiff's purchase of defendant's health insurance, the trailer home in Mississippi for defendant's mother, and a life insurance policy in defendant's name. Additionally, the judge noted that defendant would not receive an equal portion of the bonus because of her deliberate attempts to undermine plaintiff's employment. Although property subject to equitable distribution is allocated based on each party's respective contributions to the marriage, here the court determined that defendant did not substantially contribute to plaintiff earning the bonus. As Judge Sogluizzo noted, "[e]quitable distribution means what equitably did she bring to [the bonus], and I think it's pretty clear what I thought she brought to this asset. She brought very little." Thus, after weighing the credibility of the witnesses, there is adequate evidence for the judge to conclude that defendant did not contribute to the bonus in contemplation of the parties' marriage. Therefore, given the evidence in the record, the family judge did not abuse her discretion in determining that defendant's portion of the bonus is proportionate to the length of marriage.
Moreover, we note parenthetically that defendant entered into a property settlement agreement which addressed equitable distribution of the parties' assets and specifically waived her interest in any subsequently acquired property that may have arisen as a result of the marital relationship after the effective date of the agreement. Defendant knew that a bonus could occur sometime in the future and affirmatively waived her interest in any such asset. Under that theory, defendant would not have been entitled to any award of equitable distribution beyond what she had already received. Plaintiff has not asked us to disturb the award on that or any other basis.
Finally, defendant's challenge to the trial judge's decision to award counsel's fees is without sufficient merit to warrant discussion. See R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E). We also will not address defendant's arguments concerning alimony and child support because those issues were not raised before the trial court below. See Nieder v. Royal Indem. Ins. Co., 62 N.J. 229, 234-35 (1973).
Affirmed.
