NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

PER CURIAM.

In this matter, we review plaintiffs' challenges to the creation and implementation of the Camden County Police Department, which was contracted to provide law enforcement services to the City of Camden (Camden), contemporaneously with the layoff of Camden's police officers. Plaintiffs, the Fraternal Order of Police, Camden Lodge #1 (Camden FOP), Mark Willis,1 and the individually-named former officers of the Camden Police Department, appeal from a May 27, 2014 Law Division order denying plaintiffs' motion for partial summary judgment and granting the summary judgment dismissal requested by defendants, the County of Camden (the County) and Camden. Plaintiffs also appeal from an order denying reconsideration. Plaintiffs argue, as they did before the Law Division, that defendants lacked statutory authority to execute agreements establishing and hiring the Camden County Police Department (CCPD) to perform police services solely for Camden. Plaintiffs also maintain the termination of all uniformed officers, who previously comprised Camden's city police department, was illegal and violated the Uniform Shared Services and Consolidation Act (the Act), N.J.S.A. 40A:65-1 to-35. We have considered the arguments advanced on appeal, in light of the record and the applicable law. We affirm.

The relevant facts are taken from the summary judgment record, which we view in a light most favorable to plaintiffs, the non-moving party. Davis v. Brickman Landscaping, Ltd., 219 N.J. 395, 405-06 (2014).

On August 9, 2011, Camden adopted Resolution MC-11:1911, authorizing a "Memorandum of Understanding" (MOU) with the State Department of Community Affairs and the County to "prepare a plan for the creation of the Camden County Police Department." The three-page MOU, executed by Camden, the County, and the State on August 25, 2011, cited "extraordinary financial pressures due to increasing costs and a struggling economy," as motivating the parties "to work collaboratively and share necessary information in furtherance of this effort[.]"

The proposed CCPD developed a centralized management structure and offered an effective and economical alternative to providing necessary police services to participating County municipalities. The stated goal was to "reduc[e] the overall cost of providing improved police protection to each member municipality, putting more officers on the streets and allocating resources more efficiently." It is undisputed Camden was the first and, to date, the only participating municipality contracting with the CCPD.

On September 26, 2011, the County proposed a draft plan to address Camden's "policing needs as part of the countywide force." With the aid of former Philadelphia Police Commissioner John Timoney, the plan created the Metro Division of the CCPD to provide for Camden's public safety and law enforcement. The plan also delineated the CCPD's organizational structure, command hierarchy, essential functions, and provided police services, staffing projections, and anticipated costs.

Camden adopted a second resolution on December 27, 2011. Resolution MC-11:2182 supported Camden's immediate implementation of a contract with the CCPD to hire the CCPD Metro Division to provide police services and contemporaneously dissolve the Camden Police Department.2

The County's Board of Chosen Freeholders (Board) adopted a January 26, 2012 resolution authorizing continued efforts to establish the CCPD, including the Metro Division, citing as authority N.J.S.A. 40A:14-106. The County next requested the New Jersey Civil Service Commission (Commission)3 approve its proposed pilot program, waiving civil service requirements and procedures for the selection and appointment of CCPD's personnel, including officers and administrative positions.4 The County expressed a need for "up to 420 new police officers and a sufficient number of related civilian personnel . . . to immediately address the staffing needs for the [CCPD]." Supervisory and non-supervisory candidates were sought from the ranks of existing County municipal police officers, Special Reemployment Lists of municipalities within the County, Police Training Commission certified eligible police officers, candidates on the Statewide Eligible List, and applicants responding to advertisements directed at current law enforcement officers. The Commission approved the County's application on October 3, 2012.

Thereafter, Camden Mayor Dana Redd notified the Commission that Camden could "no longer sustain the costs of maintaining necessary levels of police services and intend[ed] to layoff all the uniformed members of the Police Department" by April 15, 2013. Camden proposed to contract with the CCPD to provide city police services. Approval was issued on December 27, 2012, after the Commission determined Camden's request was "in substantial compliance with the provisions of N.J.A.C. 4A:8-1.4. . . ." The layoff plan was ratified by Camden Resolution MC-13-2859 on January 4, 2013.

On January 17, 2013, the Board formally established the CCPD. Simultaneously, the Board adopted a resolution accepting a grant agreement with the State to obtain the start-up funds necessary for this effort. The agreement provided a $5.5 million advance, contingent on Camden and the County entering "into a Shared Service Agreement for the provision of police services within one year from the date of execution of th[e] Agreement. . . ." CCPD began hiring personnel, including officers to staff the Metro Division. The County stated it would employ up to 49% of qualified former members of Camden's Police Department.5

CCPD Metro Division officers began patrolling Camden in April 2013. In accordance with Camden's approved plan, all uniformed members of the Camden Police Department were laid off by April 30, 2013. The next day, Camden adopted resolutions approving a "Police Services Contract," and a "Metro Police Agreement" with the County, which detailed the contractual obligations of the parties, including the scope of services to be provided by the CCPD's Metro Division within Camden and

Camden's payment obligation for delineated police services. Further, the Police Services Agreement licensed Camden's "Eyes-in-the-Sky System" to the County, and leased Camden police vehicles, equipment, the Police Administrative Building, and the outdoor firing range to the County for a nominal annual payment, during the term of the agreement.

Prior to these events, plaintiffs filed a second verified complaint and action in lieu of prerogative writs against defendants. They renewed their request to enjoin defendants "from pursing or engaging in any action . . . for purposes of providing police services to and serving as the police department within [Camden] . . . [,]" which the court denied. Plaintiffs amended their complaint to allege defendants lacked statutory authority to establish the CCPD and that the execution of the Police Services Agreement and Metro Police Agreement violated the Act. In addition to actual damages, plaintiffs sought a declaratory judgment proclaiming the agreements "void and invalid," a permanent injunction preventing performance of police services under the agreements, or alternatively, compliance with the Act, including reinstatement of all former uniformed officers employed by Camden.

During a status conference, the Law Division judge determined no disputed material facts existed, obviating the need for discovery. Both sides agreed to file summary judgment motions. The County and Camden filed individual motions and plaintiffs filed their cross-motion for partial summary judgment. Reviewing the lengthy summary judgment record and conducting oral argument on May 9, 2014, the judge considered and denied each of plaintiffs' requests and granted defendants' motions for summary judgment dismissal of the complaint. An order memorializing these decisions was entered on May 27, 2014. Plaintiffs sought reconsideration, which was also denied.6 This appeal followed.

We review a determination granting or denying summary judgment de novo and apply the standard set forth in Rule 4:46-2(c), which guides the trial court. Davis, supra, 219 N.J. at 405-06. Thus, we consider, "`whether the competent evidential materials presented, when viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, are sufficient to permit a rational factfinder to resolve the alleged disputed issue in favor of the non-moving party.'" Id. at 406 (quoting Brill v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 142 N.J. 520, 540 (1995)).

"The very object of the summary judgment procedure . . . is to separate real issues from issues about which there is no serious dispute." Shelcusky v. Garjulio, 172 N.J. 185, 200-01 (2002). Importantly, a motion for summary judgment will not be defeated by unsupported conclusions. Petersen v. Twp. of Raritan, 418 N.J.Super. 125, 132 (App. Div. 2011). Nor will self-serving statements, Heyert v. Taddese, 431 N.J.Super. 388, 413-14 (App. Div. 2013), or disputed facts "of an insubstantial nature" be sufficient. Pressler & Verniero, Current N.J. Court Rules, cmt. 2.1 on R. 4:46-2 (2015).

Convinced "there is no genuine issue of material fact, we must then decide whether the trial court correctly interpreted the law." DepoLink Court Reporting & Litig. Support Servs. v. Rochman, 430 N.J.Super. 325, 333 (App. Div. 2013) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). See also Brill, supra, 142 N.J. at 540 ("[W]hen the evidence is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law, the trial court should not hesitate to grant summary judgment.") (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). In our plenary review of legal issues, such as the interpretation and meaning of a statute, as is presented in this matter, we accord no deference to the trial judge's conclusions. Nicholas v. Mynster, 213 N.J. 463, 478 (2013).

Prior to addressing plaintiffs' challenges, we recite the statutes relied upon by defendants as authority for the County's formation of the CCPD and Camden's right to contract for police services. Although plaintiffs concede the statutory scheme set forth in N.J.S.A. 40A:14-106, 106.1, and 107 confers general authority to establish a county police force, they maintain the County exceeded the scope of this authority when it formed the CCPD as designed solely to serve "a single municipality for a fee."

The Legislature adopted N.J.S.A. 40A:14-106 in 1971. L. 1971, c. 197, § 1. The current statute states:

Once established, county police are authorized to enforce "[a]ll rules and regulations" found in Title 2C (criminal) and Title 39 (motor vehicles and traffic regulation). N.J.S.A. 40A:14-107(2), (3). Toward this objective, N.J.S.A. 40A:14-107 specifies:

The scope of authority for more populous counties was expanded in 1978, by the adoption of N.J.S.A. 40A:14-106.1, L. 1978, c. 69, § 2, which added: "The governing body of any first or second class county may, by ordinance or resolution, as appropriate, provide that the county police department and force shall have general authority, without limitation, to exercise police powers and duties as generally provided by law for police officers and law enforcement officers." The County here is a second class county.

Plaintiffs' arguments on appeal match those presented before the Law Division. Plaintiffs assert any county police force must initially be established to patrol county roads as provided by N.J.S.A. 40A:14-106. Only then may the county police force expand to provide more comprehensive police services, as authorized by N.J.S.A. 40A:14-106.1. Plaintiffs contend the CCPD was established solely to avoid the collective negotiation process with the officers of the Camden Police Department and to replace Camden's police force, a purpose not authorized by N.J.S.A. 40A:14-106. Consequently, plaintiffs argue the Law Division erroneously granted defendants' summary judgment motions and denied plaintiffs' request for reconsideration.

The County counters asserting its creation of the CCPD complied with the letter and intent of all applicable statutory provisions. It also refutes any suggestion the County established the CCPD solely to provide police services to Camden, noting any county municipality may participate to receive offered police services. The County adds that only the Metro Division provides police services to Camden, not the entire CCPD.

"`Our task in statutory interpretation is to determine and effectuate the Legislature's intent[,]'" examining the language used and statutory objectives to be achieved. Redd v. Bowman, ___ N.J. ___, ___, (slip op. at 19) (2015) (quoting Bosland v. Warnock Dodge, Inc., 197 N.J. 543, 553 (2009)). See also N.J.S.A. 1:1-1 ("In the construction of . . . statutes[,] . . . words and phrases shall be read and construed with their context, and shall, unless inconsistent with the manifest intent of the [L]egislature[,] . . . be given their generally accepted meaning, according to the approved usage of the language.").

"`Construction of any statute necessarily begins with consideration of its plain language.'" Mun. Council v. James, 183 N.J. 361, 370 (2005) (quoting Merin v. Maglaki, 126 N.J. 430, 434 (1992)). We give plainly written statutes their "ordinary meaning, absent a legislative intent to the contrary[,]" with the understanding the language must be construed "in a fashion consistent with the statutory context in which it appears." Ibid. (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). See also Shelton v. Restaurant.com, Inc., 214 N.J. 419, 428-29 (2013). The Supreme Court has instructed:

Although Camden's willingness to participate in a countywide police force, were one available, helped ignite the CCPD's creation, we cannot reach the conclusion drawn by plaintiffs that the CCPD was created solely to replace the Camden Police Department as part of an effort to avoid collective negotiation with Camden's police officers. Such a claim is belied by the originating documents.

The "Resolution Authorizing the Establishment of a Camden County Police Department" recognized "a regional approach to policing could offer the various municipalities within the County who wish to participate . . . a safer, more effective and more efficient means of addressing public safety. . . ." Thus, all County municipalities desirous of taking advantage of the economic efficiencies of a regional police force offered by the CCPD may become members. The force is not geographically limited to Camden and its staffing was open to each of the County's thirty-seven municipalities. Simply because Camden was the first and sole participating municipality to engage the fledging CCPD at the time of suit does not demonstrate the CCPD was created solely to replace Camden's force.

Further, construing N.J.S.A. 40A:14-106, -106.1 and -107 as "a harmonious whole," In re Referendum, supra, 201 N.J. at 359, we disagree with plaintiffs' statutory interpretation that N.J.S.A. 40A:14-106.1 is circumscribed by N.J.S.A. 40A:14-106. The statute does not demand, as plaintiffs insist, a county police force designed to enforce laws on county roads must exist prior to the exercise of expanded police authority granted by N.J.S.A. 40A:14-106.1. Accordingly, we reject, as lacking merit, plaintiffs' challenge to the County's authority to form the CCPD and its Metro Division.

County police officers are granted (1) not only the broad "authority to arrest for the commission of any crime anywhere in the county of their appointment" along with "full authority to arrest for any crimes committed in their presence . . . within the territorial limits of the State of New Jersey[,]" N.J.S.A. 40A:14-107, but also are afforded (2) the broader "general authority, without limitation, to exercise police powers and duties as generally provided by law for police officers and law enforcement officers," reserved to first and second class counties, set forth in N.J.S.A. 40A:14-106.1.

The Legislature's intent to grant first and second class county police department's general policing authority is found in a related statutory section governing training for county police officers. N.J.S.A. 40A:14-106.2 reads: "[a]ll county police departments granted general authority [shall] provide the same training for their officers as is provided for regular municipal police officers, and no county police officer shall operate under a grant of general authority unless and until he [or she] has received such training." In this regard, county police officers acting in the expanded service role provided by N.J.S.A. 40A:14-106.1 are trained like any other municipal police officer. N.J.S.A. 40A:14-106.2.

Further, we find the statutory language of N.J.S.A. 40A:14-106.1 unambiguous and the Legislature's intention in amending the statute clear. "`It is not the function of the [c]ourt to rewrite a plainly-written enactment of the Legislature . . . or presume that the Legislature intended something other than that expressed by way of the plain language.'" State v. Froland, 193 N.J. 186, 193 (2007) (brackets omitted) (quoting DiProspero, supra, 183 N.J. at 493).

We reject plaintiffs' position arguing N.J.S.A. 40A:14-106.1 must be read as limiting a county police force's parameters of authority to county roads and highways under N.J.S.A. 40A:14-106. We conclude the Law Division judge properly entered summary judgment on this issue. For the reasons stated, we additionally reject, as unavailing, plaintiffs' contention the County exceeded its authority by establishing the CCPD solely for the purpose of providing policing services to Camden.

Plaintiffs next maintain the Police Services Agreement and Metro Police Agreement provided the CCPD's sole police services were for Camden and not throughout the County; therefore, the relationship between these two governing bodies must conform to the requirements of the Act, which in turn requires all Camden officers be transferred as members of the new CCPD force. Effectively, plaintiffs maintain defendants entered into a shared services plan, but failed to preserve the employment rights of Camden's uniformed law enforcement officers mandated by the Act in N.J.S.A. 40A:65-8(a), or otherwise to provide a reconciliation plan for review by the Commission, N.J.S.A. 40A:65-11(a). As such, plaintiffs contend the agreements must be set aside as void.

The Act, adopted in 2007, L. 2007, c. 63, was designed "to effectuate agreements between local units for any service or circumstance intended to reduce property taxes through the reduction of local expenses." N.J.S.A. 40A:65-2(c). The Legislature's finding and conclusion state an intent to promote shared services agreements and the new Act was designed to encourage such arrangements. N.J.S.A. 40A:65-2(b).

Local units that enter into a shared service agreement must file their plan "with the Division of Local Government Services in the Department of Community Affairs[.]" N.J.S.A. 40A:65-4(b). Authority to enter into a shared services agreement as described in N.J.S.A. 40A:65-4 may be adopted by resolution. N.J.S.A. 40A:65-5(a).

Specifically directed to law enforcement services, N.J.S.A. 40A:65-8(a) provides, in pertinent part:

Under this section, a shared services arrangement affords protection by preserving employment rights of officers currently employed by each participating entity, which are merged into one law enforcement body. The two local unit entities continue to exist after their execution of a shared services agreement merges some or all of their services.

Plaintiffs seek to conflate the creation of the CCPD and the lay-off of Camden's police force, suggesting the Camden Police Department effectively merged into the CCPD under a shared services agreement. To support this, plaintiffs argue the CCPD Metro Division officers worked side-by-side with Camden Police Department officers for three months. Also, they identify language in the MOU and the State Department of Community Affairs grant referencing a "shared services agreement."

First and foremost, plaintiffs' argument cannot be sustained because the County and Camden did not execute a shared services agreement. We recognize the initial proposals between the County and Camden mentioned utilizing a shared services arrangement. However, the references did not cite the Act, and based on the final agreements, it is clear the agreements ultimately adopted do not support an intent to merge resources or pool law enforcement personnel between the County and Camden, which is essential to triggering the provisions of the Act. Rather, Camden contracted to engage the CCPD to provide law enforcement services after its uniformed force was dissolved.

Second, even though the Law Division was incorrect in finding Camden's police force was laid off before CCPD officers began working in the city, the jurisdiction of the CCPD under N.J.S.A. 40A:14-106.1 permitted general policing in Camden. The County argues CCPD's policing efforts in Camden, prior to the final layoff of all uniformed Camden Police Department officers, was in keeping with the Board's resolutions establishing the CCPD's broad exercise of authority for a class two county under N.J.S.A. 40A:14-106.1. This position is supported by the record.

The resolutions to formally disband and dissolve Camden's police force were adopted before the CCPD was officially formed, well before officers began working in the city. Once the Commission approved Camden's plan in late December 2012, the city commenced police layoffs. Importantly, no Camden Police Department officers were employed by Camden when the Mayor executed the Police Services Agreement. By that time, the Camden police force ceased to exist. Because CCPD officers had authority to provide services throughout the County, we cannot conclude their limited presence in Camden prior to final layoff of all Camden police officers amounts to a shared services agreement as defined by N.J.S.A. 40A:65-4. Accordingly, we reject plaintiffs' arguments seeking to apply N.J.S.A. 40A:65-8 or-11.

Also, we find the State's involvement in the creation of the CCPD and dissolution of the Camden police force significant. The State Department of Community Affairs worked with defendants when they were evaluating whether to establish a county police force and provided grant money for the establishing of the force. That same agency was also vested with the authority to review any shared services agreements under the Act. N.J.S.A. 40A:65-4(b). The State Department of Community Affairs did not find the proposal flawed. Similarly, the Commission, which considered the County's pilot plan seeking waiver of civil services requirements to hire CCPD officers and Camden's lay off proposal, is the entity designated to approve an employment reconciliation plan when local units merge services under an agreement authorized by the Act. N.J.S.A. 40A:65-11(a). After reviewing the County's plan for the CCPD and Camden's plan to disband its police force, the Commission could have rejected these proposals upon a finding they represented an attempt to circumvent the established rights of affected civil service employees. Instead, the proposals were approved and not found to be a disguised attempt to create a shared services arrangement, unburdened by civil service obligations.

Next, plaintiffs contend CCPD officers worked in Camden, using Camden's facilities and equipment, prior to the layoff of Camden's last officer. We, like the motion judge, are not persuaded.

Although the Police Services Agreement allowed the CCPD to lease and use Camden's "Eyes-in-the-Sky System" while retaining its own use of this system for general public safety, we agree with the Law Division judge who found use of resources or equipment is not equivalent to merging personnel. When Camden used the system, it was not performing functions for the benefit of the CCPD and vice versa. Camden leased or transferred other facilities, equipment, and vehicles to the CCPD simply because Camden no longer had an immediate need for them. The documents at issue do not support evidence of a joint undertaking by way of shared services or joint meeting.7 No simultaneous policing services were provided and no Camden personnel manned the facilities or equipment. Thus, the use, lease, or sale of equipment cannot be viewed as the functional equivalent of performing services. We conclude no basis exists to trigger the need for a reconciliation plan or an employment preservation of security plan under the Act. N.J.S.A. 40A:65-8(a); N.J.S.A. 40A:65-11.

Plaintiffs also mentioned before the trial judge and emphasized during oral argument before us an additional procedural argument. They assert Camden's use of a resolution was unenforceable in light of N.J.S.A. 40A:65-8's use of the word "ordinance," when addressing a shared services agreement for law enforcement services. Plaintiffs admit in their brief a shared services agreement is adopted by resolution. N.J.S.A. 40A:65-5(a). However, as noted, the issue is not a concern because we conclude no shared services agreement was in place; Camden's contract for CCPD services was not executed until the Camden Police Department ceased to exist. Plaintiffs' contention that there is no other arrangement for Camden to contract with the CCPD is incorrect. The CCPD has authority to provide full police services to participating municipalities as permitted by N.J.S.A. 40A:14-106.1.

Plaintiffs' requests for reinstatement with back pay and benefits and other equitable relief are predicated upon establishing defendants violated the Act. For the reasons stated rejecting plaintiffs' statutory interpretation arguments, defendants have no concomitant liability for such claims.

Finally, we determine no error is raised in denying plaintiffs' motion for reconsideration. Plaintiffs assert they "provided the trial court with additional evidence contesting the factual conclusions relied upon" by the judge entering summary judgment. Plaintiffs also argue they were entitled to discovery to flesh out "the purpose and intent of the County force, the geographic limits of the County force's policing, whether the City . . . Police Department was ever abolished and whether there was actually a merger of departments with the County. . . ." These arguments are unavailing.

Reconsideration rests "within the sound discretion of the [c]ourt, to be exercised in the interest of justice[]" and "utilized only for those cases which fall into that narrow corridor in which either 1) the [c]ourt has expressed its decision based upon a palpably incorrect or irrational basis, or 2) it is obvious that the [c]ourt either did not consider, or failed to appreciate the significance of probative, competent evidence." D'Atria v. D'Atria, 242 N.J.Super. 392, 401 (Ch. Div. 1990). See also Cummings v. Bahr, 295 N.J.Super. 374, 384 (App. Div. 1996). Governed by Rule 4:49-2, a movant must "state with specificity the basis on which [reconsideration] is made, including a statement of the matters or controlling decisions which counsel believes the court has overlooked or as to which it has erred. . . ."

We have previously dispelled plaintiffs' contention that summary judgment and denial of reconsideration were "palpably incorrect," limiting consideration to plaintiffs' request for additional discovery. Plaintiffs suggest the provisions in the 2014 proposed Camden budget identify expenses for a police department, requiring discovery to develop further facts, which may in turn lead to disputed material evidence. Plaintiffs identify Camden's retention of civilian employees for non-armed police services, contending they remain part of Camden's police department, and also suggest the failure to amend Camden's organizational chart "which continues to identify `police' within its organization," suggests the police force remains in existence. We disagree.

The municipal resolutions and Police Services Agreement unequivocally reflect the dissolution of Camden's police force as approved by the Commission. The budget areas identified by plaintiffs do not suggest existence of a police department. Further discovery on these areas is not material and insufficient to defeat summary judgment.

In summary, we affirm the grant of summary judgment to defendants and the dismissal of plaintiffs' complaint. The plain language of the applicable statutes demonstrate the County possessed broad authority to establish the CCPD, which was authorized to exercise general policing powers. N.J.S.A. 40A:14-106, -106.1. Also, in the context of this matter, the Act applies to circumstances involving two local units contracting the merger of police service resources and protects employment rights of law enforcement officers employed by both entities at the time the contract is executed. The facts establish all Camden police officers were officially terminated prior to Camden's execution of the contract with the County for the CCPD Metro Division to provide police services for Camden.

We also affirm the denial of reconsideration, finding the motion judge's conclusions were not palpably unreasonable. We reject, as unfounded, plaintiffs' claim the motion judge failed to appreciate probative, competent evidence found in the record or improperly denied discovery because reasonably discoverable evidence, which would have created a material dispute of facts, was available. No substantial factual disputes precluded consideration of summary judgment. As such, summary judgment was correctly entered.

Affirmed.